Lynn and John Saylior have raised an important point. Who at Baltimore, or was once there, is likely to be able to account for the security of the certs for customers who still rely upon them? Not somebody to spin a fairy tale, but to truthfully explain what Baltimore has done to avoid
Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communications, by Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, Nathan Keller http://cryptome.org/gsm-crack-bbk.pdf (18 Pages, 234KB) Abstract. In this paper we present a very practical cipher-text only cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communications, and
We offer a recent South African government statement on encryption import and export regulation: http://cryptome.org/za-crypto.htm - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL
James Ellis, GCHQ, in his account of the development of non-secret encryption credits a Bell Laboratories 1944 report on Project C-43 for stimulating his conception: http://www.cesg.gov.uk/publications/media/nsecret/possnse.pdf The Possibility of Secure Non-Secret Digital Encryption J. H.
New book by Joel McNamara who runs the Tempest website: http://www.eskimo.com/~joel/tempest.html http://www.wiley.com/legacy/compbooks/mcnamara/ Secrets of Computer Espionage: Tactics and Countermeasures by Joel McNamara Covers electronic and wireless eavesdropping, computer surveillance,
If the FBI cannot crack PGP that does not mean other agencies with greater prowess cannot. It is unlikely that the capability to crack PGP would be publicly revealed for that would close an invaluable source of information. Intel crackers hardly ever reveal their most essential tools, though