On Mon, Sep 03, 2007 at 04:27:22PM -0400, Vin McLellan wrote: Thor Lancelot quoted that, and erupted with sanctimonious umbrage: I think it's important that we know, when flaws in commercial cryptographic products are being discussed, what the interests of the parties to the discussion are.
I apologize for misstating your name, Mr. Simon. I thought I had answered your question. No one asked me to reply to Ruptor, or to you -- and you chose the tone of this exchange. As I said, I would be shocked if anyone at RSA or EMC even knows about this discussion. No one tells me what
There does not seem to be much consideration about what is computationally infeasible, even with rainbow tables. If I remember correctly an 8 character 94 key space table is about 300 MB. How big would it be if it was covering 12 characters? How long would it take to compute assuming 1,000 3
On Sat, Sep 01, 2007 at 12:35:33PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: A critique of modern cryptography by Neal Koblitz in Notices of the AMS: http://www.ams.org/notices/200708/tx070800972p.pdf The way I read it, it is a critique of the (somewhat inevitable) poor quality of peer-review for
Victor Duchovni wrote: This part is not too radical. The more specific skepticism of security proofs (I am reluctant to agree that these are actively harmful), seems to be a combination of the peer review issue above, and (often?) lack of tight bounds that make the proofs applicable to