Peter Gutmann wrote:
Neither. Currently they've typically been smart-card cores glued to the
MB and accessed via I2C/SMB.
and chips that typically have had eal4+ or eal5+ evaluations. hot topic
in 2000, 2001 ... at the intel developer's forums and rsa conferences
On Feb 4, 2005, at 6:58 AM, Eric Murray wrote:
So a question for the TCPA proponents (or opponents):
how would I do that using TCPA?
check out
enforcer.sourceforge.net
We also had a paper at ACSAC 2004 with some of the apps we've built on
it.
Two things we've built that haven't made it yet to
Erwann ABALEA wrote:
I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in
installing a cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards?
I work for a PKI 'vendor', and for me, software private keys is a
nonsense. How will you convice Mr Smith (or Mme Michu) to buy an
expensive CC
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Dan Kaminsky writes:
Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
antivirus.
How? TCPA is only a
Trei, Peter wrote:
It could easily be leveraged to make motherboards
which will only run 'authorized' OSs, and OSs
which will run only 'authorized' software.
And you, the owner of the computer, will NOT
neccesarily be the authority which gets to decide
what OS and software the machine can run.
If
John Kelsey wrote:
From: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
No, I meant CBC -- there's a birthday paradox attack to watch out for.
Yep. In fact, there's a birthday paradox problem for all the standard chaining modes at around 2^{n/2}.
For CBC and CFB, this ends up leaking information
