* james hughes hugh...@mac.com wrote:
If there is no room for or an integrity field, you can look at
XTS-AES.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
A not so well-known statement of said PDF certainly is the following,
especially in light of today's storage
Hi,
I've just stumbled upon this article which you might find
interesting
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9985886-7.html?hhTest=1
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* markus reichelt [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
* Ralf-Philipp Weinmann [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My colleague Erik took photos of the slides which I put up on
Zooomr [0]. A video recording of the talk should be available
shortly and will be linked here.
preliminary link for the video
* Ralf-Philipp Weinmann [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My colleague Erik took photos of the slides which I put up on
Zooomr [0]. A video recording of the talk should be available
shortly and will be linked here.
preliminary link for the video:
* Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
1) In the paper, he mentions that the state file could be altered
by an attacker, and then he'd know the state when it first came up.
Of course, if he could do that, he could simply install a trojan in
the OS itself, so this is not really that much of a
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, it is a trick. Yesterday I updated my paper Tunnels in
Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions Within a Minute
(http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf) and MD5 collision program
(http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/2006/web_version_1.zip).
just being curious: from what
* Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So, why not always sign messages to a list that permits
signatures?
It's hard to see the benefit, and it is easy to see the potential
cost. In a litiguous world, we are (slightly) better off not using
messages that are going to haunt us in years to come.
