On Wed, 09 Sep 2009 15:42:34 +1000
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
Steven Bellovin wrote:
Several other people made similar suggestions. They all boil down
to the same thing, IMO -- assume that the user will recognize
something distinctive or know to do something special for
http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired27b/~3/CFV8MEwH_rM/
A BlackBerry update that a United Arab Emirates service provider pushed
out to its customers contains U.S.-made spyware that would allow the
company or others to siphon and read their e-mail and text messages,
according to a researcher who
On Thu, 2 Jul 2009 20:51:47 -0700
Joseph Ashwood ashw...@msn.com wrote:
--
Sent: Wednesday, July 01, 2009 4:05 PM
Subject: MD6 withdrawn from SHA-3 competition
Also from Bruce Schneier, a report that MD6 was withdrawn from the
SHA-3
http://www.cryptosmith.com/archives/621
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com
On Thu, 30 Apr 2009 17:44:53 -0700
Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
The accepted wisdom
on 80-bit security (which includes SHA-1, 1024-bit RSA and DSA keys,
and other things) is that it is to be retired by the end of 2010.
That's an interesting statement from a historical perspective -- is
While poking around Google Books, I stumbled on the following two
references that might be of interest to this list. The first is cited
by Kahn.
\emph{The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United States:
With an Exposition of Ancient and Modern Means of Communication,
and of the
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jFmxwZmt8V4URihSIugJroZE4yKgD974J72O0
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe
The assertion occasionally comes up that since the NSA cannot legally
eavesdrop on Americans, it outsources to the UK or one of the other
Echelon countries. It turns out that that's forbidden, too -- see
Section 2.12 of Executive Order 12333
On Tue, 03 Mar 2009 17:05:32 -0800
John Gilmore g...@toad.com wrote:
I would not read too much into this ruling -- I think that this is a
special situation, and does not address the more important general
issue.
In other cases, where alternative evidence is not available to the
On Tue, 03 Mar 2009 12:26:32 -0500
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
Quoting:
A federal judge has ordered a criminal defendant to decrypt his
hard drive by typing in his PGP passphrase so prosecutors can view
the unencrypted files, a ruling that raises serious concerns
On Tue, 03 Mar 2009 13:53:50 -0500
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
Adam Fields cryptography23094...@aquick.org writes:
Well, it should be clear that any such scheme necessarily will
produce encrypted partitions with less storage capacity than one
with only one set of
On Sat, 21 Feb 2009 11:33:32 -0800
Ed Gerck edge...@nma.com wrote:
I submit that the most important password problem is not that someone
may find it written somewhere. The most important password problem is
that people forget it. So, writing it down and taking the easy
precaution of not
On Wed, 25 Feb 2009 10:04:40 -0800
Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net wrote:
On Wed, 2009-02-25 at 14:53 +, John Levine wrote:
You're right, but it's not obvious to me how a site can tell an evil
MITM proxy from a benign shared web cache. The sequence of page
accesses would be pretty
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/19/ssl_busting_demo/ -- we've
talked about this attack for quite a while; someone has now implemented
it.
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography
On Fri, 20 Feb 2009 02:36:17 +1300
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
There are a variety of password cost-estimation surveys floating
around that put the cost of password resets at $100-200 per user per
year, depending on which survey you use (Gartner says so, it must be
true).
Counter Terror Expo: News of a possible viable business model for P2P
VoIP network Skype emerged today, at the Counter Terror Expo in London.
An industry source disclosed that America's supersecret National
Security Agency (NSA) is offering billions to any firm which can
offer reliable
I was reading a CPS from GeoTrust -- 91 pages of legalese! -- and came
across the following statement:
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, GeoTrust's
root public keys and the root Certificates containing them,
including all self-signed certificates, are the
On Fri, 30 Jan 2009 11:40:12 -0700
Thomas Coppi thisnuke...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 2:19 PM, John Levine jo...@iecc.com wrote:
Indeed. And don't forget that through the magic of botnets, the bad
guys have vastly more compute power available than the good guys.
Just out
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasicarticleId=9126869intsrc=hm_ts_head
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending
On Mon, 26 Jan 2009 02:49:31 -0500
Ivan Krstić krs...@solarsail.hcs.harvard.edu wrote:
Finally, any idea why the Sectéra is certified up to Top Secret for
voice but only up to Secret for e-mail? (That is, what are the
differing requirements?)
