The recently arrested "boss of bosses" of the Sicilian Mafia, Bernardo
Provenzano, wrote notes using an encryption scheme similar to the one
used by Julius Caesar more than 2,000 years ago, according to a
biography of Italy's most wanted man.
Sicilian mafia also uses mobile phones that chan
Aloha!
Just out of curiosity I tried to Google around for recent papers on
attacks against AES/Rijndael. I found the usual suspects with XLS
attacks and DJBs timing attack. But what is the current status of
attacks, anything new and exciting?
http://defectoscopy.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3
On Wed, 10 May 2006 10:01:57 -0600, John R. Black wrote
> On Thu, May 04, 2006 at 10:30:40AM -0500, Marcos el Ruptor wrote:
> >
> > http://defectoscopy.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3
> >
> > Expect new attacks soon enough.
> >
> I skimmed this. The start of
I skimmed this. The start of the article says that after 3 rounds AES
achieves perfect diffusion?!
1. It's "complete diffusion", not "perfect diffusion". Perfect diffusion is
a property meaning something completely different.
2. My post incorrectly stated that cryptographers believed that the
Can you briefly explain how you determine the PRF rounds value?
William
Your question belongs in our forums -
http://defectoscopy.com/forum/viewforum.php?f=3 where it's already being
discussed.
Ruptor
[Moderator's note: no, actually, if you're going to mention it here,
you had better be
x27;ll leave you believing whatever you want to believe and just get back to
work.
Ruptor
PS: Constructive productive positive contributions are also welcome.
[Moderator's note: Marcos el Ruptor perhaps does not understand the
concept of peer review and may be unfamiliar with the fact t
Right. But can you explain *why* you strongly believe in it?
In the last 10 years it never failed to tell the difference between good and
bad ciphers. The only thing that makes it controversial is its ability to
detect flaws in ciphers believed to be strong simply because no attacks
against t
unpublished cryptographic algorithms. The specification is secret
and confidential. It uses the SMS4 block cipher, which is secret and
patented. [*]
It's been declassified in January 2006.
The SMS4 cipher specification -
http://www.oscca.gov.cn/UpFile/200621016423197990.pdf
Ruptor
--
> unpublished cryptographic algorithms. The specification is secret
> and confidential. It uses the SMS4 block cipher, which is secret and
> patented. [*]
http://translate.google.com/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2F72.14.205.104%2Fsearch%3Fq%3Dcache%3Ae2RxJ6kpw4QJ%3Awww.oscca.gov.cn%2FUpFile%2F20062101
You can use cryptography to protect IP and to prevent cloning of microchips
even if they get reverse-engineered, but the cipher would have to possess
special properties similar to those of VEST ciphers (see
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/vestp2.html), like support family keying to
make every A
One thing is possible with Skype: any user can easily obtain any other
user's IP address (actually both internal and external IPs). Those users
don't even need to be on his contact list. Of course one would need cracking
tools or a decrypted patched Skype executable with all the 288 integrity
c
The only things that it usually passes as good are for-purpose random
number generators' or ciphers' outputs. Everything else (including a
terabyte of RC4 output, executables, zip archives, jpegs, mpegs,
mp3s, ...) that I've pointed it at, fails one or more of the tests.
Have you tried removing
Now, you said "compressed files" and you might not have meant
pictures, but note that L-Z style compressed files don't really have
much in the way of headers. If the headers were a problem, you'd
expect longer files to bury any deviation in the noise, but it
doesn't. The longer the files I test th
Compared to AES-128, AES-256 is 140% of the rounds to encrypt 200% as much
data. So when implemented in hardware, AES-256 is substantially faster.
Excuse me, AES-256 has the same block size as AES-128, that is 128 bits.
It's in fact slower, not faster, and in hardware it also occupies a
substa
My questions are: A) is this as vulnerable as it seems at first
blush? B) how many password/hex pairs would be needed to deduce the
underlying algorithm?, C) If one could deduce the algorithm, could
the attack be generalized so that it could be used against other
enterprises that use the sa
> I'd like to start with the really simple stuff; classical
> cryptography, systems with clean and obvious "breaks".
You can start with RSA SecurID, Texas Instruments DST40, Microchip
Technologies KeeLoq, Philips/NXP Hitag2, WEP RC4, Bluetooth E0, GSM
A5... It's much harder to find a product
I didn't realise the current SecurID tokens had been broken. A
quick Google
doesn't show anything, but I'm probably using the wrong terms. Do
you have
references for this that I could have a look at?
http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/162.pdf
This attack may not be as practical as an algebraic att
it, but Cerulean Studios won't pay for it. It's still
on http://cryptolib.com/ruptor/
Marcos el Ruptor
PS: There was also a buffer overflow in their original DLL if you
send a very long key. I don't know if they have fixed it or not. I
ha
I found those threads:
http://forums.ceruleanstudios.com/showthread.php?t=53433
http://forums.ceruleanstudios.com/showthread.php?t=56207
As you can see from the last post in the second thread, ultimately
they agreed that 128-bit DH is secure and that I am just some crazy
guy trying to scare
The 48-bit Philips Hitag2 algorithm has been completely reverse-
engineered a long time ago:
http://cryptolib.com/ciphers/hitag2/
Ruptor
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http://www.intersil.com/cda/deviceinfo/0,1477,ISL6296,0.html
"A 32-Bit CRC-based hash engine (FlexiHashTM)
calculates the authentication result immediately after
receiving a 32-Bit random challenge code."
huh?
heh!
-
The Cryp
endless exploitable vulnerabilities should be enough
of a proof of that.
Best regards,
Marcos el Ruptor
http://www.enrupt.com/ - Raising the bar.
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them at least some access to the servers and traffic
obfuscation algorithms was to have a US company pay $4bln for it...
Well done!
Marcos el Ruptor
http://www.enrupt.com/ - Raising the bar.
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Of course they *are* able to comply with such requests. They just
either won't or just won't tell us.
Best regards,
Marcos el Ruptor
http://www.enrupt.com/ - Raising the bar [and disabling Skype
SuperNode].
---
xt and for all
the encrypted files with the same first 16 bytes (roughly 1/256 of
them), the keystream will match. No cryptography to implement, only
XOR. Good luck!
Best regards,
Marcos el Ruptor
http://www.enrupt.com/ - Raising the bar.
---
want a disarmed harmless one to play with, I can e-
mail you my decrypted and patched up variant.
Marcos el Ruptor
http://www.enrupt.com/ - Raising the bar.
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