On 08/09/2013 21:51, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Sun, 8 Sep 2013 14:50:07 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
Even for one-to-one discussions, these days, people want
transparent movement across their hardware. If I'm in a chat
session on my laptop and leave the house, I'd like to be able to
continue on my phone. How do I hand off the conversation - and the
I wrote about this a couple of weeks ago, see:
Which is pretty spot-on and one of my biggest gripes about OTR. It just
doesn't mesh at all with user's expectations.
In summary, it would appear that the most viable solution is to make
the end-to-end encryption endpoint a piece of hardware the user owns
(say the oft mentioned $50 Raspberry Pi class machine on their home
net) and let the user interact with it over an encrypted connection
(say running a normal protocol like Jabber client to server
protocol over TLS, or IMAP over TLS, or https: and a web client.)
Sounds like another Freedom Box...
Anyway, if we consider each device an end-point to a group-chat that has
to be verified at least once by another end-point (and that is a
somewhat doable thing, e.g. the socialist millionaire's problem), what
about having end-points being able to vouch for other end-points?
For example if I introduce my smartphone to an already existing instant
messaging chat, I can vouch for it through my PC and if other end-points
already trust my PC, there is no reason not to trust my smartphone either.
If this is a dumb idea, feel free to point it out.
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