Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Adam Shostack wrote: I'd suggest starting from the deployment, training, and help desk costs. The technology is free, getting users to use it is not. I helped several banks look at this stuff in the late 90s, when cost of a smartcard reader was order ~25, and deployment costs were estimated at

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Sun, Jul 01, 2007 at 08:38:12AM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes: (The usage model is that you do the UI portion on the PC, but perform the actual transaction on the external device, which has a two-line LCD display for source and destination of

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Hal Finney
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes: (The usage model is that you do the UI portion on the PC, but perform the actual transaction on the external device, which has a two-line LCD display for source and destination of transaction, amount, and purpose of the transaction. All communications

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Adam Shostack
On Sun, Jul 01, 2007 at 04:01:03PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: | | Adam Shostack [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: | On Mon, Jul 02, 2007 at 01:08:12AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: | | Given that all you need for this is a glorified pocket calculator, | you could (in large enough quantities)

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Florian Weimer
* Ian G.: Banks are the larger and more informed party. But not as far as client-side fraudulent activity is concerned. After all, the attacked systems are not under their administrative control. They need to provide systems that are reasonable given the situation (anglo courts generally

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Florian Weimer
* Anne Lynn Wheeler: In the mid-90s, financial institutions looking at the internet for online, commercial banking and cash management (i.e. business equivalent to consumer online banking) were extremely conflicted ... they frequently were almost insisting on their own appliance at the

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Florian Weimer wrote: Oh really? In Germany, early digital banking had no cryptographic protection at all. Integrity and confidentiality were inherited from the underlying phone system. There were no end-to-end digital signatures. Nothing. Just a one-time password for each transaction, but

RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine

2007-07-02 Thread Ian Farquhar \(ifarquha\)
Dave Korn wrote: Ian Farquhar wrote: Maybe I am showing my eternal optimist side here, but to me, this is how TPM's should be used, as opposed to the way their backers originally wanted them used. A removable module whose connection to a device I establish (and can de-establish, assuming

Re: TPM, part 2

2007-07-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Peter Gutmann wrote: I have a friend who implemented a basic trusted-boot mechanism for a student project, so we have evidence of at least one use of a TPM for TC, and I know some folks at IBM Research were playing with one a few years ago, so that's at least two users so far. Anyone else? as

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Leichter, Jerry
| | Given that all you need for this is a glorified pocket | | calculator, you could (in large enough quantities) probably get | | it made for $10, provided you shot anyone who tried to | | introduce product-deployment DoS mechanisms like smart cards and | | EMV into the picture. Now

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Stephan Neuhaus
Peter Gutmann wrote: Given that all you need for this is a glorified pocket calculator, you could (in large enough quantities) probably get it made for $10, provided you shot anyone who tried to introduce product-deployment DoS mechanisms like smart cards and EMV into the picture. That seems

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Peter Gutmann
Adam Shostack [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I'd suggest starting from the deployment, training, and help desk costs. The technology is free, getting users to use it is not. I helped several banks look at this stuff in the late 90s, when cost of a smartcard reader was order ~25, and deployment costs

TPM hacking

2007-07-02 Thread Sean W. Smith
Seeing as how there are are some rumors about other attacks coming from BlackHat, I thought we should publicize ours a bit: A 3 piece of wire does the job. More info (and a link to a YouTube demo) at: www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pkilab/sparks/ --Sean Sean W. Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Nicholas Bohm
Perry E. Metzger wrote: Adam Shostack [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Mon, Jul 02, 2007 at 01:08:12AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: Given that all you need for this is a glorified pocket calculator, you could (in large enough quantities) probably get it made for $10, provided you shot anyone who

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Peter Gutmann wrote: Smart cards are part of the problem set, not the solution set - they're just an expensive and awkward distraction from solving the real problem. What I was suggesting (and have been for at least ten years :-) is a small external single-function device (no need for an OS)

Re: The bank fraud blame game

2007-07-02 Thread Adam Shostack
On Sun, Jul 01, 2007 at 11:09:16PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote: | | | Given that all you need for this is a glorified pocket | | | calculator, you could (in large enough quantities) probably get | | | it made for $10, provided you shot anyone who tried to | | | introduce