Re: The future of security (bulk reply, long)

2004-05-25 Thread Joseph Ashwood
I've moved this to the top because I feel it is the most important statement that can be made Hadmut said : Security doesn't necessarily mean cryptography. - Original Message - From: Hadmut Danisch [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: The future of security On Mon, Apr 26, 2004 at

Re: Bank transfer via quantum crypto

2004-05-25 Thread Ivan Krstic
Apologies for the late response. Finals have a knack for keeping me away from the keyboard. Ian Grigg wrote: You are looking at QC from a scientific perspective. What is happening is not scientific, but business. [Points 1..7 snipped] Hence, quantum cryptogtaphy. Cryptographers and engineers

Re: Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities?

2004-05-25 Thread Enzo Michelangeli
- Original Message - From: Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2004 12:44 PM Subject: Re: Can Skype be wiretapped by the authorities? [...] BUT, unfortunately, the implementation is closed source, so there are no guarantees that the software is not GAKked. Also no

Re: Brands' private credentials

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Wed, Apr 28, 2004 at 07:54:50PM +, Jason Holt wrote: Last I heard, Brands started a company called Credentica, which seems to only have a placeholder page (although it does have an info@ address). I also heard that his credential system was never implemented, It was implemented at

chaum's patent expiry? (Re: Brands' private credentials)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
Oh yes, my other comment I forgot to mention was that if non-patent status were a consideration, aside from Wagner's approach, another approach for which the patent will presently expire is Chaum's original approach combined with Niels Ferguson's single term offline coins. (Don't have citation

Re: Brands' private credentials

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
[copied to cpunks as cryptography seems to have a multi-week lag these days]. OK, now having read: http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/HiddenCredentials.html http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/pubs/wpes03.pdf and seeing that it is a completely different proposal essentially being an application of IBE, and extension

Re: chaum's patent expiry? (Re: Brands' private credentials)

2004-05-25 Thread Jason Holt
On Sun, 9 May 2004, Adam Back wrote: Anyone have to hand the expiry date on Chaum's patent? (Think it is in patent section of AC for example; perhaps HAC also). I think it's June 2005. Actually, now that you mention Chaum, I'll have to look into blind signatures with the BF IBE (issuing is

Re: Brands' private credentials

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 02:42:04AM +, Jason Holt wrote: However can't one achieve the same thing with encryption: eg an SSL connection and conventional authentication? How would you use SSL to prove fulfillment without revealing how? You could get the CA to issue you a patient or

blinding BF IBE CA assisted credential system (Re: chaum's patent expiry?)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 03:03:56AM +, Jason Holt wrote: [...] Actually, now that you mention Chaum, I'll have to look into blind signatures with the BF IBE (issuing is just a scalar*point multiply on a curve). I think you mean so that the CA/IBE server even though he learns pseudonyms

Accoustic Cryptoanalysis for RSA?

2004-05-25 Thread Dave Howe
opinions? http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

more hiddencredentials comments (Re: Brands' private credentials)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 08:02:12PM +, Jason Holt wrote: Adam Back wrote: [...] However the server could mark the encrypted values by encoding different challenge response values in each of them, right? Yep, that'd be a problem in that case. In the most recent (unpublished) paper, I

Re: blinding BF IBE CA assisted credential system (Re: chaum's patent expiry?)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
But if I understand that is only half of the picture. The recipient's IBE CA will still be able to decrypt, tho the sender's IBE CA may not as he does not have ability to compute pseudonym private keys for the other IBE CA. If you make it PFS, then that changes to the recipient's IBE CA can get

Looking for mirror (or: better) sites to host my crypto/security lectures

2004-05-25 Thread Amir Herzberg
I keep the foils of my courses `intro to applied crypto` and `intro to secure communication and commerce` online at http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/book.html. Total of about 15 topics, each covered by pretty extensive set of foils (planned for between one and four 2-hour sessions for each

RSA founders give perspective on cryptography

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.computerworld.com.au/pp.php?id=1406778897fp=16fpid=0 Wednesday, 12th May 2004 Computerworld - The Voice of IT Management RSA founders give perspective on cryptography M.E. Kabay, Network World 11/05/2004 08:43:53 The famous cryptographers Leonard Adleman, Ronald Rivest, and Adi

