For years, the Election Integrity Committee of the Pima County Democratic Party has been trying to improve the security of the elections systems used in local elections. The results include: -- a dozen or so suggestions that they made were actually accepted and implemented by the county. -- there was a criminal investigation by the Attorney General's office into the actions of Pima County Division of Elections personnel, but no charges were brought. -- last but not least, they wanted access (after each election) to the record of votes cast, but the county refused, leading to a lawsuit that has just now come to trial.
Background info on the trial: http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/2007/11/pima-county-ele.html http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/2007/12/pima-county-ele.html Overview with links: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5384 Report on day one, with links to statements and testimony: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5399 I note that the plaintiffs' opening statement actually used the term "security through obscurity". Report on day two, with links to testimony: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5408 "Election Security Report" From the County Administrator to the Board of Supervisors http://www.pima.gov/GenInfo/Pdfs/Election%20Security%20101907.pdf The last 20 pages reproduce an article from The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation "Stop the Presses: How Paper Trails Fail to Secure e-Voting" which quite one-sidedly favors cryptologic solutions to all problems. It suggests things like cut-and-choose and zero- knowledge proofs ... which makes for a dramatic contrast with the appalling unsophistication of the Diebold machines that are actually being used. ========================= Disclaimer: One of the attorneys in the case is T. A. Denker. Yes, he is my brother. No, I have not learned _anything_ about the case from him. I am not involved in this case ... except to the extent that as a voter I have a stake in the outcome. ========================= This is not an issue for the trial, but I can't help noting that for years the Australians have been using a Linux-based e-voting system, with all code open to public review: http://www.elections.act.gov.au/EVACS.html http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2003/11/61045 which makes another dramatic contrast with Diebold's stated "need" for secrecy. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
