Guys, in order to minimize Tor Project's dependance on
federal funding and/or increase what they can do it
would be great to have some additional funding ~10 kUSD/month.
If anyone is aware of anyone who can provide funding at
that level or higher, please contact exec...@torproject.org
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 03:54:26PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
Having a public bulletin board of posted emails, plus a protocol for
anonymously finding the ones your key can decrypt, seems like a pretty decent
architecture for prism-proof email. The tricky bit of crypto is in making
access to
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 04:24:19PM -0700, Glenn Willen wrote:
I am going to be interested to hear what the rest of the list says about
this, because this definitely contradicts what has been presented to me as
'standard practice' for PGP use -- verifying identity using government issued
ID,
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--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http
On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 12:30:40PM -0400, Kelly John Rose wrote:
If Google, or other similar businesses want to convince people to store
data in the cloud, they need to set up methods where the data is
encrypted or secured before it is even provided to them using keys which
That would
http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf
Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ?
Georg T. Becker1
, Francesco Regazzoni2
, Christof Paar1,3 , and Wayne P. Burleson1
1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
2TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University of Lugano, Switzerland
On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 08:47:16AM +1000, Dave Horsfall wrote:
Another whacky idea...
Given that there is One True Source of randomness to wit radioactive
What makes you think that e.g. breakdown oin a reverse biased
Zener diode is any less true random? Or thermal noise in a
crappy CMOS
On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 09:33:34AM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote:
What's really bothered me about the phrase perfect forward secrecy is
it's being applied to public key algorithms we know will be broken as soon
as a large quantum computer has been built (in e.g. a decade or two).
I do not think
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 07:32:04PM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote:
With a FOAF routing scheme with just 3 degrees of separation there
are not that many strangers left.
How do you meet people outside your circle of friends?
You don't. The message is routed through the social network, until
it
On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 09:01:49PM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote:
My scheme does the opposite. It allows *total strangers* to exchange
keys securely over the internet.
With a FOAF routing scheme with just 3 degrees of separation
there are not that many strangers left.
If you add opportunistic
http://www.mathbulletin.com/research/Breakthrough_in_cryptography_could_result_in_more_secure_computing.asp
Breakthrough in cryptography could result in more secure computing
(9/10/2013)
Tags: computer science, research, security, cryptography
Nigel Smart, Professor of Cryptology
New
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html
Sep. 9, 2013
SP 800-90 A Rev 1 B and C
DRAFT Draft SP 800-90 Series: Random Bit Generators
800-90 A Rev. 1: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators
800-90 B: Recommendation for the Entropy
Just got word from an Openswan developer:
To my knowledge, we never finished implementing the BTNS mode.
It wouldn't be hard to do --- it's mostly just conditionally commenting out
code.
There's obviously a large potential deployment base for
BTNS for home users, just think of
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
Security and Pervasive Monitoring
The Internet community and the IETF care deeply about how much we can trust
commonly used Internet services and the protocols that these services use.
So the reports about large-scale
Forwarded without permission, hence anonymized:
Hey, I had a look at SEC2 and the TLS/SSH RFCs. SSH uses secp256/384r1
which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the
parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!
TLS specifies you can use those two curves as
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1517
NSA: Possibly breaking US laws, but still bound by laws of computational
complexity
Last week, I got an email from a journalist with the following inquiry. The
recent Snowden revelations, which made public for the first time the US
government’s “black
-
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org
AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
the Koblitz
curves).
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 07:42:33PM -1000, Tim Newsham wrote:
Jumping in to this a little late, but:
Q: Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source
encryption software and silently replacing these with their own versions?
A: (Schneier) Yes, I believe so.
perhaps, but they
...@yahoo.com
To: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN
X-Mailer: YahooMailWebService/0.8.156.576
Reply-To: Andreas Davour ko...@yahoo.com
Apropos IPsec, I've tried searching for any BTNS (opportunistic encryption
mode for
IPsec) implementations
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 09:19:07PM -0400, Derrell Piper wrote:
...and to add to all that, how about the fact that IPsec was dropped as a
'must implement' from IPv6 sometime after 2002?
Apropos IPsec, I've tried searching for any BTNS (opportunistic encryption mode
for
IPsec) implementations,
://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe,
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
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go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org
- Forwarded message from Thor Lancelot Simon t...@panix.com -
Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 15:36:33 -0400
From: Thor Lancelot Simon t...@panix.com
To: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Cc: cryptogra...@randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG
User-Agent
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 01:53:13PM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote:
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:53 PM, Marcus D. Leech mle...@ripnet.com wrote:
One wonders why they weren't already using link encryption systems?
