RE: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-07 Thread Alex Pankratov
-Original Message- From: pgut001 [mailto:pgut...@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz] On Behalf Of Peter Gutmann Sent: October 5, 2009 10:07 PM To: a...@poneyhot.org; cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Trusted timestamping Alex Pankratov a...@poneyhot.org writes: I have

Entropy USB key

2009-08-11 Thread Alex Pankratov
Just spotted this on one of the tech news aggregators - http://www.entropykey.co.uk The Entropy Key, or eKey, is a small, unobtrusive and easily installed USB stick that generates high-quality random numbers, or entropy, which can improve the performance, security and reliability of

RE: [p2p-hackers] IETF rejects Obfuscated TCP

2008-08-20 Thread Alex Pankratov
-Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Eric Rescorla Sent: August 20, 2008 10:31 AM To: Alex Pankratov Cc: 'theory and practice of decentralized computer networks'; cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] IETF rejects

RE: Password vs data entropy

2007-10-27 Thread Alex Pankratov
-Original Message- From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, October 26, 2007 3:56 PM To: Alex Pankratov Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Password vs data entropy [snip] In other words, your password needs to be x/y times the size of the secret

Password vs data entropy

2007-10-26 Thread Alex Pankratov
Say, we have a random value of 4 kilobits that someone wants to keep secret by the means of protecting it with a password. Empirical entropy estimate for an English text is 1.3 bits of randomness per character, IIRC. Assuming the password is an English word or a phrase, and the secret is

RE: Trillian Secure IM

2007-10-10 Thread Alex Pankratov
-Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Leichter, Jerry Sent: Monday, October 08, 2007 11:48 AM To: Alex Pankratov Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: RE: Trillian Secure IM | But, opportunistic cryptography is even more fun

RE: Trillian Secure IM

2007-10-08 Thread Alex Pankratov
-Original Message- From: Ian G [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, October 08, 2007 6:05 AM To: Peter Gutmann Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Trillian Secure IM Peter Gutmann wrote: Alex Pankratov [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: SecureIM

Re: Secure phones from VectroTel?

2006-05-23 Thread Alex Pankratov
Perry E. Metzger wrote: Following the links from a /. story about a secure(?) mobile phone VectroTel in Switzerland is selling, I came across the fact that this firm sells a full line of encrypted phones. http://www.vectrotel.ch/ The devices apparently use D-H key exchange to produce a 128

Re: Zfone and ZRTP :: encryption for voip protocols

2006-03-18 Thread Alex Pankratov
Damien Miller wrote: On Wed, 15 Mar 2006, Ed Gerck wrote: [snip] ...allows the detection of man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks by displaying a short authentication string for the users to read and compare over the phone. Depends on the trust model. May not work. This is incomplete. The

Re: Zfone and ZRTP :: encryption for voip protocols

2006-03-18 Thread Alex Pankratov
will not possess the cached shared secrtes held by the real owner of that ZID. The user interface will tell the user that there are no shared secrets, which means he must reverify the SAS. Thus, his attack will fail. On Mar 17, 2006, at 4:21 PM, Alex Pankratov wrote: Damien Miller

Re: hamachi p2p vpn nat-friendly protocol details

2006-02-26 Thread Alex Pankratov
I replied to Tero privately, then realized that I was not the only recipient of his email. So here's a copy for everyone's reference. Alex Tero Kivinen wrote: Travis H. writes: http://www.hamachi.cc/security Based on a cursory look over this, I'm impressed by both the level of detail and

Re: hamachi p2p vpn nat-friendly protocol details

2006-02-26 Thread Alex Pankratov
Travis H. wrote: On 2/24/06, Alex Pankratov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tero Kivinen wrote: [snip] The protocol description is missing some details, so cannot say anything about them (things like what is the format of Ni, Nr, Gi, Gr when sent over wire and when put to the signatures etc