I actually explained (my take on) that
On Mon, 19 Jan 2009 10:45:55 +0100
Bodo Moeller bmoel...@acm.org wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2009 at 5:24 PM, Steven M. Bellovin
s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
I've mentioned it before, but I'll point to the paper Eric Rescorla
wrote a few years ago:
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/new
On Mon, 12 Jan 2009 16:05:08 +1300
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
Weger, B.M.M. de b.m.m.d.we...@tue.nl writes:
Bottom line, anyone fielding a SHA-2 cert today is not going=20
to be happy with their costly pile of bits.
Will this situation have changed by the end of
On Fri, 09 Jan 2009 20:12:16 -0500
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
Just about everyone knows that the FBI must obtain a formal
wiretap order from a judge to listen in on your phone calls
legally. But the U.S. Department of Justice believes that police
don't need
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/36704
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2008 11:05:28 -0500
From: Russ Housley hous...@vigilsec.com
To: ietf-p...@imc.org, ietf-sm...@imc.org, s...@ietf.org, c...@irtf.org
Subject: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/
MD5
On Fri, 26 Dec 2008 01:35:43 -0500
Ivan Krsti__ krs...@solarsail.hcs.harvard.edu wrote:
2.
The DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies recently
released a report titled 'Securing Cyberspace for the 44th
Presidency' written by a number of influential authors:
On Wed, 17 Dec 2008 13:02:58 -0500
Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote:
On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:22 PM, Charles Jackson wrote:
I probably should not be commenting, not being a real device guy.
But,
variations in temperature and time could be expected to change SSD
timing.
Slightly off-topic, but a cause celebre on cypherpunks some years ago
-- but HavenCo, which ran a datacenter on the nation of Sealand, is
no longer operating there:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/25/havenco/ (pointer via Spaf's
blog).
--Steve Bellovin,
From: Sara Caswell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: Comment Period for FIPS 186-3: Digital Signature Standard
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2008 14:52:17 -0500
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (Windows/20080421)
As stated in the Federal Register of November 12, 2008, NIST requests
From: Sara Caswell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: NIST Special Publication 800-108 Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2008 08:57:40-0500
Dear Colleagues:
NIST Special Publication 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-10069776-46.html?tag=mncol
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Forwarded with permission.
---
From: Sieg, Kent G [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Symposium Call for Papers
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2008 10:23:50 -0400
Just sending notice of our upcoming Symposium, especially if you can
present or know of a colleague who would like to do so. Dr. Kent Sieg
The
http://technology.newscientist.com/channel/tech/dn14866-laser-cracks-unbreakable-quantum-communications.html?feedId=online-news_rss20
Not surprisingly, it's attacking the implementation, not the physics --
but of course we use implementations to communicate, rather than
theories.
Elcomsoft has a product that uses GPUs to do password-cracking on a
variety of media. They claim a speed-up of up to 67x, depending on the
application being attacked.
http://www.elcomsoft.com/edpr.html?r1=prr2=wpa
(This has led to a variety of stories (see, for example,
On Wed, 24 Sep 2008 20:43:53 -0400
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Human factors haven't received nearly enough attention, and as
long as human factors failings are dismissed as the fault of
idiot users, they never will.
Strong
On Thu, 18 Sep 2008 17:18:00 +1200
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
- Use TLS-PSK, which performs mutual auth of client and server
without ever communicating the password. This vastly complicated
phishing since the phisher has to prove advance knowledge of your
credentials in order
Does anyone know where and when the use of red (inside networks) and
black (outside, encrypted networks for crypto gear) started? I'm
especially intrigued by the use of red, since in other military
nomenclature (in the US) blue is the usual color for US and friendly
forces and red is (for obvious
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:49:20 +0200
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 12:16:23PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
ETR road
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 17:55:57 +0200
Stefan Kelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but
currently is only used
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 17:05:44 +0200
Philipp G__hring [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi,
I am searching for symmetric encryption algorithms for decimal
strings.