Probably line rate and the cost of encrypting every single fiber link.
There are few
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 04:41:04PM -0400, Richard Outerbridge wrote:
Surely not Canada? After all, we're one of the five eyes! ;)
Six. Sweden (FRA) is part of it. http://www.heise.de/tp/blogs/8/154917
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On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 04:11:57PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
If a person at Snowden's level in the NSA had any access to information
Snowden didn't have clearance for that information. He's being described
as 'brilliant' and purportedly was able to access documents far beyond his
On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 04:25:12PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
A response he wrote as part of a discussion at
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html:
Q: Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source encryption
software and silently replacing these with
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 01:30:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:04:34 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote:
One thing that irks me, though, is the problem of the robust, secure
terminal: if everything is encrypted, how does one survive the
loss/theft/destruction of a
On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 02:44:32PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
My main issue with this proposal is that somebody identifiable is
going to manufacture these boxes. Maybe several somebodies, but
IMO, that's an identifiable central point of control/failure.
Recently there's a trend for at
Comments?
https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/5dd304276ba5745ec21fc1e6686a0b28da29e6fc
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779
Not new, but some probably have missed it.
http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http
, statistically random set from elsewhere.
Journal source: Nature Photonics, DOI: 10.1038/nphoton.2010.197
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-719726,00.html
09/27/2010 11:23 AM
Recruited by West Germany
Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO
By Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to
.
starting with the DNS itself, and also most public contents (because
Encryption is cheap enough (especially if you cache keys from
previous sessions). Why not encrypt everything?
their purveyors won't want to pay for the crypto; sad but true).
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=25670channel=Briefingssection=Microprocessors
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Nanoscale Random Number Circuit to Secure Future Chips
Intel unveils a circuit that can pump out truly random numbers at high speed.
By Tom Simonite
It
exchange is over
traditional cryptography.
I agree with Perry that it solves a non-problem.
There is a human-readable summary at: http://focus.aps.org/story/v25/st7
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
input stream and add
encrypted/digested product to the host entropy pool with the specified
entropy density estimate adjusted downward to your requirements. (most
OS'es support this)
--
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
--
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
On Thu, Oct 29, 2009 at 07:15:53AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 2:24 PM +0100 10/29/09, Eugen Leitl wrote:
We discuss why no existing cipher satisfies the requirements of this
application. Uh-oh.
Yeah, we all know what a light-weight and careless person Neils Ferguson is.
Who would listen
We discuss why no existing cipher satisfies the requirements of this
application. Uh-oh.
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=131dae03-39ae-48be-a8d6-8b0034c92555DisplayLang=en
AES-CBC + Elephant diffuser
Brief Description
A Disk Encryption Algorithm for Windows Vista
The
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/science/27trojan.html?8dpc=pagewanted=all
Old Trick Threatens the Newest Weapons
By JOHN MARKOFF
Published: October 26, 2009
Despite a six-year effort to build trusted computer chips for military
systems, the Pentagon now manufactures in secure facilities run
http://www.randombit.net/bitbashing/programming/serpent_in_simd.html
Wed, 09 Sep 2009
Speeding up Serpent: SIMD Edition
The Serpent block cipher was one of the 5 finalists in the AES competition,
and is widely thought to be the most secure of them due to its conservative
design. It was also
I can has contributions, please?
From: Michael Richardson m...@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
Subject: Re: [btns] IETF75
To: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
cc: b...@ietf.org
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2009 15:03:33 -0400
Eugen == Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org writes:
Eugen On Wed, Jun 24, 2009 at 03:15:59PM
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Tellitec_Tellinet_Sat_Spy_manual%2C_6_Mar_2006
Tellitec Tellinet Sat Spy manual, 6 Mar 2006
May 24, 2009
Summary
Tellinet is an accelerator for satellite communications made by Tellitec GmbH
of Berlin. It supports encrypted TCP (ETCP), but as this confidential
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http
http://www.wired.com/print/science/discoveries/magazine/17-05/ff_kryptos
Mission Impossible: The Code Even the CIA Can't Crack
By Steven Levy Email 04.20.09
The sculpture named Kryptos at CIA headquarters contains a secret message ?
but not even the agency's brightest can crack its code.
