On 9/13/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Perry E. Metzger) wrote:
Generally speaking, I think software with a security impact should not
be written in C.
I agree. I also note that Paul A. Karger and Roger R. Schell, in their
paper, Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security
Evaluation state:
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On Thu, Sep 15, 2005 at 08:51:02PM -0700, Bill Frantz wrote:
On 9/13/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Perry E. Metzger) wrote:
Generally speaking, I think software with a security impact should not
be written in C.
I agree. I also note that Paul A. Karger and Roger R. Schell, in their
paper,
Victor Duchovni wrote:
While some of the fault is perhaps in the core language, my contention is
that the real problem is the anemic standard C-library. When working on C
projects that have (and uniformly use) their own mature string handling
libraries (I was a contributor to Tcl in the 90's
