[Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)

2013-10-14 Thread Adam Back
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 12:47:56PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote: The actual technical question is whether an across the board 128 bit security level is sufficient for a hash function with a 256 bit output. This weakens the proposed SHA3-256 relative to SHA256 in preimage resistance, where SHA256

[Cryptography] was this FIPS 186-1 (first DSA) an attemped NSA backdoor?

2013-10-10 Thread Adam Back
Some may remember Bleichenbacher found a random number generator bias in the original DSA spec, that could leak the key after soem number of signatures depending the circumstances. Its described in this summary of DSA issues by Vaudenay Evaluation Report on DSA

[Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 06:35:24PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote: Having read the mail you linked to, it doesn't say the curves weren't generated according to the claimed procedure. Instead, it repeats Dan Bernstein's comment that the seed looks random, and that this would have allowed NSA to

Re: [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-10-01 Thread Adam Back
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 08:47:49AM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote: On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 3:08 AM, Adam Back [1]a...@cypherspace.org wrote: But I do think it is a very interesting and pressing research question as to whether there are ways to plausibly deniably symmetrically weaken

Re: [Cryptography] TLS2

2013-09-30 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 11:49:49AM +0300, ianG wrote: On 30/09/13 11:02 AM, Adam Back wrote: no ASN.1, and no X.509 [...], encrypt and then MAC only, no non-forward secret ciphersuites, no baked in key length limits [...] support soft-hosting [...] Add TOFO for self-signed keys. Personally

Re: [Cryptography] TLS2

2013-09-30 Thread Adam Back
If we're going to do that I vote no ASN.1, and no X.509. Just BNF format like the base SSL protocol; encrypt and then MAC only, no non-forward secret ciphersuites, no baked in key length limits. I think I'd also vote for a lot less modes and ciphers. And probably non-NIST curves while we're at

[Cryptography] three crypto lists - why and which

2013-09-30 Thread Adam Back
I am not sure if everyone is aware that there is also an unmoderated crypto list, because I see old familiar names posting on the moderated crypto list that I do not see posting on the unmoderated list. The unmoderated list has been running continuously (new posts in every day with no gaps)

[Cryptography] forward-secrecy =2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

2013-09-25 Thread Adam Back
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:59:50PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: Something that can sign a new RSA-2048 sub-certificate is called a CA. For a browser, it'll have to be a trusted CA. What I was asking you to explain is how the browsers are going to deal with over half a billion (source: Netcraft

Re: [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity

2013-09-15 Thread Adam Back
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 04:55:05PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote: The more I think about it, the more important it seems that any anonymous email like communications system *not* include people who don't want to be part of it, and have lots of defenses to prevent its anonymous communications from

Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength

2013-09-14 Thread Adam Back
On Sat, Sep 14, 2013 at 12:56:02PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3766 | requirement | Symmetric | RSA or DH| DSA subgroup | | for attack | key size | modulus size | size | +-+---+--+--+ |100

Re: Against Rekeying

2010-03-25 Thread Adam Back
Seems people like bottom post around here. On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 8:51 PM, Nicolas Williams nicolas.willi...@sun.com wrote: On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:42:38AM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote: On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 11:21:01AM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Ekr has an interesting blog post up

Re: Against Rekeying

2010-03-23 Thread Adam Back
In anon-ip (a zero-knowledge systems internal project) and cebolla [1] we provided forward-secrecy (aka backward security) using symmetric re-keying (key replaced by hash of previous key). (Backward and forward security as defined by Ross Anderson in [2]). But we did not try to do forward

Re: Password hashing

2007-10-12 Thread Adam Back
I would have thought PBKDF2 would be the obvious, standardized (PKCS #5 / RFC 2898) and designed for purpose method to derive a key from a password. PBKDF2 would typically be based on HMAC-SHA1. Should be straight-forward to use PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 instead for larger key sizes, or for

