(This discussion from hashcash list is Cc'd to cryptography and
cypherpunks.)
Hashcash uses SHA1 and computes a partial pre-image of the all 0bit
string (0^160).
Following is a discussion of what the recent results from Joux, Wang
et al, and Biham et al on SHA0, MD5, SHA1 etc might imply for hash
At 12:00 2004-08-18 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Biham & Chen can find collisions in a reduced round version of SHA-1,
but am I correct in saying that no one has found collisions in the
full SHA-1 at this point?
Correct, and at the end of his full talk this morning Eli said "we're not
close to b
http://serbianc.sourceforge.net/projects/fEncH
Quoting the project page
This is a fast and simple, yet hard to crack encryption program. It
uses XOR encryption with variable key, based on the password that user
inputs to the program
I read the code quickly -- it is a simple repeated XO
On Thu, 19 Aug 2004 00:49:17 +1000, Greg Rose <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > It seems to be a straightforward differential cryptanalysis attack, so
> > one wonders why no-one else came up with it.
>
> With further hindsight, and Phil Hawkes' help, I understand now. The
> technique needs to alterna
At 12:04 2004-08-18 -0400, Whyte, William wrote:
> There has been criticism about the Wang et. al paper that "it doesn't
> explain how they get the collisions". That isn't right. Note that from the
> incorrect paper to the corrected one, the "delta" values didn't change.
> Basically, if you throw r
At 00:49 2004-08-19 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
There has been criticism about the Wang et. al paper that "it doesn't
explain how they get the collisions". That isn't right. Note that from the
incorrect paper to the corrected one, the "delta" values didn't change.
Basically, if you throw random numb
> There has been criticism about the Wang et. al paper that "it doesn't
> explain how they get the collisions". That isn't right. Note that from the
> incorrect paper to the corrected one, the "delta" values didn't change.
> Basically, if you throw random numbers in as inputs, in pairs with the
One more question about the results at Crypto...
Biham & Chen can find collisions in a reduced round version of SHA-1,
but am I correct in saying that no one has found collisions in the
full SHA-1 at this point?
And would anyone like to take a crack at explaining the work by Wang,
Feng, Lai and
On Tue, 17 Aug 2004, Hal Finney wrote:
>A couple of quick responses to the questions on RPOW, as I am at
>Crypto this week.
I'm wondering how applicable RPOW is. Generally speaking, all
the practical applications I can think of for a proof-of-work
are defeated if proofs-of-work are storable, t
In the light of day and less inebriated, I'd like to clarify some of what I
wrote last night, and maybe expand a bit. My original account wasn't what
I'd like to think of as a record for posterity.
Greg.
At 13:11 2004-08-18 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
Xiaoyun Wang was almost unintelligible.
This was
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney") writes:
>The initial paper from Wang eg al announcing the results is unusual in that
>it merely exhibits the collisions, while providing no information whatsoever
>about how they were obtained.
Perhaps they've managed to reduce RFC 3607 to practice :-).
Peter.
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