[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Security Analysis of Protocols

2004-05-25 Thread Linda Casals
* DIMACS Workshop on Security Analysis of Protocols June 7 - 9, 2004 DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: John Mitchell, Stanford, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ran Canetti, IBM Watson, [EMAIL

Re: who goes 1st problem

2004-05-25 Thread Jason Holt
[Adam and I are taking this discussion off-list to spare your inboxes, but this message seemed particularly relevant. Perhaps we'll come back later if we come up with anything we think will be of general interest.] -J On Tue, 11 May 2004, Adam Back

Re: The future of security

2004-05-25 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 8:21 PM +0100 4/26/04, Graeme Burnett wrote: Hello folks, I am doing a presentation on the future of security, which of course includes a component on cryptography. That will be given at this conference on payments systems and security: http://www.enhyper.com/paysec/ Would anyone there have any

New puzzle for war code breakers

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/uk_news/england/staffordshire/3703191.stm The BBC Tuesday, 11 May, 2004, 09:50 GMT 10:50 UK New puzzle for war code breakers Experts from Bletchley Park are trying to crack a 250-year-old code rumoured to point the way to the Holy Grail. Specialists from the

Problem solved - NetBSD kernel's DES implementation broken

2004-05-25 Thread VaX#n8
Nevermind my previous message. The NetBSD kernel's des_set_key is hosed. The key schedule is not correctly written to, and subkeys are left uninitialized. It appears that someone changed the key schedule organization and didn't change the code that rights to it. (They added the weak_key field

CAs for spies?

2004-05-25 Thread Steve Bellovin
Have you ever wondered what CA a spy agency would trust? In the case of the Mossad, it's Thawte. Go to http://www.mossad.gov.il/Mohr/MohrTopNav/MohrEnglish/MohrAboutUs/ and click Contact Us or Application Form. You'll get an SSL-protected connection, with a 1024-bit RSA key (with MD5) in a

Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key server

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 21:26:31 -0600 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key server To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Subscribe: http://ls.fstc.org/subscribe, mailto:[EMAIL

Mutual Funds - Timestamping

2004-05-25 Thread Ian Grigg
Original Message http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000141.html In a rare arisal of a useful use of cryptography in real life, the mutual funds industry is looking to digital timestamping to

EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2004/0517euseeks.html Network World Fusion EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon By Philip Willan IDG News Service, 05/17/04 The European Union is to invest ¤11 million ($13 million) over the next four years to develop a secure communication system

[Publicity-list]: DIMACS Workshop on Usable Privacy and Security Software

2004-05-25 Thread Linda Casals
* DIMACS Workshop on Usable Privacy and Security Software July 7 - 8, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Lorrie Cranor, Chair, ATT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mark Ackerman, University

Illuminating Blacked-Out Words

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/10/technology/10crypto.html?pagewanted=printposition= The New York Times May 10, 2004 Illuminating Blacked-Out Words By JOHN MARKOFF European researchers at a security conference in Switzerland last week demonstrated computer-based techniques that can identify

Re: Reusable hashcash for spam prevention

2004-05-25 Thread Fearghas McKay
This was posted on the ASRG list - the IRTF Anti Spam Research Group list, which at first reading indicates that the future for Hashcash/Camram may be limited. Eric Johansson the camram developer has some different numbers which he has just run that I will dig out and forward. f ---

VIA Reveals Details of Next Generation C5J Esther Processor Core With Advanced Features For Securing E-Commerce Transactions

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.linuxelectrons.com/article.php/20040519090517729 LinuxElectrons - VIA Reveals Details of Next Generation C5J Esther Processor Core With Advanced Features For Securing E-Commerce Transactions Wednesday, May 19 2004 @ 09:05 AM Contributed by: ByteEnable San Jose, CA -- VIA

RE: EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon

2004-05-25 Thread Trei, Peter
Tom Shaddack wrote: On Tue, 18 May 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: Monyk believes there will be a global market of several million users once a workable solution has been developed. A political decision will have to be taken as to who those users will be in order to prevent terrorists

Hyperencryption by virtual satellite

2004-05-25 Thread Ivan Krstic
As part of the Harvard University Science Center Lecture Series, Michael O. Rabin, the T.J. Watson Sr. Professor of Computer Science at Harvard University, lectures on hyper-encryption and provably everlasting secrets. In this lecture, Professor Rabin confronts the failure of present-day

Have any Crack DES Now graphics from 1997?

