| I often say, Rub a pair of cryptographers together, and you'll
| get three opinions. Ask three, you'll get six opinions. :-)
|
| However, he's talking about security, which often isn't quantifiable!
From what I see in the arguments, it's more complicated than that.
On one side, we have SeLinux, produced with at least the aid of the NSA.
SeLinux embodies the accepted knowledge about how to do security
right. This is a matter of engineering experience, not science. The
fact is, very few things in this world are a matter of science.
Science can provide answers, but it can't choose the questions for you.
In the case of security, you first have to choose your model of what
needs to be secured, and against what kind of attacks. There's no
possible science here - science can help you by telling you where the
limits are, what impact some choices have on others, but ultimately what
you consider important to protect, and what kinds of attacks you
consider plausible enough to be worth the costs of preventing, are
judgements that science cannot make. The NSA has tons of experience
here, along all the relevant dimensions. But the judgements they make,
while appropriate to their circumstances, may make little sense in other
circumstances. I'm quite willing to grant that, in the sphere in which
NSA works, SeLinux is a great solution. But few of us live there.
So ... on the other side, we have those who focus on the difficulty with
actually configuring and using an SeLinux system. This is a dimension
that doesn't particularly concern NSA: They have legal and operational
requirements that *must* be met, and the way to deal with the complexity
is to throw trained people and money at the problem. But hardly anyone
else is in a position to take that approach. So the net result is that
people end up not using SeLinux. Seeing this, others come along with
simpler-to-use approaches. They don't solve the problems SeLinux
solves, but they do solve *some* real problems - and they are claimed to
be much more likely to be adopted. (Adoption rates, at least, *can* be
measured. You can complain all you like about what people *should* be
doing, but ultimately what they *are* doing is something you have to
measure in the real world - scientifically! - not just think about.)
Now, the security absolutists say But you're getting people to adopt
something that doesn't *really* protect them. Perhaps, though in the
words of George Orwell, The best is the enemy of the good.
We see the same kinds of arguments in cryptography. There are the
absolutists, who brand as snake oil anything that doesn't pass every
known test anyone has ever published, that hasn't had every individual
component fully vetted by people they trust (and ultimately, they trust
no one, so it ends up the only things they trust are things they created
themselves). There are the true snake oil salesmen. And there are
those who try to get something good enough out there: Something that
will actually get used by more than a tiny fraction of the population
and will protect them against reasonable threats. For myself, I long
ago decided that no data I have is so valuable that it needs to survive
an attack that costs more than, say, a few thousand dollars to pull off.
In fact, if we're talking about data that can't be identified up front -
e.g., if someone had to go through my encrypted files one at a time, not
knowing what was in them until they had decrypted them - the threshold
is dramatically lower. I'd probably be happy if it cost more than $100
per file. Even at those rates, there would be cheaper ways to get at
my stuff than attacking the cryptography.
Obviously, others will have different thresholds. But thinking about
this kind of thing in monetary terms does help you get away from the
kind of nebulous I want my stuff secure from any possible attack by
anyone thinking. So I don't trust WEP for anything, but I do trust WPA
- but I use SSH even over WPA links for many things. It's cheap, it's
as easy to use as the alternatives - why not? I have files encrypted
with what by today's standards are very weak algorithms. If they get
broken, I've judged that my loss is trivial. The old programs are quick
and easy to use and I just haven't gotten 'round to re-encrypting with
newer algorithms that, on today's machines, are fast enough and easy
enough to use. I tend to zero out files before deleting them, just
because it's easy to do and it can't hurt. On the other hand, I don't
go out of my way to use some 7-pass or - Lord save us from those who
can't even be bothered to read Peter Guttman's paper on this and
understand what he actually said - 35-pass erasure algorithm: If I have
to worry about an attacker who are willing to use fancy data recovery
hardware to look for remnant magnetization, I've got other problems.
(BTW, it always amazes me that no modern system has picked up an old,
old idea from VMS: You can set a marker on a file that
