On 04 April 2007 00:44, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Not that WEP has been considered remotely secure for some time, but
the best crack is now down to 40,000 packets for a 50% chance of
cracking the key.
http://www.cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/aircrack-ptw/
Sorry, is that actually better
Afternoon all,
This story is a couple of days old now but I haven't seen it mentioned
on-list yet.
The DHS has requested the master key for the DNS root zone.
http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/87655
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/03/dns_master_key_controversy/
On Wed, Apr 04, 2007 at 05:51:27PM +0100, Dave Korn wrote:
Can anyone seriously imagine countries like Iran or China signing up to a
system that places complete control, surveillance and falsification
capabilities in the hands of the US' military intelligence?
How is this any different from
The DHS has requested the master key for the DNS root zone.
Can anyone seriously imagine countries like Iran or China signing up
to a system that places complete control, surveillance and
falsification capabilities in the hands of the US' military
intelligence?
For anyone who hasn't been
anti-rant
At 5:51 PM +0100 4/4/07, Dave Korn wrote:
Can anyone seriously imagine countries like Iran or China signing up to a
system that places complete control, surveillance and falsification
capabilities in the hands of the US' military intelligence?
No.
But how does having the root
Dave Korn [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Surely if this goes ahead, it will mean that DNSSEC is doomed to widespread
non-acceptance.
I realise this is a bit of a cheap shot, but:
How will this be any different from the current situation?
Peter.
On Apr 4, 2007, at 03:38 , Dave Korn wrote:
On 04 April 2007 00:44, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Not that WEP has been considered remotely secure for some time, but
the best crack is now down to 40,000 packets for a 50% chance of
cracking the key.
Dave,
For the purposes of discussion,
(1) Why should I care whether Iran or China sign up?
(2) Who should hold the keys instead of the only powerful
military under democratic control?
(a) The utterly porous United Nations?
(b) The members of this mailing list, channeling
for
On 05 April 2007 16:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dave,
For the purposes of discussion,
(1) Why should I care whether Iran or China sign up?
I think it would be consistent to either a) care that *everybody* signs up,
or b) not care about DNSSEC at all, but I think that a fragmentary
Dave mentioned:
# Can anyone seriously imagine countries like Iran or China signing up to a
#system that places complete control, surveillance and falsification
#capabilities in the hands of the US' military intelligence?
I'm not sure having control of the keys for the root zone would
Paul Hoffman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
At 5:51 PM +0100 4/4/07, Dave Korn wrote:
Can anyone seriously imagine countries like Iran or China signing up to a
system that places complete control, surveillance and falsification
capabilities in the hands of the US' military intelligence?
No.
* Peter Gutmann:
Dave Korn [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Surely if this goes ahead, it will mean that DNSSEC is doomed to widespread
non-acceptance.
I realise this is a bit of a cheap shot, but:
How will this be any different from the current situation?
You can see that the keys change and
Simon Josefsson wrote:
However, in practice I don't believe many will trust the root key
alone -- for example, I believe most if not all Swedish ISPs would
configure in trust of the .se key as well. One can imagine a
web-of-trust based key-update mechanism that avoids the need to trust
a
* Simon Josefsson:
However, in practice I don't believe many will trust the root key
alone -- for example, I believe most if not all Swedish ISPs would
configure in trust of the .se key as well.
There are some examples that such static configuration is extremely
bad. Look at the problems
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