2004-05-25 Thread Matt Curtin
Hi, Pardon the diversion. As most here know, I'm hard at work on the book BRUTE FORCE, which is the story behind the 1997 DESCHALL effort that was the first to crack a DES key by brute force in public. (Presently it is on-course for an October release by Copernicus Books; we're aiming for

[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [fc-announce] CFP: FC'05 - Financial Cryptography and Data Security]

2004-05-25 Thread R. Hirschfeld
From: Stuart Schechter [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [fc-announce] CFP: FC'05 - Financial Cryptography and Data Security To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 16:59:41 -0400 Organization: Harvard University FC'05 Financial Cryptography and Data

Mixmaster Protocol Draft (revision)

2004-05-25 Thread Len Sassaman
An updated version of the Mixmaster Protocol Specification has been published: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sassaman-mixmaster-01.txt I'd like this to be the last revision, so if you have any comments on it (or if you've raised issues in the past that you don't see addressed),

Re: more hiddencredentials comments (Re: Brands' private credentials)

2004-05-25 Thread Jason Holt
On Mon, 10 May 2004, Adam Back wrote: OK that sounds like it should work. Another approach that occurs is you could just take the plaintext, and encrypt it for the other attributes (which you don't have)? It's usually not too challenging to make stuff deterministic and retain security. Eg.

[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice

2004-05-25 Thread Linda Casals
* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels,

US intelligence exposed as student decodes Iraq memo

2004-05-25 Thread Ian Grigg
Original Message Subject: Financial Cryptography Update: US intelligence exposed as student decodes Iraq memo http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000137.html 13 May 2004 DECLAN BUTLER

Did SSLeay/OpenSSL change its DES implementation?

2004-05-25 Thread VaX#n8
I've been working on integrating TCFS into NetBSD's kernel. Currently I have a stand-alone package that builds an LKM that works. The NetBSD people asked me to use the extant crypto code in the kernel, and both TCFS's and NetBSD's came from SSLeay. I had to make only one minor change to it

Vulnerability in the WinZip implimentation of AES?

2004-05-25 Thread Dave Howe
http://www.cse.ucsd.edu/users/tkohno/papers/WinZip/ Abstract: WinZip is a popular compression utility for Microsoft Windows computers, the latest version of which is advertised as having easy-to-use AES encryption to protect your sensitive data. We exhibit several attacks against WinZip's new

Re: Looking for mirror (or: better) sites to host my crypto/security lectures

2004-05-25 Thread Marcel Popescu
From: Amir Herzberg [EMAIL PROTECTED] So, if anyone has a reliable ftp server where I could post the lectures (and update them via ftp), please let me know. You might also want to look into installing a tracker and sharing them with BitTorrent http://bitconjurer.org/BitTorrent/ - it should

The EU pursues quantum crypto because of Echelon

2004-05-25 Thread Steve Bellovin
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,93220,00.html?from=homeheads I'm not sure what more to say, given my opinion of the general utility of quantum crypto --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb

Re: 3. Proof-of-work analysis

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
Here's a forward of parts of an email I sent to Richard with comments on his and Ben's paper (sent me a pre-print off-list a couple of weeks ago): One obvious comment is that the calculations do not take account of the CAMRAM approach of charging for introductions only. You mention this in the

Re: The future of security

2004-05-25 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg writes: Security architects will continue to do most of their work with little or no crypto. And rightly so, since most security problems have nothing to do with the absence of crypto. j. a cryptographic solution for spam and viruses won't be found.

