On Tue, Jan 04, 2005 at 08:44:11PM +, Ian G wrote:
| R.A. Hettinga wrote:
|
|
http://help.channels.aol.com/article.adp?catId=6sCId=415sSCId=4090articleId=217623
| Have questions? Search AOL Help articles and tutorials:
| .
| If you no longer want to use AOL PassCode, you must release
I got mine in Secret Codes by Jackson. It's a cheap plastic model
in a kids book. I didn't try to assemble the morse code thing, so
can't comment on its quality.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0762413514/
Adam
On Sun, Jan 02, 2005 at 12:59:14PM +0100, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
|
* Ian G.:
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
http://help.channels.aol.com/article.adp?catId=6sCId=415sSCId=4090articleId=217623
Have questions? Search AOL Help articles and tutorials:
.
If you no longer want to use AOL PassCode, you must release your screen
name from your AOL PassCode so that you will no
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispo/business/technology/10556269.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp
Posted on Mon, Jan. 03, 2005
New computerized passport raises safety concerns
By Kristi Heim
Seattle Times
When traveling abroad these days, most Americans probably wouldn't
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
At 12:24 PM 1/4/2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In both cases, this is SecurID.
Yup. It's the little keychain frob that gives you a string
On Tue, 04 Jan 2005 15:41:12 -0500, John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Udhay Shankar N wrote:
I just got a batch of spam: perfectly justified blocks of random-looking
characters. Makes me wonder if somebody is trying to train Bayesian
filters to reject PGP messages.
Or someone is trying
C. Scott Ananian wrote:
On Wed, 22 Dec 2004, Ben Laurie wrote:
Blimey. Finally. An attack I can actually believe in. Excellent.
On Tue, Jan 04, 2005 at 03:24:56PM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
R.A. Hettinga wrote:
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???
Could someone explain this to me?
No. Really. I'm serious...
Cheers,
RAH
The slashdot article title is really, really misleading.
In
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Adam Back
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 11:48 PM
I would think the simplest canonical counter-attack would be to make a
p2p app that compares diffs in the binary output (efficiently rsync
style) accumulates enough
Bill Stewart wrote:
That's still a serious risk for a bank,
since the scammer can use it to log in to the web site
and then do a bunch of transactions quickly;
it's less vulnerable if the bank insists on a new SecurID hit for
every dangerous transaction, but that's too annoying for most customers.
The order of the wheels can't be changed.
So this encryption device doesn't use any key?
Only the most trivial; you choose the row to transmit.
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Dean, James wrote:
The order of the wheels can't be changed.
So this encryption device doesn't use any key?
Only the most trivial; you choose the row to transmit.
From what I've seen on the web not even that:
Unlike the original Jefferson wheel these toys are not
intended to choose any row,
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