James A. Donald wrote:
Many protocols use some form of self describing data format, for example
ASN.1, XML, S expressions, and bencoding.
Why?
Presumably both ends of the conversation have negotiated what protocol
version they are using (and if they have not, you have big problems) and
when
Peter Gutmann wrote:
-- Snip --
This is very scary. I bet that our Minister of the Interior would love
it, though, since he has been pushing a scheme for stealth examination
of suspects' computers (called Federal Trojan). Technology like this
would be a large first step towards making
On Friday, June 01, 2007 7:00 AM James A. Donald wrote:
Many protocols use some form of self describing data format, for
example
ASN.1, XML, S expressions, and bencoding.
Why?
Presumably both ends of the conversation have negotiated what protocol
version they are using (and if they
On Tue, 5 Jun 2007, Travis H. wrote:
1048576000 bytes (1.0 GB) copied, 3.08291 seconds, 340 MB/s
[...]
That seems to reflect that it isn't really going to disk.
I'm surprised the controller has that much RAM on it,
I guess it is not the controller, but the kernel.
Encryption reduces
| Many protocols use some form of self describing data format, for
| example ASN.1, XML, S expressions, and bencoding.
|
| Why?
|
| Presumably both ends of the conversation have negotiated what protocol
| version they are using (and if they have not, you have big problems)
| and when they
Many protocols use some form of self describing data format, for example
ASN.1, XML, S expressions, and bencoding.
I'm not sure what you're getting at. All XML and S expressions really get
you is that you know how to skip past something you don't understand. This
is also true for many (XER,
Thanks to Vincent Rijmen and all who provided their papers and presentations.
Most of them are there:
http://events.iaik.tugraz.at/HashWorkshop07/program.html
Vlastimil Klima
- PŮVODNÍ ZPRÁVA -
Od: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Komu: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Předmět: proceedings from ECRYPT Hash
Peter Gutmann wrote:
[...] a register article saying Intel released its new platform Centrino Pro
which includes Intel Active Management 2.5. An article with some more info is
here:
It appears Active Management is a setting that can be disabled normally
from the BIOS, like with TPMs today:
On Tue, Jun 05, 2007 at 07:00:51PM -0500, Travis H. wrote:
I just did some performance testing on a file server (debian 4.0) and
thought I'd share the figures, both raw and using the luks
cryptosystem described here:
http://luks.endorphin.org/about
Here's the specs:
AMD Athlon 64 x2
A quick question.
Is anyone aware of a commercial product that implements secret sharing? If
so, can I get a pointer to some product literature?
Chuck Jackson
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending
Interesting-looking article on how users of P2P networks end up sharing
much more than they expected: http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/43.pdf
-- Jerry
-
The
| Interesting-looking article on how users of P2P networks end up sharing
| much more than they expected: http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/43.pdf
Earlier analysis by the USPTO:
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/copyright/oir_report_on_inadvertent_sharing_v1012.pdf
In case anyone is interested in seeing how the Trusted Computing Group
is pitching Trusted Computing to OEMs.
Trusted Storage - Why You Need Security
in Storage and How to Make Storage Secure
Sponsored by: Trusted Computing Group
Thursday, June 21st
11am PT/2pm ET
This Webinar provides a
US Government has select 9 security vendors that will product drive
and file level encryption software.
See:
http://security-basics.blogspot.com/2007/06/fde-fde-solutions-selected-for-us.html
OR
http://tinyurl.com/2xffax
-
The
Hi Folks,
On a legal mailing list I'm on there is a bunch of emails on the
perceived effects of quantum cryptography. Is there any authoritative
literature/links that can help clear the confusion?
Thanks in advance,
Aram Perez
see also: Reliability of security systems
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/#Reliability
=JeffH
From: Ross Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Newsnight tonight
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 19:19:24 +0100
We helped make a piece on ATM fraud a few weeks ago for
of potential related interest is..
Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nea-requirements-02.txt
note term remediate/remediation.
relevant snippage below. see also..
According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde), French government
defense experts have advised officials in France's corridors of power
to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping by U.S.
intelligence agencies.
