* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Of course, it is a trick. Yesterday I updated my paper Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions Within a Minute (http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf) and MD5 collision program (http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/2006/web_version_1.zip). just being curious: from what
Hi Vlastimil and group, Gera Richarte has done some interesting work with executable files that have the same MD5 hash. Take a look at http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/projects/research_topics.php to see his talk at PacSec `05 and Two executable files with the same MD5 hash, crc32, checksum32
It seems not everyone has gotten the message that monoalphabetic substitution was broken many hundreds of years ago. Excerpt: The recently arrested boss of bosses of the Sicilian Mafia, Bernardo Provenzano, wrote notes using an encryption scheme similar to the one used by Julius Caesar
* Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So, why not always sign messages to a list that permits signatures? It's hard to see the benefit, and it is easy to see the potential cost. In a litiguous world, we are (slightly) better off not using messages that are going to haunt us in years to come.
From: Owen Blacker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Deniable File System To: UK Crypto list [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 11:43:18 +0100 (BST) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/deniable_file_s.html Some years ago I did some design work on something I
and a second data point, not everyone in the mafia chooses good passphrases; a few years ago the government got a black bag warrant (once and a renewal) to install some still undescribed keystroke monitoring technology on nicky scarfo jr's pc, to find out the pgp key of a spreadsheet of a