Let's say we have various 40-digit decimal numbers:
2349823966232362361233845734628834823823
3250920019325023523623692235235728239462
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:10:51 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bill Frantz writes, in part:
-+--
| In the San Francisco Bay Area, they are using the transponder codes
| to measure how fast traffic is moving from place to place. They
| post the times to various
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 09:34:15 -0700
Greg Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So, you don't have a 133-bit block cipher lying around? No worries,
I'll sell you one ;-).
Also see Debra Cook's PhD dissertation on Elastic Block Ciphers at
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~dcook/thesis_ab.shtml
Greg, assorted folks noted, way back when, that Skipjack looked a lot
like a stream cipher. Might it be vulnerable?
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 10:56:16 -0400
From: Sara Caswell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: NIST Documents Available for Review
NIST revised the first drafts of Special Publication(SP) 800-106,
Randomized Hashing for Digital Signatures, and SP
On Sat, 09 Aug 2008 19:38:45 -0400
Ivan Krsti__ [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, 09 Aug 2008 17:11:11 -0400, Perry E. Metzger
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Las Vegas - Three students at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) were ordered this morning by a federal court
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2008 12:36:36 -0400
From: Sara Caswell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: FIPS 198-1 announcement
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is pleased to
announce approval of Federal Information Processing
On Tue, 22 Jul 2008 10:21:14 -0400
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Niels Provos has a web page up with some javascript that automatically
checks if your DNS caching server has been properly patched or not.
http://www.provos.org/index.php?/pages/dnstest.html
It is worth telling
On Mon, 14 Jul 2008 16:27:58 +0200
Florian Weimer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On top of that, some operators decided not to offer TCP service at
all.
Right. There's a common misconception, on both security and network
operator mailing lists, that DNS servers use TCP only for zone
transfers, and
On Wed, 09 Jul 2008 11:22:58 +0530
Udhay Shankar N [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think Dan Kaminsky is on this list. Any other tidbits you can add
prior to Black Hat?
Udhay
http://www.liquidmatrix.org/blog/2008/07/08/kaminsky-breaks-dns/
I'm curious about the details of the attack. Paul
On Fri, 04 Jul 2008 20:46:13 -0700
Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Is there an upper limit on the number of RSA Public/Private 1024 bit
key pairs possible? If so what is the relationship of the number of
1024 bit to the number of 2048 and 4096 bit key pairs?
There are limits, but they're
Off-topic, but (a) some crypto stuff, and (b) I think this group will
appreciate it: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/garden/12puzzle.html
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography
On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 15:58:26 -0400
Jeffrey I. Schiller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I bet the malware authors can change keys faster then we can factor
them...
To put it mildly. They can can even set up sophisticated structures to
have lots of
According to
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasicarticleId=9094818intsrc=hm_list%3E%20articleId=9094818intsrc=hm_list
some new malware is encrypting files with a 1024-bit RSA key. Victims
are asked to pay a random to get their files decrypted. So -- can
the key
On Sat, 24 May 2008 20:29:51 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, we have now persuaded even the most stubborn OS that
randomness matters, and most of them make it available, so perhaps
this concern is moot.
Though I would be interested to know how well they do it! I did
On Tue, 13 May 2008 12:10:16 -0400
Jonathan S. Shapiro [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben's points are well taken, but there is one *small* piece of this
where I have some sympathy for the Debian folks:
What can we learn from this? Firstly, vendors should not be fixing
problems (or, really,
On Tue, 13 May 2008 23:00:57 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 13 May 2008 14:10:45 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Debian have a stunning example of how blindly fixing problems
pointed out by security tools can be disastrous
Given the published list of bad ssh keys due to the Debian mistake (see
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/), should sshd be
updated to contain a blacklist of those keys? I suspect that a Bloom
filter would be quite compact and efficient.
