A quick question.
Is anyone aware of a commercial product that implements secret sharing? If
so, can I get a pointer to some product literature?
Chuck Jackson
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An earlier post, talking about vulnerabilities and the lack of an
appropriate market response, said:
We're talking about phone calls -- did all of the well-publicized
cellular eavesdropping (Prince Charles, Newt Gingrich (then a major US
politician), and more) prompt a change? Well, t
Also interesting is the requirement that all DOD computers include TPM (1.2
or higher). See next to last paragraph of the memorandum at
http://iase.disa.mil/policy-guidance/dod-dar-tpm-decree07-03-07.pdf
This memo was pointed to by the story referenced below.
Chuck Jackson
-Original Mess
I looked at the Ironkey website and, although there is obviously a little
marketing-speak, my snake-oil and BS detectors do not go off. Some of the
criticisms by Aram Perez appear to be somewhat unjustified.
Perez states:
"Protected by a password that is entered on whatever PC you plug the
Ir
Well, I don't want to start a flame war (drop me a note offline if I'm
coming across as doing so), but I do want to respond to one point.
Ali Saqib wrote:
> I don't like the "Military Grade AES Encryption" phrase that IronDrive
> uses on their website, cause that implies they know what Military
Pointed out by slashdot.
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/bruce-schneier-blazes-throu
gh-your-questions/
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One virtualization approach that I have not see mentioned on this thread is
to run the virtual machine on a more secure OS than is used by the
applications of interest.
For example, one could run VMware on SELinux and use VMware to host
Windows/Vista. Thus, even if a virus subverts Windows it s
Professor Christopher Andrew to present Schorreck Memorial Lecture, April 7,
2008 at 2:00 PM, Laurel, MD
The Center for Cryptologic History at the National Security Agency is
pleased to announce a lecture by Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge
University, author of numerous books on intellig
I don't recall seeing any discussion of this article on the list.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080702.wgtatmbreach0702
/BNStory/Technology/?page=rss&id=RTGAM.20080702.wgtatmbreach0702
Chuck Jackson
[Moderator's note: when forwarding links, please include some
indicat
Here's a pointer to the new release
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122660908325125509.html
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-Michael Heyman
Wrote:
Before we give up on using drive timings [as an entropy source], does anyone
have evidence to
verify this assertion [that SSD drives will have much less variation in
read/write timing]? The reviews I have seen using tools like HD
Tune and HD Tach seem to show timing noise r
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8147534.stm
Chuck
[Moderator's note: It is helpful, when posting a link, to give enough
information that people can know whether they want to go and read the
article. In this case, the title and first few sentences are:
Snooping through the power socket
On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 9:18 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> >To say the same thing the other way, I was always amazed that the Nazis
> were
> >unable to figure out that their crypto was broken during WWII. There were
> >experiments they could have done, such as sending out a few U-boats under
> >stric
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