motherhood without apple pie. I can easily break a bank vault by
putting an MP5 to the head of the guy with the key, but that's hardly
the vault's fault, now is it?
Speaking-only-for-myself,
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?
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an encrypted
USB key you can use on Linux, Windows and OS X. If you're *just*
talking about OS X, I don't believe TrueCrypt offers any advantages
over encrypted disk images unless you're big on conspiracy theories.
Cheers,
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On Sep 15, 2009, at 4:12 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
The ideas used in Tahoe are useful tools that can be used to solve
important problems.
Yes, and I'd be happy to opine on that as soon as someone told me what
those important problems are.
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-world systems. And in real-world systems, you
don't get to play Jeopardy with cryptography.
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on disk, the resulting
application won't get access to Keychain until you explicitly approve
it.
You can inspect and modify your keychain with the Keychain Access
application, which also allows you to add your own items.
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on the _chance_ they're not divulging all the information; what, then,
is the other explanation?
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on this list in 2004, and some
other software is mentioned in the replies:
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg02169.html
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obstructing
justice or disobeying the court? It becomes a he-said-she-said with
the CBP agent, your word against his.
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until you're satisfied with the definition of what you're trying to
build. Once you can focus on implementation, I suggest looking at
things like bcrypt, PBKDF2, and SRP as background reading.
Cheers,
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On Jan 29, 2009, at 11:17 PM, Ivan Krstić wrote:
I'd find mobile e-mail just as useful if it went through a proxy
that stripped out _everything_ that's not plaintext. I open
attachments on my phone about once in a blue moon, and wouldn't miss
the ability if it were gone.
As a postscript
.
I'd find mobile e-mail just as useful if it went through a proxy that
stripped out _everything_ that's not plaintext. I open attachments on
my phone about once in a blue moon, and wouldn't miss the ability if
it were gone.
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(logical pp. 61-65).
Maybe, uh, it'll work this time around?
Cheers,
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enhanced Levenshtein distance:
http://hissa.nist.gov/~black/GTLD/
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On Sat, 09 Aug 2008 17:11:11 -0400, Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Las Vegas - Three students at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) were ordered this morning by a federal court
judge to cancel their scheduled presentation about vulnerabilities
in
. But not very random.
I boggled a bit at the abuse of simple descriptive statistics, too.
For those interested in actual statistical tests of randomness,
there's a good literature survey at http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/RES/RANDTEST.HTM
.
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is simply the
token's serial number, though it's not clear if these are in fact
serial.
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didn't hold hands
and all together chant bring us a good cryptographer with such
maniacal monophony as to rival any Gregorian choir makes me highly
suspicious about their supposed expertise with _networks_.
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.
[0] See first half of http://radian.org/~krstic/talks/2007/auscert/slides.pdf
. Note: I'm no longer affiliated with OLPC.
[1] E.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CapDesk, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polaris_(computer_security)
, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitfrost
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. The emergence of reasonably priced VM hosting providers
(e.g. slicehost.com) makes it fairly uncomplicated, modulo initial
setup.
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://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/
It's several years out of date, however.
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, polynomials, CNF/DNF formulae, or
threshold predicates (among others). Besides serving as what we feel
is a significant step forward in the theory of predicate encryption,
our results lead to a number of applications that are interesting in
their own right.
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of security.
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it. I don't know of any machine that actually does this
The OLPC XO-1 laptop has an open-source bootloader (Open Firmware)
which checks the operating system signature before passing control to
it.
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[1] http://graphics.stanford.edu/~danielrh/vote/mzalewski.c
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micha%C5%82_Zalewski
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design can't be bitsliced and generally
doesn't lend itself well to large speedups in hardware, by design.
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server that the present
system nicely avoids.
Cheers,
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!) crypto take on Harry Belafonte's Banana
Boat Song:
http://www.catonmat.net/blog/musical-geek-friday-crypto/
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and then
checking whether the result matches the observed ciphertext.
How is this conceptually different from classic dictionary attacks,
and why does e.g. running the file through PBKDF2 and using the result
for convergence not address your concern(s)?
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prohibitive in
most cases while not interfering with normal filesystem operation.
What am I missing?
Cheers,
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to the motherboard -- into an
advantage, and making the Air the laptop of choice for discriminating,
fashion-aware, security-conscious professionals the world over?
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is Window
Snyder who I'd easily describe as a pretty top-notch security person.
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security systems.
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by point, why his
needs cannot be met by existing, vetted systems. That explanation
should ideally be made public for dissection by the community.
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heard back.
[0] Last paragraph, http://diswww.mit.edu/bloom-picayune/crypto/14238
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the information back and try to figure out what the
difficulties were, posting here if anything interesting becomes
illuminated.
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://www.matasano.com/log/930/side-channel-detection-attacks-against-unauthorized-hypervisors/
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the drill cold, such as Fedora and Mozilla, were
actually not very familiar with the processes involved.)
Cheers,
Ivan.
[0] http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf
[1] http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/746.pdf
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for all my e-banking and related needs. It provides a
drastically more secure platform for doing so than any mainstream
computer I know exists.
