Hi Ed,
What about ID-based crypto: the public key can be any string, such as
your e-mail address. So the sender can encrypt even before the
recipient has a key pair. The private key is derived from the
public key by a trusted party when the recipient asks for it.
Yes, the recipient does have some
Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
PGP allows that a relying party vet a public key with the key owner
and/or vet the key with one or more others (web-of-trust)
note that while public key alleviates the requirement that a key be
distributed with secrecy ... it doesn't eliminate the requirement that
the
Benne,
With Voltage, all communications corresponding to the same public key can be
decrypted using the same private key, even if the user is offline. To me, this
sounds worse than the PKC problem of trusting the recipient's key. Voltage
also corresponds to mandatory key escrow, as you noted, with
On Wed, 15 Sep 2004 16:30:54 +0100, Ian Grigg said:
There is a device that is similar to those characteristics:
http://woudt.nl/epass-pgp/
http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000201.html
The advantage of the OpenPGP card is that is is a specification that
it is open and ready for
Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that
systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great.
* I don't see Verisign's web server tax as meaningful; they accept no
liability, and numerous companies foist you off to unrelted domains.
We could get roughly the same
At 11:19 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
Yes, PKC provides a workable solution for key distribution... when you
look at servers. For email, the PKC solution is not workable (hasn't been)
and gives a false impression of security. For example, the sender has no
way of knowing if the recipient's key is
Adam Shostack wrote:
Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that
systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great.
I think the consensus from debate back last year on
this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it
didn't do anything that couldn't be done with
Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
the issue then is what level do you trust the recipient, what is the
threat model, and what are the countermeasures.
if there is a general trust issue with the recipient (not just their key
generating capability) ... then a classified document compromise could
happen
Adam Shostack wrote:
I think the consensus from debate back last year on
this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it
didn't do anything that couldn't be done with PGP,
and added more risks to boot.
Voltage actually does. It allows secure communication
without pre-registering the recipient.
