Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

> > Symetric cryptography does a much easier thing. It combines data and some > mysterious data (key) in a way that you cannot extract data without the > mysterious data from the result. It's like a + b = c. Given c you need b to > find a. The tricks that are involved are mostly about sufficie

Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

> I have also, in debate with Jerry, opined that public-key cryptography is a > powerful thing that can't be replaced with symmetric-key cryptography. That's > something that I firmly believe. At its most fundamental, public-key crypto > allows one to encrypt something to someone whom one does

Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

> > Public-key cryptography is less well-understood than symmetric-key > cryptography. It is also tetchier than symmetric-key crypto, and if you pay > attention to us talking about issues with nonces, counters, IVs, chaining > modes, and all that, you see that saying that it's tetchier than tha

[Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

rican (and thus subverted) CA to get the recipients public key. What other reasons could there be for this advice? Best, Jaap-Henk (I apologise for typos and being terse; this mail was written on an iPad) -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman TNO, Groningen & Dept. of Computer Science Radboud University N

Re: Unforgeable dialog.

7;re SOL. > > Peter Trei > > ----- > The Cryptography Mailing List > Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | I've got su

Re: Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch biometric passport crack (anothercard skim vulnerability)

ling List > | Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > - > The Cryptography Mailing List > Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] &g

Re: serious threat models

Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | I've got sunshine in my pockets Dept. of Computer Science | Brought it back to spray the day Radboud University Nijmegen |Gry "Rocket" (

Re: Is there any future for smartcards?

ll <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Is there a real problem that they uniquely solve, sufficient > to drive the building of the needed infrastructure? > I don't see it, and I'd love to be made smarter. > > -- > Pat Farrell > http://www.pfarrell.com -- Jaap-Henk Hoepm

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

nsaction contents seems to be infeasible, given the number of bits > which must be copied.) > > - > The Cryptography Mailing List > Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > -- Jaap-Henk Hoep

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

GRNWrS > > > ----- > The Cryptography Mailing List > Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | I've got sunshine in my pockets Dept. of Computer

Re: quantum hype

; > right, so it's no better than the arguable hard problem of factoring > a 2048 bit number. -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | I've got sunshine in my pockets Dept. of Computer Science | Brought it back to spray the day University of Nijmegen |Gry "Rocket&

Security of DH key exchange

f the adversary of distinguishing h(g^{ab}) from k is negligible in _n_). References to this are much appreciated. Regards, Jaap-Henk -- Jaap-Henk Hoepman | I've got sunshine in my pockets Dept. of Computer Science | Brought it back to spray the day University of Nijmegen |

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

an I do about it, as an individual? Make the cellphone companies >> build good crypto into their systems? Any ideas how to do that? > > Nope. Cellphone companies are big slow moving > targets. They get their franchise from the > government. If the NSA wants weak crypto, they