Re: Public FTP Space (was looking for sites to host my crypto...)

2004-07-15 Thread Udhay Shankar N
At 04:56 AM 7/14/2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
Recently a list member requested public ftp/web space for the hosting of
various crypto files.
Also see: http://munitions.vipul.net/
For Linux-based crypto software only, AFAIK. Multi-homed, hosted outside 
the US.

Udhay
--
((Udhay Shankar N)) ((udhay @ pobox.com)) ((www.digeratus.com))
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Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

2004-07-15 Thread Rich Salz
 SET failed due to the complexity of distributing the software and setting
 up the credentials.  I think another reason was the go-fast atmosphere of
 the late 90s, where no one wanted to slow down the growth of ecommerce.
 The path of least resistance was simply to bring across the old way of
 authorizing transactions by card number.

I think your other reason was in fact the primary reason.  And, of course,
the primary enablers of the go-fast approach were, in fact, the very same
credit card companies.  They made a conscious business decision to treat
online transactions the same as conventional transactions -- I forget the
details, but it was pretty risk-free for a merchant to do online credit
cards, getting low surchage rates.  That, coupled with the US law that
limited consumer liability to $50, made CCard-over-SSL a no-brainer over
SET.

From a consumer viewpoint, CC/SSL is more secure then SET ever was.  Since
it wasn't a CCard transacdtion, my liability under SET was unlimited (at
least until Congress caught up to the technology).  Looking at the risk
management aspect, SET was a big loser for the customer.

/r$

--
Rich Salz  Chief Security Architect
DataPower Technology   http://www.datapower.com
XS40 XML Security Gateway  http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
XML Security Overview  http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html

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New Attack on Secure Browsing

2004-07-15 Thread Ian Grigg
 Financial Cryptography Update: New Attack on Secure Browsing )
 July 15, 2004

http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000179.html


Congratulations go to PGP Inc - who was it, guys, don't be shy this
time? - for discovering a new way to futz with secure browsing.
Click on http://www.pgp.com/ and you will see an SSL-protected page
with that cute little padlock next to domain name.  And they managed
that over HTTP, as well!  (This may not be seen in IE version 5 which
doesn't load the padlock unless you add it to favourites, or some
such.)
Whoops!  That padlock is in the wrong place, but who's going to notice?
 It looks pretty bona fide to me, and you know, for half the browsers I
use, I often can't find the darn thing anyway.  This is so good, I just
had to add one to my SSL page (http://iang.org/ssl/ ).  I feel so much
safer now, and it's cheaper than the ones that those snake oil vendors
sell :-)
What does this mean?  It's a bit of a laugh, is all, maybe.  But it
could fool some users, and as Mozilla Foundation recently stated, the
goal is to protect those that don't know how to protect themselves.  Us
techies may laugh, but we'll be laughing on the other side when some
phisher tricks users with the little favicon.
It all puts more pressure on the oh-so-long overdue project to bring
the secure back into secure browsing.  Microsoft have befuddled the
already next-to-invisible security model even further with their
favicon invention, and getting it back under control should really be a
priority.
Putting the CA logo on the chrome now seems inspired - clearly the
padlock is useless.  See countless rants [1] listing the 4 steps needed
and also a new draft paper from Amir Herzberg and Ahmad Gbara [2]
exploring the use of logos on the chrome.
[1] SSL considered harmful
http://iang.org/ssl/
[2]  Protecting (even) Naïve Web Users,
or: Preventing Spoofing and Establishing Credentials of Web Sites
http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/spoofing.htm
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Humorous anti-SSL PR

2004-07-15 Thread J Harper
This barely deserves mention, but is worth it for the humor:
Information Security Expert says SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is Nothing More
Than a Condom that Just Protects the Pipe
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/7/prweb141248.htm

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Re: Humorous anti-SSL PR

2004-07-15 Thread Eric Rescorla
J Harper [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 This barely deserves mention, but is worth it for the humor:
 Information Security Expert says SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is Nothing More
 Than a Condom that Just Protects the Pipe
 http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/7/prweb141248.htm

What's wrong with a condom that protects the pipe? I've used
condoms many times and they seemed to do quite a good job
of protecting my pipe.

-Ekr

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Re: Humorous anti-SSL PR

2004-07-15 Thread Ian Grigg
J Harper wrote:
This barely deserves mention, but is worth it for the humor:
Information Security Expert says SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is Nothing More
Than a Condom that Just Protects the Pipe
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/7/prweb141248.htm
I guess the intention was to provide more end-to-end
security for transaction data.  After a reasonable start,
if a bit scattered, it breaks down with this:
What we can be certain of is that it is not possible
to have a man-in-the-middle attack with FormsAssurity
 encryption ensures that the form has really come from
the claimed web site, the form has not been altered,
and the only person that can read the information
filled in on the form is the authorized site.
Which is quite inconsistent - so much so that it seems
that the press release writer got confused over which
system he or she was talking about.
iang
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RE: Humorous anti-SSL PR

2004-07-15 Thread Anton Stiglic

This barely deserves mention, but is worth it for the humor:
Information Security Expert says SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is Nothing More
Than a Condom that Just Protects the Pipe
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/7/prweb141248.htm

The article says
The weaknesses of SSL implementations have been well known amongst security
professionals, but their argument has been that SSL is the best tool
currently on offer. The fact that it can be spoofed and is open to man in
the middle attacks is played down.

O.k., so if there is a vulnerability in a particular implementation there
might be a possible MITM attack.  Also possible to do MITM if user doesn't
do proper verification.  But I wouldn't say that SSL implementations in
general are suspect to MITM attacks.
Later in the article it is written:

What we can be certain of is that it is not possible to have a
man-in-the-middle attack with FormsAssurity - encryption ensures that the
form has really come from the claimed web site, the form has not been
altered, and the only person that can read the information filled in on the
form is the authorized site.

O.k., so how do they achieve such assurances?

Eric's comment about condoms being effective is right, so bad analogy as
well!

--Anton



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Re: Humorous anti-SSL PR

2004-07-15 Thread John Denker
J Harper [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

This barely deserves mention, but is worth it for the humor:
Information Security Expert says SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is Nothing More
Than a Condom that Just Protects the Pipe
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004/7/prweb141248.htm
To which Eric Rescorla replied:
What's wrong with a condom that protects the pipe? I've used
condoms many times and they seemed to do quite a good job
of protecting my pipe.
The humor just keeps on coming.  It's always amusing to
see an invocation of the principle that I've tried it
on several occasions and it seemed to work, therefore
it must be trustworthy.
What's wrong with this depends, as usual, on the threat
model.  Sometimes it is wise to consider other parts
of the system (not just the pipe) in the threat model.
If we set you up on a blind date with an underfed grizzly,
you might find that protecting your pipe with a condom
doesn't solve all your problems.
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