Alexander Klimov wrote:
On Wed, 11 Jan 2006, Ian G wrote:
Even though triple-DES is still considered to have avoided that
trap, its relatively small block size means you can now put the
entire decrypt table on a dvd (or somesuch, I forget the maths).
This would need 8 x 2^{64} bytes of stor
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From what I understand simple quantum computers can easily brute-force attack
RSA keys or other
types of PK keys.
My understanding is that quantum computers cannot "easily" do anything.
As the saying goes:
"We can factor the number 15 with quantum computers. We
- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -
From: Roger Dingledine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2006 18:03:40 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Tor security advisory: hidden services can be located quickly
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Tue, Jan 10, 2006 at 03:28:49AM -0600, Travis H. wrote:
> I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
> GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I
> remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the
> impression that the 1024 bit
On Wednesday 11 January 2006 08:04, Ian G wrote:
[...]
> I don't think EC is available for OpenPGP although
> GPG may have some experimental product in it?
RFC2440 has 9.1. Public Key Algorithms has ID 18 as "Reserved for
Elliptic Curve" followed by the statement "Implementations MAY
implement a
On Wed, 11 Jan 2006, Ian G wrote:
> Even though triple-DES is still considered to have avoided that
> trap, its relatively small block size means you can now put the
> entire decrypt table on a dvd (or somesuch, I forget the maths).
This would need 8 x 2^{64} bytes of storage which is approximate
I must admit, I just had a "duh" moment.
Why the heck am I expiring encryption keys each year? Anyone who
records the email can crack it even if the key is invalid by then.
All it really does is crudely limit the quantity of data sent under
that key, which is little to none anyway.
*bonks foreh
>From what I understand simple quantum computers can easily brute-force attack
>RSA keys or other types of PK keys. Is ECC at risk too? And are we at risk
>in 10, 20 or 30 years from now?
- Alex
- Original Message -
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: cryptography@met