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not publicly documented -- even if
the system is buzzword-compliant -- and implemented by a company
(hard disk vendor) where crypto is about as far from their core
competency as you can get.
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passive listener. But hey, if the peer is
malicious or compromised to begin with, it could just as well do DH
normally and explicitly send the secret to the listener when it's
done. Not much to see here.
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. This
means the usual wisdom applies: if you really need the extra entropy,
mix some of these SRAM state bits into your pool, but make sure
you're also feeding the pool from at least one source about whose
randomness you can reason strongly.
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On Sep 14, 2007, at 8:36 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Secrets From The Future, MC Frontalot's song about crypto
Lyrics: http://frontalot.com/index.php/?page=lyricslyricid=41
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on a centrally-
managed spare for enabling data migration.
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it comes
to how you approach the recovery keyfile problem. You can build tools
for it, or any company that perceives a market need can do so.
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glass window
borders?
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productive discussion of these concerns. Cheers,
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terminology paint
themselves in a corner and trigger our snakeoil detectors. I deeply
support Jon's proposal of renaming the whole thing quantum secrecy,
in which case I'd get off my snark horse and show more respect for
the whole thing.
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--
instead of turning off or muting your phone at night, you can, for
instance, specify that only certain people can call you.)
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Peter Gutmann wrote:
I've seen all sorts of *claims* of TPM support, but try going out and buying a
PC with one
Of the 25 business laptop models that HP offers on its site right now,
only 5 don't have a TPM installed.
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of the phone functionality to it through a set of APIs, and
is happy to grab my mail via IMAP+SSL. With an unlimited data plan, who
cares if it's pull instead of push e-mail?
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.
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://www.matasano.com/log/772/a-case-against-dnssec-count-2-too-complicated-to-deploy/).
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European country, and it was a
larger one than Estonia.
Out of curiosity, does anyone have information on how fat Estonia's
external pipes are?
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laptop and commiserate about desktop security over beer.)
[0] Summary at http://wiki.laptop.org/go/Bitfrost with full spec at
http://wiki.laptop.org/go/OLPC_Bitfrost
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with very little security experience feel
comfortable doing this kind of work just boggles my mind. Please
congratulate everyone involved, and remind them to always use their PPTP
VPN over their WEP-protected wireless.
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with phishing and the like -- even if it required
new assumptions or approaches -- we could probably do it. So maybe it's
time (for us, perhaps) to organize a workshop on this? Is there a better
way to do it?
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Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
What about unprotected, frequently-running web browsers?
I don't follow. How do you hop from one browser to another, if you want
to use one as your spread vector? Browsers don't accept inbound connections.
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of a mine
field, with the exit guarded by a killer rabbit. It's also certainly
possible I'm not smart enough, and other people find this to be an
easier problem.
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from process permissions and integrating
explicit assent into dealing with the user's documents get you a long,
long way towards a usable and reasonably secure system, I think. If I'm
wrong, I'll have 10 million reasons to not sleep next year.
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CSO later today to talk about what we can do to make the
browsing experience more secure.)
Cheers,
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on a port and act as a server. There aren't going to be
unprotected, constantly-running servers to exploit.
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are. It sees a process, or some number of processes,
which are the browser.
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scheduled for release sometime in late March (there's a pile of crypto
powering various choice bits of the system). Comments are very much invited.
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use it on the
web. It passes the technical requirements, but utterly fails at being a
usable security technology.
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egress. MOYM (man on your machine) attacks are a bit
of a lost cause with most modern OS environments, though I've been
working pretty hard to try and change that on the One Laptop per Child
machines.
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this long? My curiosity demands to know.
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extremely braindead -- a welcome
downgrade, given all of Peter's other points.
[0]
http://windowsvistablog.com/blogs/windowsvista/archive/2007/01/20/windows-vista-content-protection-twenty-questions-and-answers.aspx
[1] http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/vista_cost.html
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all of Peter's other points.
[0]
http://windowsvistablog.com/blogs/windowsvista/archive/2007/01/20/windows-vista-content-protection-twenty-questions-and-answers.aspx
[1] http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/vista_cost.html
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to the 3 out of
x problem.
Read Shamir's original paper:
http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~bchor/Shamir.html
and the Wikipedia page:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_sharing
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versions,
but I could well have written it down incorrectly. Thanks for the
correction.
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with the social problem
it's trying to solve. I think Microsoft's is, surprisingly enough.
As a sidenote, I wonder if Seagate will release full details and code
for their FDE (and AES) implementation, or if we're supposed to take the
no backdoors clause on faith, as we do with TPMs.
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.
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''?
The Microsoft guy presenting BitLocker at HITB last month mentioned
this, but glossed over it without explaining. He did seem to indicate
that they had some solution, but didn't provide details, IIRC.
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a hash of the system state for
visual inspection before boot do it?
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-consultancy.demon.co.uk/key3.html
Cheers,
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have to write something from scratch to satisfy our
needs at OLPC (http://laptop.org).
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