Re: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Dave \No, not that one\ Korn
Max A. wrote: Hello! Could anybody familiar with PGP products look at the following page and explain in brief what it is about and what are consequences of the described bug? 1. The disk is encrypted using a long, secure, random, symmetric en/de-cryption key. (EDK for short). 2. The EDK

Fw: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Dave Korn
[ Originally tried to post this through gmane, but it doesn't seem to work; apologies if this has been seen before. ] Max A. wrote: Hello! Could anybody familiar with PGP products look at the following page and explain in brief what it is about and what are consequences of the described

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Jon Callas
On 21 Aug 2006, at 3:36 PM, Max A. wrote: Hello! Could anybody familiar with PGP products look at the following page and explain in brief what it is about and what are consequences of the described bug? http://www.safehack.com/Advisory/pgp/PGPcrack.html The text there looks to me rather

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Dr Adam Back
What they're saying is if you change the password, create some new data in the encrypted folder, then someone who knew the old password, can decrypt your new data. Why? Well because when you change the password they dont change the symmetric key used to encrypt the data. The password is used to

Re: Solving systems of multivariate polynomials modulo 2^32

2006-08-27 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Mon, 14 Aug 2006, David Wagner wrote: Here's an example. Suppose we have the equations: x*y + z = 1 x^3 + y^2 * z = 1 x + y + z = 0 Step 1: Find all solutions modulo 2. This is easy: you just have to try 2^3 = 8 possible assignments and see which one satisfy the

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Mon, 21 Aug 2006, Max A. wrote: Could anybody familiar with PGP products look at the following page and explain in brief what it is about and what are consequences of the described bug? http://www.safehack.com/Advisory/pgp/PGPcrack.html The text there looks to me rather obscure with a

Chasing the Rabbit - a cryptanalytic contest

2006-08-27 Thread Erik Zenner
Hi all! At the rump session of Crypto 2006, we started the chasing the Rabbit contest. Dan Bernstein was so kind as to present the slides on our behalf. The details of the contest are given below; they can also be downloaded from http://www.cryptico.com/Files/Filer/rabbit_contest.pdf. Best

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Dave Korn
Ondrej Mikle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]... Max A. wrote: Hello! Could anybody familiar with PGP products look at the following page and explain in brief what it is about and what are consequences of the described bug?

Hypothesis: PGP backdoor (was: A security bug in PGP products?)

2006-08-27 Thread Ondrej Mikle
Hello. We discussed with V. Klima about the recent bug in PGPdisk that allowed extraction of key and data without the knowledge of passphrase. The result is a *very*wild*hypothesis*. Cf. http://www.safehack.com/Advisory/pgp/PGPcrack.html Question 1: why haven't anybody noticed in three

Re: Hamiltonian path as protection against DOS.

2006-08-27 Thread Travis H.
What is the complexity class for Eulerian paths/trails? Wikipedia doesn't say. -- If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the precipitate. Unix guru for rent or hire -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484

collisions in 64 round variant of SHA-1 with 25% chosen plaintext

2006-08-27 Thread Travis H.
http://www.heise-security.co.uk/news/77244 ``Although the demonstration was restricted to the reduced SHA-1 variant in 64 steps, it can, according to the experts, also be generalised to the standard 80 step variant. This means that SHA-1 must also be considered as cracked in principle. Christian

skype not so anonymous...

2006-08-27 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Fugitive executive is tracked down by tracing his Skype calls... http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060824-7582.html Perry - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL

[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [fc-announce] CFP: Usable Security (USEC'07)]

2006-08-27 Thread R. Hirschfeld
From: Rachna Dhamija [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [fc-announce] CFP: Usable Security (USEC'07) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2006 10:55:05 -0400 This workshop will be held in conjunction with Financial Cryptography and Data Security '07. We encourage you to participate and to

CRCs and passphrase hashing

2006-08-27 Thread Travis H.
Howdy! I was talking to Terry Ritter, and he was explaining to me that when he needed to make some keys from a user-supplied passphrase, he computed various CRCs over the passphrase, and used those as derived keys. I'd like to know more about it, and I was wondering if anyone knew of any work

Provably secure cryptosystem

2006-08-27 Thread Ondrej Mikle
Hello. I humbly say that I *might* have devised a provably secure cryptosystem that actually *might* work in reality. It provides secure authentication and possibly might be extended to something else. Sounds too good to be true? Well, you're right. In reality it's a bit more complicated.

Re: Chasing the Rabbit - a cryptanalytic contest

2006-08-27 Thread Greg Rose
At 15:26 +0200 2006/08/23, Erik Zenner wrote: Hi all! At the rump session of Crypto 2006, we started the chasing the Rabbit contest. Dan Bernstein was so kind as to present the slides on our behalf. The details of the contest are given below; they can also be downloaded from

Re: Hypothesis: PGP backdoor (was: A security bug in PGP products?)

2006-08-27 Thread Len Sassaman
On Thu, 24 Aug 2006, Ondrej Mikle wrote: 2) AFAIK, Zimmerman is no longer in control of the company making PGP. AFAIK the company (NAI) has been bought by another group couple of years ago. The rescue of PGP from NAI's gross neglect and mismanagement of the product line was orchestrated by