On Sat, 31 Jul 2010, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
On 31 jul 2010, at 08.44, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Apparently the DNS root key is protected by what sounds like a five-of-seven
threshold scheme, but the description is a bit unclear. Does anyone know
more?
The DNS root key is stored in HSMs. The key b
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On 07/31/2010 02:44 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Apparently the DNS root key is protected by what sounds like a
> five-of-seven threshold scheme, but the description is a bit
> unclear. Does anyone know more?
>
> (Oh, and for people who want to quibble
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On 07/31/2010 12:32 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 1 If you can do an online check for the validity of a key, there is
> no need for a long-lived signed certificate, since you could
> simply ask a database in real time whether the holder of the key
On Sat, Jul 31, 2010 at 12:32:39PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 5 Also related to 3, but important in its own right: to quote Ian
> Grigg:
>
> *** There should be one mode, and it should be secure. ***
6. Enrolment must be simple.
I didn't see anything about transitive trust. My rule
On 07/31/2010 01:30 PM, Guus Sliepen wrote:
But, if you query an online database, how do you authenticate its answer? If
you use a key for that or SSL certificate, I see a chicken-and-egg problem.
Part of what is now referred to as "electronic commerce" is a payment gateway that
sits between t
On Sat, 31 Jul 2010 19:30:06 +0200 Guus Sliepen
wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 31, 2010 at 12:32:39PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
> > 1 If you can do an online check for the validity of a key, there
> > is no need for a long-lived signed certificate, since you could
> > simply ask a database in real t
On Sat, Jul 31, 2010 at 06:44:12PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote:
| Apparently the DNS root key is protected by what sounds like a five-of-seven
| threshold scheme, but the description is a bit unclear. Does anyone know
| more?
|
| (Oh, and for people who want to quibble over "practically-deployed",
I'm currently reading "Defend the Realm", an authorized history oF MI-5 by a
historian who had access to their secret files. The chapter on Venona has the
following fascinating footnote: "The method of decryption is summarized in a
number of NSA publications, among them the account by Cecil Jam
On Jul 31, 2010, at 8:44 12AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Apparently the DNS root key is protected by what sounds like a five-of-seven
> threshold scheme, but the description is a bit unclear. Does anyone know
> more?
>
> (Oh, and for people who want to quibble over "practically-deployed", I'm not
On Sat, Jul 31, 2010 at 04:55:18AM -0700, John Denker wrote:
> > 2. How dangerous it is to feed the pool with stale seed data in the next
> >boot (i.e. in a failure mode where we do not regenerate the seed file) ?
[...]
> Now, to answer the question: A random-seed file should never be reused.
On 07/31/2010 08:49 AM, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> the best way of fixing a Debian
> system to be more secure as far as the quality of the randomness used by a
> random user application will be, AFAIK, is to simply get a medium or high
> bandwidth TRNG,
Yes indeed!
> I don't have
On Sat, Jul 31, 2010 at 12:32:39PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> 1 If you can do an online check for the validity of a key, there is no
> need for a long-lived signed certificate, since you could simply ask
> a database in real time whether the holder of the key is authorized
> to perform
Usability engineering requires empathy. Isn't it interesting that nerds
built themselves a system, SSH, that mostly adheres to Perry's theses? We
nerds have empathy for ourselves. But when it comes to a system for other
people, we suddenly lose all empathy and design a system that ignores
Perry's t
On 31 jul 2010, at 08.44, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Apparently the DNS root key is protected by what sounds like a five-of-seven
> threshold scheme, but the description is a bit unclear. Does anyone know
> more?
The DNS root key is stored in HSMs. The key backups (maintained by ICANN) are
encrypte
"Perry E. Metzger" writes:
>Inspired by recent discussion, these are my theses, which I hereby nail upon
>the virtual church door:
Are we allowed to play peanut gallery for this?
>1 If you can do an online check for the validity of a key, there is no
> need for a long-lived signed certificate,
Nice theses. I'm looking forward to the other 94. The first one is a
nice summary of why DKIM might succeed in e-mail security where S/MIME
failed. (Succeed as in, people actually use it.)
>2 A third party attestation, e.g. any certificate issued by any modern
> CA, is worth exactly as much as
corollary to "security proportional to risk" is "parameterized risk management"
... where variety of technologies with varying integrity levels can co-exist within the same
infrastructure/framework. transactions exceeding particularly technology risk/integrity threshold
may still be approved gi
At 07:16 AM 7/28/2010, Ben Laurie wrote:
SSH does appear to have got away without revocation, though the nature
of the system is s.t. if I really wanted to revoke I could almost
always contact the users and tell them in person. This doesn't scale
very well to SSL-style systems.
Unfortunately, t
Inspired by recent discussion, these are my theses, which I hereby
nail upon the virtual church door:
1 If you can do an online check for the validity of a key, there is no
need for a long-lived signed certificate, since you could simply ask
a database in real time whether the holder of the ke
On Fri, 30 Jul 2010 19:40:49 -0700 Ray Dillinger
wrote:
> Assume, contra facto, that in some future iteration of PKI, it
> works, and works very well.
>
> What the heck does it look like?
>
> At a guess Anybody can create a key (or key pair). They
> get one clearly marked "private", which t
Hi Henrique --
This is to answer the excellent questions you asked at
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=587665#81
Since that bug is now closed (as it should be), and since these
questions are only tangentially related to that bug anyway, I am
emailing you directly. Feel free to
Apparently the DNS root key is protected by what sounds like a five-of-seven
threshold scheme, but the description is a bit unclear. Does anyone know
more?
(Oh, and for people who want to quibble over "practically-deployed", I'm not
aware of any real usage of threshold schemes for anything, at b
Assume, contra facto, that in some future iteration of PKI, it
works, and works very well.
What the heck does it look like?
At a guess Anybody can create a key (or key pair). They
get one clearly marked "private", which they're supposed to keep,
and one clearly marked "public", which
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