Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

Wondering how in the world we got into this endless debate, I went back and re-read the entire thread(s). I think that early comments were predictive, where Ian Grigg wrote: ... Crypto is such a small part of security that most all crypto people move acros

Re: entropy depletion

Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote: I would love to have an information-theoretic argument for the security of my PRNG, but that's not what we have, Yes, and I'd like my goldfish to ride a bicycle, but he can't. The P in PRNG is for Pseudo, and means the PRNG is relying on computational intractability, not

Re: entropy depletion

I would love to have an information-theoretic argument for the security of my PRNG, but that's not what we have, and I don't think reducing the entropy_count by one bit per output bit gets us any closer to such an argument. For starters, the entropy_count value before you output the bit is obv

TSA: Tests going well for Secure Flight

CNN TSA: Tests going well for Secure Flight Friday, January 7, 2005 Posted: 11:21 AM EST (1621 GMT) WASHINGTON (AP) -- The government has begun testing a computerized screening system that compares airline passengers' na

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

- Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, January 07, 2005 9:30 AM Subject: Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing) > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Enzo > > Michelangeli > > Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 7:50 P

Re: OpenVPN and "SSL VPNs"

* Stefan Mink: > a) It would be good to hear from this community if there > are any negative aspects of OpenVPN (vs. IPsec VPNs). It's not standardized, and it only interoperates with itself (but this is true for many IPsec implementations as well). This is more than compensated by its portabili