From: Toni Alatalo ant...@kyperjokki.fi
Subject: Re: [Opensim-dev] Technical assessment of Cable Beach asset server
To: opensim-...@lists.berlios.de
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 18:47:00 +0200
Reply-To: opensim-...@lists.berlios.de
Eugen Leitl kirjoitti:
On Thu, Jan 15, 2009 at 02:10:13PM +0900, Mike
/arXivblog
--
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/24/spanish_enigmas/
Spanish discover cache of 26 Enigma machines
Franco's 'secret weapon' tracked to army HQ
By Lester Haines
Posted in Science, 24th October 2008 10:03 GMT
Spanish newspaper El Pa�s last week tracked down 26 examples of Franco's
secret
before the human assist is all but unneeded.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but currently
is only used for truck toll.
--
Eugen* Leitl
://www.heise.de/newsticker/Debatte-um-Zugriff-auf-LKW-Mautdaten-fuer-Fahndungen-geht-weiter--/meldung/76321
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
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=en
--
Kilian
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of that into national laws is supposed to be completed by
October 2007; most countries have until March 2009 for Internet logs
Apparently, Germany will implement Internet connection retention by
end of the year/beginning of 2008 latest.
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
Computing is science fiction. Some science fiction
eventually becomes reality.
A nice blog to follow here is Shtetl-Optimized:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
endpoints?
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
..1000 MBit/s
speed, with IPsec or OpenVPN (FreeBSD 6.2 or pfsense data
would be great).
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.ativel.com
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29
://www.openssl.org
Development Mailing List openssl-dev@openssl.org
Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
] http://www.shmoocon.org/speakers.html#overlier
[6] http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-federal-06/bh-fed-06-speakers.html#Syverson
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM
for access to the pads but
even this would require manual destruction.
do they make physically hardened authentication tokens with timed self
destruction built in?
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
___
Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences:
http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
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On Wed, Oct 19, 2005 at 09:45:38AM -0500, Alaric Dailey wrote:
Cisco seems to be doing these kinds of boneheaded things for quite sometime.
Does Juniper have a better security story?
--
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forwarded message -
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
-
You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To manage your subscription, go to
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Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl
(still) isn't ready for prime time.
Not ready for 1984? One sure would hope so.
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443
. Teenagers are pretty sophisticated.
Are we talking even about the same species? About
the same teenagers which already own malware-infested
PCs, and swap whatever ringtones, logos and games en vogue
with their FOAFs?
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl
smartcards
and smartcard readers, or suffer extreme losses through fraud
they won't introduce these secure readers and smartcards.
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
is PIN/TAN (TANs distributed on dead tree).
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
signature.asc
Description
to an insecure, networked machine.
Is there a real problem that they uniquely solve, sufficient
to drive the building of the needed infrastructure?
I don't see it, and I'd love to be made smarter.
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl
are to be right.
The fingerprint hash (fingerprint's fingerprint) has to be resistant
to rotation/translation, area size and subpattern presence, and tolerate
some skin lesion noise, so it's the very opposite of a cryptographic hash.
Probably quite easy to reverse.
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl
principle of security through obscurity (keeping the
details secret) may in practice give it a greater degree of protection.
--
--
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__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
://www.SnapGear.com
Custom Embedded Solutions + Security Fx:+61 7 38913630 http://www.uCdot.org
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has the effect of
erasing it and regenerating new internal keys.
Really? How interesting. Please tell us more.
--
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__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D
to
detect whether we have previously seen a preIV.
This document has been placed in the public domain by Connelly
Barnes, 2005-01-17.
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in ESP).
Michal Ludvig
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List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
is
OpenBSD/Linux/OpenSSL/gpg.
Any suggestions?
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http
]
Clarifications below...
Eugen Leitl wrote:
- Forwarded message from \Hal Finney\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2004 12:57:29 -0700 (PDT)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: potential new IETF WG on anonymous
, Eurecom, France
* Kai Rannenberg, University of Frankfurt, Germany
* Stephen Weis, MIT
--
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA
non-truck license plates are
discarded, but it's clear enough theres demand for realtime tracing of select
and movement profiles for the masses, for data mining.
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Interview with Glenn Henry, founder of VIA processor subsidiary CeTo: [EMAIL
PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2004 18:51:21 +0200
http://linuxdevices.com/articles/AT2656883479.html
[ker-snip]
The third one, is one you haven't asked me about
, but it has its own problems (Bluetooth/IrDa, security, fax
effect, etc).
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29
is supposed to do
the checking.
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
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http://moleculardevices.org
, and will require agoric load levelling elements (to prevent bad
nodes from DoSing the global store) which also requires prestige tracking.
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http
want to fly a LEO constellation of them, you need a very sparse structure (or
a huge density of pongsats, which doesn't agree with observations).
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http
.
-- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
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