On Sat, 14 Jan 2006, Michael Cordover wrote:
> In order to factor a 1024
> bit modulus you'd need a 1024 bit QC. Perhaps if there were some sudden
> breakthrough it'd be a danger in a decade - but this is the same as the
> risk of a sudden classical breakthrough: low.
This is not necessarily s
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/121505-tape-encryption.html
"Proposed standards for protecting data on disk or tape are gathering steam
within the IEEE and could be supported in products as soon as next year,
according to proponents."
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.
According to President Bush, the illegal NSA domestic espionage
program he ordered was narrowly targeted against people known to have
Al Qaeda links. However, it appears that, as with his previous false
claims that espionage only happened with a warrant, that this claim
was on its face untrue:
> >From what I understand simple quantum computers can easily
> brute-force attack RSA keys or other types of PK keys. Is
> ECC at risk too? And are we at risk in 10, 20 or 30 years from now?
Quantum computers break RSA, cryptosystems based on discrete log
over finite fields, and cryptosyst
Travis H. wrote:
Why the heck am I expiring encryption keys each year? Anyone who
records the email can crack it even if the key is invalid by then.
All it really does is crudely limit the quantity of data sent under
that key, which is little to none anyway.
If your threat model includes att
In 1996, New Zealander Nicky Hager wrote a book "Secret Power" containing a
great deal of information on Echelon, with a particular NZ perspective. A few
days ago, papers held by the Prime Minister of the time were accidentally
released and appeared in the Sunday Star Times. Some quotes from the
Guus Sliepen wrote:
> It depends on how it is used. For example, when I sent this email, I
> typed in the passphrase of my PGP key, authorising GnuPG to create a
> signature for this email. This comes very close to "human signing". I
> read, understood, approve etc. with the contents of this email.
On Sat, Jan 14, 2006 at 12:30:25PM -0700, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> Guus Sliepen wrote:
> > By default, GPG creates a signing key and an encryption key. The signing
> > key is used both for signing other keys (including self-signing your own
> > keys), and for signing documents (like emails). H
Guus Sliepen wrote:
> By default, GPG creates a signing key and an encryption key. The signing
> key is used both for signing other keys (including self-signing your own
> keys), and for signing documents (like emails). However, it is possible
> to "split" the signing key into a master key that you
At 03:04 AM 1/14/2006 +1100, Michael Cordover wrote:
John Denker wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From what I understand simple quantum computers can easily brute-force
attack RSA keys or other
types of PK keys.
My understanding is that quantum computers cannot "easily" do anything.
Au contr
Alexander Klimov wrote:
>On Wed, 11 Jan 2006, Ian G wrote:
>> Even though triple-DES is still considered to have avoided that trap,
>> its relatively small block size means you can now put the entire
>> decrypt table on a dvd (or somesuch, I forget the maths).
> This would need 8 x 2^{64} byte
On Thu, 12 Jan 2006 00:48:05 -0600, Travis H said:
> All it really does is crudely limit the quantity of data sent under
> that key, which is little to none anyway.
And it has the advantage that people will stop sending encrypted mail
to this key after the expiration date. Comes handy if you for
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Ian G writes:
>Alexander Klimov wrote:
>> On Wed, 11 Jan 2006, Ian G wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Even though triple-DES is still considered to have avoided that
>>>trap, its relatively small block size means you can now put the
>>>entire decrypt table on a dvd (or somesuch, I
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0%2c70001-0.html?tw=wn_tophead_5
They seems to have built a device which can store one qubit, isolated
from the rest of the world. They seem to be able to scale up their
technique to store many qubits, but I strongly suspect th
John Denker wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From what I understand simple quantum computers can easily brute-force
attack RSA keys or other
types of PK keys.
My understanding is that quantum computers cannot "easily" do anything.
Au contraire, quantum computers can easily perform prime
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