Call for papers: New Security Paradigms Workshop
New Security Paradigms Workshop http://www.nspw.org September 18-21, 2007 White Mountain Hotel and Resort, New Hampshire, USA Important Dates 1. The submission deadline is May 1 2. Notification of acceptance is by July 3 3. Camera-ready papers for pre-proceedings due August 28 4. Workshop during September 18-21 5. Camera-ready papers for proceedings due November 1 NSPW is a unique workshop that is devoted to the critical examination of new paradigms in security. Each year, since 1992, we examine proposals for new principles upon which information security can be rebuilt from the ground up. We conduct extensive, highly interactive discussions of these proposals, from which we hope both the audience and the authors emerge with a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of what has been discussed. For full call for papers and other details, visit www.nspw.org Konstantin (Kosta) Beznosov NSPW '07 Publicity Chair -- ___ Konstantin Beznosov Assistant Professor Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering http://lersse.ece.ubc.ca Electrical and Computer Engineering University of British Columbia http://www.ece.ubc.ca/~beznosov/ 4047-2332 Main Mall Phone: +1 604 822 9181 Vancouver, BC, Fax:+1 801 515 8630 Canada V6T 1Z4 ___ -- ___ Konstantin Beznosov Assistant Professor Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering http://lersse.ece.ubc.ca Electrical and Computer Engineering University of British Columbia http://www.ece.ubc.ca/~beznosov/ 4047-2332 Main Mall Phone: +1 604 822 9181 Vancouver, BC, Fax:+1 801 515 8630 Canada V6T 1Z4 ___ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Entropy of other languages
Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Feb 07, 2007 at 05:42:49AM -0800, Sandy Harris wrote: He starts from information theory and an assumption that there needs to be some constant upper bound on the receiver's per-symbol processing time. From there, with nothing else, he gets to a proof that the optimal frequency distribution of symbols is always some member of a parameterized set of curves. Do you remember how he got from the upper bound on processing time to anything other than a completely uniform distribution of symbols? No. There was some pretty heavy math in the paper. With it in my hand, I understood enough to follow the argument. 20 years later with no paper to hand, I haven't a clue. Paper is likely somewhere under his home page. http://www.math.yale.edu/mandelbrot/ Seems to me a flat distribution has the minimal upper bound on information content per symbol for a given amount of information! Probably, but he did have a proof that the skewed distribution is more efficient in some ways. -- Sandy Harris Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
padlocks with backdoors - TSA approved
Hi, has this been mentioned here before? I just had my crypto mightmare experience. I was in a (german!) outdoor shop to complete my equipment for my next trip, when I came to the rack with luggage padlocks (used to lock the zippers). While the german brand locks were as usual, all the US brand locks had a sticker Can be opened and re-locked by US luggage inspectors. Each of these (three digit code) locks had a small keyhole for the master key to open. Obviously there are different key types (different size, shape, brand) as the locks had numbers like TSA005 tell the officer which key to use to open that lock. Never seen anything in real world which is such a precise analogon of a crypto backdoor for governmental access. Ironically, they advertise it as a big advantage and important feature, since it allows to arrive with the lock intact and in place instead of cut off. This is the point where I decided to have nightmares from now on. regards Hadmut - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: private credential/ecash thread on slashdot (Re: announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials)
At 04:40 PM 2/20/2007, Adam Back wrote: There is quite some underinformed speculation as critique on the thread... Its interesting to see people who probably understand SSL, SMIME and stuff at least at a power user if not programmer level, try to make logical leaps about what must be wrong or limited about unlinkable credential schemes. Shows the challenges faced in deploying this stuff. Cant deploy what people dont understand! I certainly relate with that. Much of what is widely deployed fits that category with me. But then, look at how successful fiat money, paper money, is. That is certainly not understood by most, but it does not have the problem of lack of deployment. So maybe trust and understanding are not related with each other and we need to understand this point better. In actuality, most stuff is not understood. Who understands how their cars work, or their airplane rides across the country, or their computers, banks, medical systems and on and on? I say Adam has a good point, but maybe it's the wrong one. :) Steve - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
