RE: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

2005-11-16 Thread Anton Stiglic
The general consensus is that for 500-bit numbers one needs only 6 MR tests for 2^{-80} error probability [1]: ... and thus a single test gives ~2^{-13}. If you just took the exponent 80 and divided it by 6 to get ~13, I don't think that is the right reasoning. Look at table 4.3 of the

Re: the effects of a spy

2005-11-16 Thread Nicholas Bohm
Perry E. Metzger wrote: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and encryptor designs. [...] One intriguing

Re: the effects of a spy

2005-11-16 Thread lrk
On Tue, Nov 15, 2005 at 06:31:30PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys

Re: the effects of a spy

2005-11-16 Thread leichter_jerrold
On Tue, 15 Nov 2005, Perry E. Metzger wrote: | Does the tension between securing one's own communications and | breaking an opponents communications sometimes drive the use of COMSEC | gear that may be too close to the edge for comfort, for fear of | revealing too much about more secure methods?

[Clips] Sony DRM infection removal vulnerability uncovered

2005-11-16 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2005 12:55:50 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] Sony DRM infection removal vulnerability uncovered Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL

[Bugtraq] Schneier's PasswordSafe password validation flaw

2005-11-16 Thread Kerry Thompson
Posted on Bugtraq a few hours ago: Subject: Schneier's PasswordSafe password validation flaw From: info_at_elcomsoft.com Date: Thu, November 17, 2005 1:27 Title : Schneier's PasswordSafe password validation flaw Date : November 16, 2005 Product : PasswordSafe 1.x,

timing attack countermeasures (nonrandom but unpredictable delays)

2005-11-16 Thread David Wagner
Travis writes: The naive countermeasure to timing attacks is to add a random delay, but of course that can be averaged out by repeating the computation. I have never heard anyone propose a delay that is based on the input, and maybe some per-machine secret, so that it is unpredictable but