Re: long-term GPG signing key

2006-01-17 Thread Ian Brown
Travis H. wrote: Why the heck am I expiring encryption keys each year? Anyone who records the email can crack it even if the key is invalid by then. All it really does is crudely limit the quantity of data sent under that key, which is little to none anyway. If your threat model includes

Re: mother's maiden names...

2005-07-14 Thread Ian Brown
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: Cambridge Trust puts your picture on the back of your VISA card, for instance. They have for more than a decade, maybe even two. One New York bank -- long since absorbed into some megabank -- did the same thing about 30 years ago. They gave up -- it was expensive

Re: They Said It Couldn't Be Done

2004-09-21 Thread Ian Brown
[snip HAVA quote and Nevada news] So unless there is a amendment to that law (that I am obviously unaware of) it isn't up to individual States to add this as an additional requirement - its already required. perhaps someone could enlighten me? I believe many e-voting machines meet this

Re: Al Qaeda crypto reportedly fails the test

2004-08-12 Thread Ian Brown
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], John Denker writes: Here's a challenge directly relevant to this group: Can you design a comsec system so that pressure against a code clerk will not do unbounded damage? What about pressure against a comsec system designer? Modulo Steve's comments about the threat