cryptography and security-related papers from North Korea

2005-11-15 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
I stumbled on the following link:http://cryptome.org/dprk/dprk-papers.htm --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

MD4 and MD5 collision generators

2005-11-15 Thread pstach
I am releasing my collision generators for MD4 and MD5. They have significant time improvements over the ones described in the papers by Wang, et al. MD4 collisions can be generated almost instantly, MD5 can be generated in approximately 45 minutes on my p4 1.6ghz (on average).

Re: FW: How broad is the SPEKE patent.

2005-11-15 Thread D Jablon
At 14:47 11/10/2005 -0800, Charlie Kaufman wrote: [... Radia Perlman and I] were approached by David Jablon, the inventor of SPEKE but no longer the patent holder, who suggested that we should not assume that PDM did not infringe SPEKE and should not make such claims to others. This was based on

Re: Pseudorandom Number Generator in Ansi X9.17

2005-11-15 Thread Travis H.
In Practical Cryptography, Schneier discusses a new PRNG design called Fortuna. It has some neat features. He also discusses problems with the ANSI PRNG here: http://www.schneier.com/paper-prngs.html -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -- We already have enough fast, insecure systems.

timing attack countermeasures (nonrandom but unpredictable delays)

2005-11-15 Thread Travis H.
The naive countermeasure to timing attacks is to add a random delay, but of course that can be averaged out by repeating the computation. I have never heard anyone propose a delay that is based on the input, and maybe some per-machine secret, so that it is unpredictable but constant. Of course

ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one: http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.html I haven't been following the IPSec mailing lists of late -- can anyone who knows details

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Perry E. Metzger writes: Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one: http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.ht ml I haven't been following the IPSec

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 10:14 AM -0500 11/15/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one: http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.html I haven't been following the IPSec

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Paul Hoffman writes: At 10:14 AM -0500 11/15/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one:

Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

2005-11-15 Thread Hal Finney
Ron Rivest reported on some theoretical and practical experimental work in Crypto 90, Finding Four Million Large Random Primes, http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-FindingFourMillionLargeRandomPrimes.ps A number n is a (base two) pseudoprime if it is composite and satisfies the identity

Re: ISAKMP flaws?

2005-11-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 2:29 PM -0500 11/15/05, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: I mostly agree with you, with one caveat: the complexity of a spec can lead to buggier implementations. Well, then we fully agree with each other. Look at the message formats used in the protocols they have attacked successfully so far.

the effects of a spy

2005-11-15 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and encryptor designs. --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

Re: the effects of a spy

2005-11-15 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and encryptor designs. Very interesting indeed. I was unaware that the