--Steve Bellovin,
On Sun, 04 May 2008 11:22:51 +0100
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Sat, 03 May 2008 17:00:48 -0400
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes:
I am left with the strong suspicion that SSL VPNs are easier
On Sat, 03 May 2008 19:50:01 -0400
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Almost exclusively the use for such things is nailing up a tunnel to
bring someone inside a private network. For that, there is no need for
per user auth -- the general assumption is that the remote box is a
single
On Fri, 2 May 2008 08:33:19 +0100
Arcane Jill [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ryan Phillips
Sent: 28 April 2008 23:13
To: Cryptography
Subject: SSL and Malicious Hardware/Software
I can't think of a great
On Sat, 03 May 2008 17:00:48 -0400
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes:
I am left with the strong suspicion that SSL VPNs are easier to
configure and use because a large percentage of their user
population simply is not very sensitive to how
On Wed, 30 Apr 2008 12:49:12 +0300 (IDT)
Alexander Klimov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/421/2:
Lance Corporal Jennifer Long was issued a government computer
to use on a government military network. When she was
suspected of violations of the
http://www.nsa.gov/public/crypt_spectrum.cfm
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Wed, 16 Apr 2008 14:07:49 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Which seem to be aimed at a drop in replacement for SSL (with a
working example using Firefox and Apache). They seem to rest on a key
exchange or agreement based on a shared secret.
As opposed to, say, RFC 4279,
On Mon, 07 Apr 2008 08:53:44 -0700
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Consider Shannon. He didn?t do just information theory. Several
years before, he did some other good things and some which are still
locked up in the security of cryptography.
Shannon's crypto work that is still [1986]
http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItemih=005viewitem=item=150231089624rd=1
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography
On Fri, 21 Mar 2008 08:52:07 +1000
James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From time to time I hear that DNSSEC is working fine, and on
examining the matter I find it is working fine except that
Seems to me that if DNSSEC is actually working fine, I should be able
to provide an
I've been thinking about similar issues. It seems to me that just
destroying the key schedule is a big help -- enough bits will change in
the key that data recovery using just the damaged key is hard, per
comments in the paper itself.
http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/45946-1.html
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Thu, 21 Feb 2008 13:37:20 -0800
Ali, Saqib [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Umm, pardon my bluntness, but what do you think the FDE stores the
key in, if not DRAM? The encrypting device controller is a computer
system with a CPU and memory. I can easily imagine what you'd need
to build to do
On Fri, 7 Mar 2008 15:04:49 +0100
COMINT [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi,
This may be out of the remit of the list, if so a pointer to a more
appropriate forum would be welcome.
In Applied Crypto, the use of padding for CBC encryption is suggested
to be met by ending the data block with a 1
On Wed, 13 Feb 2008 20:38:49 -0800
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Pat Farrell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To:
Subject: Re: Toshiba shows 2Mbps hardware RNG
Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2008 17:40:19 -0500
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann)
On Thu, 07 Feb 2008 17:37:02 +1300
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) wrote:
The real issues occur in two locations:
1. In the browser UI.
2. In the server processing, which no longer gets the password via an
HTTP POST but as a side-effect of the TLS connect.
(1) is a one-off cost for the
On Mon, 4 Feb 2008 09:33:37 -0500 (EST)
Leichter, Jerry [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The NSA quote someone - Steve Bellovin? - has repeated comes to mind:
Amateurs talk about algorithms. Professionals talk about economics.
Using DTLS for VOIP provides you with an extremely high level of
Why require contactless in the first place?
Is swiping one's card, credit-card style too difficult for the average
user? I'm thinking two parallel copper traces on the card could be
used to power it for the duration of the swipe, with power provided
by the reader. Why, in a
The Bush administration is reforming the way export controls are
administered; see
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/01/bush_administration_unveils_ne.php
It's too soon to know if crypto will be affected; certainly, it's
something to watch.
--Steve Bellovin,
A knowledgeable colleague (but who is nevertheless not a crypto expert)
thinks he's seen something about Typex (the WW II British rotor
machine) having been cracked. Does anyone know anything about that? A
quick Google found nothing of the sort, but did find references showing
that it was used
On Tue, 22 Jan 2008 21:49:32 -0800
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As I commented in the
second paragraph, an attack at the ISP (where SSL/TLS is
of no help) has been the dominant threat -- and that is
why one of the main problems is called warrantless
wiretapping. Further, because US law
On Wed, 23 Jan 2008 08:10:01 -0800
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Tue, 22 Jan 2008 21:49:32 -0800
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As I commented in the
second paragraph, an attack at the ISP (where SSL/TLS is
of no help) has been the dominant threat
http://www.technologynewsdaily.com/node/8965 (for those of you who
don't take TEMPEST seriously)
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending
On Tue, 15 Jan 2008 08:19:11 -0500
Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The PDF link points to:
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WashWire.pdf
which I'm unable to access at the moment.
