On 31 August 2007 02:44, travis+ml-cryptography wrote:
I think it might be fun to start up a collection of snake oil
cryptographic methods and cryptanalytic attacks against them.
I was going to post about crypto done wrong after reading this item[*]:
I feel I should add a followup to the earlier post, this was implied by the
rhetorical question about what the LINPACK performance of a botnet is, but
I'll make it explicit here:
The standard benchmark for supercomputers is the LINPACK linear-algebra
mathematical benchmark. Now in practice the
I'd like to start with the really simple stuff; classical
cryptography, systems with clean and obvious breaks.
You can start with RSA SecurID, Texas Instruments DST40, Microchip
Technologies KeeLoq, Philips/NXP Hitag2, WEP RC4, Bluetooth E0, GSM
A5... It's much harder to find a product or
A critique of modern cryptography by Neal Koblitz in Notices of the AMS:
http://www.ams.org/notices/200708/tx070800972p.pdf
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Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Crossroads is an undergraduate journal.
We'd do well to single out more worth targets for public ridicule
than CS undergrads.
If you want to help the author, why not educate, rather than
mocking? He's obviously been motivated to think about the subject
matter and to even take the bold
I don't think fingerprint scanners work in a way that's obviously
amenable to hashing with well-known algorithms. Fingerprint scanners
produce an image, from which some features can be identified. But, not
all the same features can be extracted identically every time an image
is obtained. I know
On 02 September 2007 01:13, Nash Foster wrote:
I don't think fingerprint scanners work in a way that's obviously
amenable to hashing with well-known algorithms. Fingerprint scanners
produce an image, from which some features can be identified. But, not
all the same features can be extracted
