| No mention is made of encryption or challenge response
| authentication but I guess that may or may not be part of the design
| (one would think it had better be, as picking off the ESN should be duck
| soup with suitable gear if not encrypted).
|
| From a business perspective, it makes
John Gilmore wrote:
[By the way, [EMAIL PROTECTED] is being left out of this conversation,
by his own configuration, because his site censors all emails from me. --gnu]
Sourceforge was doing that to me today!
Well, I am presuming that ... the EZ Pass does have an account
number, right? And
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], John Gilmore writes:
If they could read the license plates reliably, then they wouldn't
need the EZ Pass at all. They can't. It takes human effort, which is
in short supply.
There are, in fact, toll roads that try to do that; see, for example,
At 21:54 2004-07-09 +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
John Gilmore wrote:
It would be relatively easy to catch someone
doing this - just cross-correlate with other
information (address of home and work) and
then photograph the car at the on-ramp.
Am I missing something?
It seems to me that EZ Pass spoofing
FasTrak is a passive system relative to the transponder -- it uses the
transponder ID, a vehicle sensor, and an axle counter to generate toll
records. The associated license plate capture-and-decode feature is only
invoked if a non-transponder-equipped or invalidated-transponder-equipped
vehicle
* Amir Herzberg:
Florian Weimer wrote:
* Amir Herzberg:
# Protecting (even) Naïve Web Users, or: Preventing Spoofing and
Establishing Credentials of Web Sites, at
http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/trusted%20credentials%20area.PDF
The trusted credentials area is an interesting
* Hal Finney:
Only now are we belatedly beginning to pay the price for that decision.
If anything, it's surprising that it has taken this long. If phishing
scams had sprung up five years ago it's possible that SET would have
had a fighting chance to survive.
Wouldn't typical phishing
On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 10:28:49AM +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
If they could do that reliably, they wouldn't need the toll thingy, nu? I
have been told by someone in the photo-enforcement industry that their
reliability is only around 75%, and they're very expensive, and ... anyway,
not a
On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Anton Stiglic wrote:
The problem is not really authentication theft, its identity theft, or if
you want to put it even more precisely, it's identity theft and
authenticating as the individual to whom the identity belongs to. But the
latte doesn't make for a good buz-word :)
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
John Gilmore [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It would be relatively easy to catch someone
doing this - just cross-correlate with other
information (address of home and work) and
then photograph the car at the on-ramp.
Am I missing something?
It seems
Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
All the toll lanes that accept EZ Pass that I've seen are equipped
with cameras. These cameras are used to identify toll evaders
already. You point out that doing this would require manual work, but
in fact several systems (including the one used for
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