Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificat es

2005-12-21 Thread leichter_jerrold
| Imagine a E-commerce front end: Instead of little-guy.com buying a cert | which you are supposed to trust, they go to e-commerce.com and pay for a | link. Everyone trusts e-commerce.com and its cert. e-commerce provides a | guarantee of some sort to customers who go through it, and

Re: whoops (residues in a finite field)

2005-12-21 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Mon, 19 Dec 2005, Travis H. wrote: He says no mpi/modular arithmetic libraries that he knows of use this technique I guess the main reason is that the environments where these libraries are supposed to be used are believed to be immune to the attacks these checks are trying to prevent: the

Re: A small editorial about recent events.

2005-12-21 Thread Adam Fields
On Sun, Dec 18, 2005 at 07:55:57PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: [...] The Court also noted that Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency. Given that the Patriot Act did amend various aspects of the wiretap statute, it's

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-21 Thread Ben Laurie
Jack Lloyd wrote: On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:20:26AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: 2) While CTR mode with a random key is sufficient for creating a permutation of N-bit blocks for a fixed N, is there a general-purpose way to create a N-bit permutation, where N is a variable? How about picking a

Re: browser vendors and CAs agreeing on high-assurance certificates

2005-12-21 Thread Peter Gutmann
James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: If no attacks, this is just an excuse for higher priced holy water, an attempt to alter the Browser interface to increase revenue, not increase security - to solve the CA's problem, not solve the user's problem. That's a somewhat cynical view :-) of

Re: another feature RNGs could provide

2005-12-21 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Jack Lloyd wrote: On Mon, Dec 12, 2005 at 12:20:26AM -0600, Travis H. wrote: 2) While CTR mode with a random key is sufficient for creating a permutation of N-bit blocks for a fixed N, is there a general-purpose way to create a N-bit permutation, where N