On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 9:10 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> I am even
> starting to think that maybe we should start using the NSA checksum
> approach.
>
> Incidentally, that checksum could be explained simply by padding prepping an
> EC encrypted session key. PKCS#1 has similar stuff to ensure
> There is still a need for a distributed
> database to handle the lookup load, though, and one that is not the
> DNS.
>
What do you think of namecoin?
—♯ƒ • François-René ÐVB Rideau •Reflection&Cybernethics• http://fare.tunes.org
Truth comes as conqueror only to those who have lost the art of rec
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Phill wrote:
> My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with
> anything more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look
> feel and smell exactly the same as current mail. The only difference being
> that sometime the se
>> So, how do I translate "al...@example.org" into a key?
>>
Once again, what do you think of namecoin?
A bitcoin-like consensual database based on proof of work.
If you also require proof-of-key via signature from the recipient,
majority attacks make DoS easy, but identity stealing is still
depend
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 7:19 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 03:00:42 +0200 Faré wrote:
>> >> At intervals, the trustworthy organization (and others like it)
>> >> can send out email messages to Alice, encrypted in said key,
>> >> saying
Don't write the code. Write a reasonably general software solver that
finds a program that fulfill given specifications, given a minimum
number of hints. Then write a specification for the problem (e.g.
finding a nice elliptic curve with interesting properties) and let the
solver find them.
You di
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Richard Salz wrote:
>> ITAR doesn't require a license or permit for strong hash functions, but for
>> US persons
>> require(d?) notification of NSA of authorship, contact email and download
>> URL(s), at least in
>> 2006 it did.
>
> That strikes me as an overly-co
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> On Sep 3, 2013, at 3:16 PM, Faré wrote:
>> Can't you trivially transform a hash into a PRNG, a PRNG into a
>> cypher, and vice versa?
> No.
>
> Let H(X) = SHA-512(X) || SHA-512(X)
> where '||'
On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
>> Just because it's trivial to produce bogus crypto doesn't mean it's
>> non-trivial to produce good crypto, given a few universal recipes.
> Look, if you want to play around a produce things that look secure to you and
> a few of your buddi
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 9:42 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Two caveats on the commentary about a symmetric key algorithm with a
> trapdoor being a public key algorithm.
>
> 1) The trapdoor need not be a good public key algorithm, it can be flawed in
> ways that would make it unsuited for use as
if in paranoid mode — in which case there is
a DoS attack possible if NTP is subverted.
—♯ƒ • François-René ÐVB Rideau •Reflection&Cybernethics• http://fare.tunes.org
Reason isn't about not having prejudices,
it's about having (appropriate) postjudices. — Faré
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