I believe the proper URL is
On Fri, 11 Jan 2008 17:32:04 -0800
Alex Alten [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Generally any standard encrypted protocols will probably eventually
have to support some sort of CALEA capability. For example, using a
Verisign ICA certificate to do MITM of SSL, or possibly requiring
Ebay to provide
Forwarded with permission.
This is part of a discussion of the proposed SHA-3 API for the NIST
competition. Those interested in discussing it should subscribe to the
list; see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/email_list.html for
instructions.
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2008
On Sat, 5 Jan 2008 15:28:50 -0800
Stephan Somogyi [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 16:38 +1300 04.01.2008, Peter Gutmann wrote:
At $1.40 each (at least in sub-1K quantities) you wonder whether
it's costing them more to add the DRM (spread over all battery
sales) than any marginal gain in
On Thu, 03 Jan 2008 11:52:21 -0500
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The aspect of this that is directly relevant to this
list is that while we have labored to make network
comms safe in an unsafe transmission medium, the
world has now reached the point where the odds favor
the hypothesis that
On Mon, 10 Dec 2007 11:27:10 -0500
Vin McLellan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What does it say about the integrity of the FIPS program, and its
CMTL evaluation process, when it is left to competitors to point out
non-compliance of evaluated products -- proprietary or open source --
to basic
On Tue, 11 Dec 2007 13:49:19 +1000
James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
It's moderately complex if you're trying to conserve bandwidth
(which translates to power) and preserve a datagram model. The
latter constraint generally rules out stream ciphers
On Thu, 29 Nov 2007 16:05:00 -0500
Tim Dierks [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A random thought that's been kicking around in my head: if someone
were looking for a project, an open-source permissive action link (
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html is a good link,
thank you Mr.
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2007 16:22:51 -0500
From: Morris Dworkin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: NIST announces approval of SP 800-38D specifying GCM
FYI, yesterday NIST announced the approval of Special Publication
800-38D, which specifies
On Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:45:37 -0600
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I wonder if we here could develop a handshake that was
cryptographically secure, resistant to CPU DoS now, and would be
possible to adjust as we get faster at doing crypto operations to
reduce latency even further. Basically an
There was a paper by Li Gong at an early CCS -- '93, I think, though it
might have been '94 -- on the number of messages different types of
authentication protocol took. It would be a good starting point.
-
The Cryptography
On Thu, 11 Oct 2007 22:19:18 -0700
james hughes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A proposal for a new password hashing based on SHA-256 or SHA-512 has
been proposed by RedHat but to my knowledge has not had any rigorous
analysis. The motivation for this is to replace MD-5 based password
hashing at
On Tue, 02 Oct 2007 15:50:27 +0200
Simon Josefsson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It sounds to me as if they are storing the AES key used for bulk
encryption somewhere on the disk, and that it can be unlocked via the
password.
I'd say decrypted by the password, rather than unlocked, but that's
On Wed, 19 Sep 2007 09:29:53 +0100
Dave Korn [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 18 September 2007 23:22, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
Anyone know anything about the Yoggie Pico (www.yoggie.com)? It
claims to do much more than the Ironkey, though the language is a
bit less marketing-speak. On the
Are there any open source digital cash packages available? I need one
as part of another research project.
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by
On Mon, 17 Sep 2007 11:20:32 -0700
Netsecurity [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Back in the late 60's I was playing with audio and a magazine I
subscribed to had a circut for creating warble tones for standing
wave and room resonance testing.
The relevance of this is that they were using a random
http://www.fcw.com/article103563-08-27-07-Print
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/prevention/article.php/3694711
I'd sure like technical details...
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/econ_crypto.pdf
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.tgdaily.com/content/view/33425/118/
Ann Arbor (MI) - University of Michigan scientists have discovered a
breakthrough way to utilize light in cryptography. The new technique
can crack even complex codes in a matter of seconds. Scientists believe
this technique offers much advancement
1 - 100 of 290 matches
Mail list logo
