Donald Knuth stops paying for errata

It seems that Donald Knuth had his bank accounts attacked not once but three times using his checking account number off of checks he sent out for bounties for flaws in his books and software, and is thus ending a practice of nearly 40 years. Rather sad. I mark this as another milestone in the sl

Re: Who cares about side-channel attacks?

On Wed, 29 Oct 2008 23:41:40 -0500 Thierry Moreau <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Does SCA protection enter the picture? Marginally at best. > You're forgetting the first questions you need to ask: who are your enemies, what are you trying to protect, and what can you enemy spend? And regardless of

Parallel Skein Hash Construction based on the Subset Sum Problem?

On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 9:23 AM, Stephan Somogyi wrote: > > The Skein team has announced its submission to the NIST hash competition: > > > Now that we've all had a chance to read the Skein algorithm, I've got a question for the list: Would it be possible to c

Re: the skein hash function

Eugen Leitl and Stephan Somogyi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote about the Skein hash function announcement. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/the_skein_hash.html?1 > http://www.schneier.com/skein.html One thing I noticed on a first read-through was a discussion of speed for ASICs vs. gene

Re: Who cares about side-channel attacks?

Peter Gutmann wrote: Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Peter Gutmann wrote: Given the string of attacks on crypto in embedded devices (XBox, iPhone, iOpener, Wii, some not-yet-published ones on HDCP devices :-), etc) this is by far the most at-risk category because there's a huge ince

Re: Who cares about side-channel attacks?

Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >Peter Gutmann wrote: >> Given the string of >> attacks on crypto in embedded devices (XBox, iPhone, iOpener, Wii, some >> not-yet-published ones on HDCP devices :-), etc) this is by far the most >> at-risk category because there's a huge incentive to attack t