SSL secure browsing - attack tree Mindmap

2004-05-25 Thread Ian Grigg
Original Message Subject: Financial Cryptography Update: SSL secure browsing - attack tree Mindmap http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000136.html Here is a /work in progress/ Mindmap on the

The Fingerprint As Password

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
There's one born every minute, boys and girls. We should take bets on when the first digital robbery occurs spoofing the output of one of these things. Cheers, RAH http://www.forbes.com/2004/05/21/cx_ah_0521tentech_print.html Forbes Ten O'Clock Tech The Fingerprint As Password Arik

RE: EU seeks quantum cryptography response to Echelon

2004-05-25 Thread Tyler Durden
Boondoggle. A solution in search of a problem: Monyk believes there will be a global market of several million users once a workable solution has been developed. A political decision will have to be taken as to who those users will be in order to prevent terrorists and criminals from taking

Pitney Bowes Technology on Display at National Cryptologic Museum

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109STORY=/www/story/05-11-2004/0002171630EDATE= Pitney Bowes Technology on Display at National Cryptologic Museum STAMFORD, Conn., and FT. GEORGE G. MEADE, Md., May 11 /PRNewswire- FirstCall/ -- Pitney Bowes (NYSE: PBI), the world's leading

EU to use QC as a response to Echelon

2004-05-25 Thread Ivan Krstic
/. reports: An article on Security.ITWorld.com[1] seems to outline a coming information arms race. The European Union has decided to respond to the Echelon project [2] by funding research into supposedly unbreakable quantum cryptography that will keep EU data out of Echelon's maw. Leaving

Re: Reusable hashcash for spam prevention

2004-05-25 Thread Fearghas McKay
and the data that Eric S. Johansson got: -=-=- forwarded text -=-=- this is frustrating. I have run through the exact same calculations and come up with a very different answer. The answers I came up with the show that at worst case, spammers with zombies would almost have enough horsepower to

Monthly Talk of Iranian Society of Cryptology

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text From: Siamak Fayyaz Shahandashti [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Robert Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: Siamak Fayyaz Shahandashti [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 00:30:23 -0700 Subject: Monthly Talk of Iranian Society of Cryptology Title: Transitive Signature

Hashcash and ecash for spam prevention

2004-05-25 Thread Anonymous
Recently someone proposed a system which combined ecash and hashcash for email postage. Here is some analysis. There are already proposals and even some working code for hashcash email postage. See http://www.camram.org/. This is intended as an anti-spam measure. The idea is that to send

SSL accel cards

2004-05-25 Thread Jack Lloyd
Does anyone know of an SSL acceleration card that actually works under Linux/*BSD? I've been looking at vendor web pages (AEP, Rainbow, etc), and while they all claim to support Linux, Googling around all I find are people saying Where can I get drivers? The ones vendor shipped only work on

Demand Grows to Require Paper Trails for Electronic Votes

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/politics/campaign/23vote.html?th=pagewanted=printposition= The New York Times May 23, 2004 Demand Grows to Require Paper Trails for Electronic Votes By KATHARINE Q. SEELYE ASHINGTON, May 22 - A coalition of computer scientists, voter groups and state

Researchers unlock the key to `unbreakable' coded messages

2004-05-25 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.asahi.com/english/nation/TKY200405130208.html The Asahi Shimbun Researchers unlock the key to `unbreakable' coded messages TSUKUBA, Ibaraki Prefecture-The Holy Grail of data transmission-practical communication of encrypted messages impervious to eavesdroppers-may finally be

Re: Reusable hashcash for spam prevention

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
FYI Richard amended the figures in the paper which makes things 10x more favorable for hashcash in terms of being an ecomonic defense against spammers. Richard wrote on asrg: | we're grateful (albeit a little embarrassed) for the consideration | given to one of our figures by Ted Wobber (MS

RE: SSL accel cards

2004-05-25 Thread Grant Goodale
We've had great luck with the nFast and nForce lines of ssl accelerators from nCipher under Red Hat: http://www.ncipher.com Depending on which model you choose, you can get anywhere from 150 to 1600 key ops/sec. HTH, G -- Grant Goodale

Re: The future of security

2004-05-25 Thread l . crypto
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Would anyone there have any good predictions on how cryptography is going to unfold in the next few years or so? I have my own ideas, but I would love to see what others see in the crystal ball. I'd like to think we would see a new flowering of

looking for crypt library without known plaintext fields

2004-05-25 Thread VaX#n8
I'm looking for something like Mcrypt, but without any meta-information stored in the encrypted versions of the files. That is, I want just the encrypted data, with no identifying features. I could dive into Mcrypt and strip out certain fields, but is there a tool or library which already works