That's a bit puzzling. My understanding is that email is encrypted
from
There is a opensource implementation available:
http://point-at-infinity.org//
On 6/13/07, Charles Jackson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A quick question.
Is anyone aware of a commercial product that implements secret sharing? If
so, can I get a pointer to some product literature?
--
Saqib
Hi.
On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nea-requirements-02.txt
[...]
NEA technology may be used for several purposes. One use is to
facilitate endpoint compliance
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde), French government
defense experts have advised officials in France's corridors of power
to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping by U.S.
intelligence agencies.
That's a bit puzzling. My understanding is
=?UTF-8?B?SXZhbiBLcnN0acSH?= [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It appears Active Management is a setting that can be disabled normally from
the BIOS, like with TPMs today:
http://support.intel.com/support/motherboards/desktop/sb/cs-020837.htm
With TPMs it's a bit different, they're absent from the
On 21 June 2007 04:41, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde), French government
defense experts have advised officials in France's corridors of power
to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping by U.S.
intelligence agencies.
That's a bit
On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 11:41:20PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde), French government
defense experts have advised officials in France's corridors of power
to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping by U.S.
intelligence agencies.
James A. Donald wrote:
snip
In the case of XML, yes there is a parsing engine, and if the structure
of the DTD reflects the structure of the algorithm, then indeed it makes
things much easier. But usually the committee have not thought about
the algorithm, or have unresolved disagreements
Steve,
It could be that the linkage between user ids and auth keys is too weak,
allowing a MITM attack to be undetected that sniffs the data encryption
key. This seems to be common problem with many of the secure protocols
I've examined.
- Alex
- Original Message -
From: Steven M.
There's a rather ominous EU legislation to be passed soon,
which requires any party acting as a provider (you run anonymous
proxy, or mix cascade, you are a provider) to log all connection
info (when, who, with whom). What's the status of ad hoc IPsec
or any other TCP/IP-tunneling VPN for random
On Fri, 22 Jun 2007, Peter Gutmann wrote:
It's available as part of other products (e.g. nCipher do it for keying their
HSMs), but I don't know of any product that just does... secret sharing. What
would be the user interface for such an application? What would be the target
audience? (I
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], Eugen Leitl
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes
There's a rather ominous EU legislation to be passed soon,
which requires any party acting as a provider (you run anonymous
proxy, or mix cascade, you are a provider) to log all connection
info (when, who, with whom). What's the
On Fri, Jun 01, 2007 at 08:59:55PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
Many protocols use some form of self describing data format, for example
ASN.1, XML, S expressions, and bencoding.
ASN.1 is not an encoding, and not all its encodings are self-describing.
Specifically, PER is a compact encoding
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 04:32:50PM +0300, Alexander Klimov wrote:
Hi.
On Wed, 20 Jun 2007 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nea-requirements-02.txt
[...]
NEA technology may be used
But the main motivation (imho) is that it's trendy. And once anyone
proposes a heavyweight standard encoding, anyone who opposes it is
labeled a Luddite.
Maybe. But there's quite a lot to be said for standards which lead to
widespread availability of tools implementing them, both, open source
RSA's BSAFE 6.2.1.0 supports Bloom-Shamir secret sharing.
Peter Trei
Principal Engineer
RSA: the Security Division of EMC.
Disclaimer: I am not a spokesperson for RSA or EMC.
-Original Message-
Charles Jackson asks:
A quick question.
Is anyone aware of a commercial product that
On Mon, Jun 11, 2007 at 09:28:02AM -0400, Bowness, Piers wrote:
But what is does help is allowing a protocol to be expanded and enhanced
while maintaining backward compatibility for both client and server.
Nonsense. ASN.1's PER encoding does not prevent extensibility.
On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 09:10:12PM -0700, Aram Perez wrote:
On a legal mailing list I'm on there is a bunch of emails on the
perceived effects of quantum cryptography. Is there any authoritative
literature/links that can help clear the confusion?
Quantum Cryptography or Quantum Computing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] schrieb:
Steve,
It could be that the linkage between user ids and auth keys is too weak,
allowing a MITM attack to be undetected that sniffs the data encryption
key. This seems to be common problem with many of the secure protocols
I've examined.
- Alex
Ahoi!
Nobody
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