Re: open source digital cash packages

2007-09-18 Thread Adam Back
credlib provides Brands' and Chaum credentials, both of which can be used for ecash. http://www.cypherspace.org/credlib/ Adam On Mon, Sep 17, 2007 at 01:46:04PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: Are there any open source digital cash packages available? I need one as part of another

Re: remote-attestation is not required (Re: The bank fraud blame game)

2007-07-04 Thread Adam Back
I think you misread what I said about BIOS jumper required install. Ie this is not a one click install from email. It is something one user in 10,000 would even install at all! It would be more like people who program and install custom BIOSes or something, people who reverse-engineer security

remote-attestation is not required (Re: The bank fraud blame game)

2007-07-03 Thread Adam Back
I do not believe the mentioned conflict exists. The aim of these calculator-like devices is to make sure that no malware, virus etc can create unauthorized transactions. The user should still be able to debug, and inspect the software in the calculator-like device, or virtual software

Re: New digital bearer cash site launched

2007-02-24 Thread Adam Back
I read some of the docs and ecache appears to be based on HMAC tickets, plus mixes. The problem I see is that you have to trust the mix. Now the documentation does mention that they anticipate 3rd party mixes, but still you have to trust those mixes also. And as we know from mixmaster etc.,

private credential/ecash thread on slashdot (Re: announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials)

2007-02-21 Thread Adam Back
faced in deploying this stuff. Cant deploy what people dont understand! Adam -- http://www.cypherspace.org/credlib/ On Fri, Feb 16, 2007 at 11:14:39AM -0500, Adam Back wrote: Hi I implemented Chaumian and Brands credentials in a credential library (C code, using openSSL). I implemented some

announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials (Re: see also credentica announcement about U-prove)

2007-02-16 Thread Adam Back
Hi I implemented Chaumian and Brands credentials in a credential library (C code, using openSSL). I implemented some of the pre-computation steps. Have not made any attempt so far to benchmark it. But thought I could take this opportunity to make it public. I did not try to optimize so far.

see also credentica announcement about U-prove (Re: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source)

2007-02-15 Thread Adam Back
Related to this announcement, credentica.com (Stefan Brands' company) has released U-Prove, their toolkit SDK for doing limited-show, selective disclosure and other aspects of the Brands credentials. http://www.credentica.com/uprove_sdk.html (Also on Stefans blog

secure CRNGs and FIPS (Re: How important is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cert?)

2006-12-26 Thread Adam Back
Anoymous wrote: [criticizing FIPS CRNGs] You can make a secure CRNG that you can obtain FIPS 140 certification on using the FIPS 186-2 appendix 3.1 (one of my clients got FIPS 140 on an implementation of the FIPS 186-2 RNG that I implemented for general key generation and such crypto use.) You

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread Adam Back
has serious potential problems when most machine owners do not understand security). Does anyone know the current state of affairs on this issue within the Trusted Computing Group (and the marketed products of its members)? Adam Back wrote: So the part about being able to detect viruses

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Adam Back
So the part about being able to detect viruses, trojans and attest them between client-server apps that the client and server have a mutual interest to secure is fine and good. The bad part is that the user is not given control to modify the hash and attest as if it were the original so that he

Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)

2006-09-10 Thread Adam Back
On Sat, Sep 09, 2006 at 09:39:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: There is some more detail here: http://groups.google.ca/group/sci.crypt/browse_thread/thread/e1b9339bf9fb5060/62ced37bb9713a39?lnk=st Interesting. In fact, Gligor et al appear to have proposed IGE rather later than this date

IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)

2006-09-09 Thread Adam Back
Hi Ben, Travis IGE if this description summarized by Travis is correct, appears to be a re-invention of Anton Stiglic and my proposed FREE-MAC mode. However the FREE-MAC mode (below described as IGE) was broken back in Mar 2000 or maybe earlier by Gligor, Donescu and Iorga. I recommend you do

Re: A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-27 Thread Dr Adam Back
What they're saying is if you change the password, create some new data in the encrypted folder, then someone who knew the old password, can decrypt your new data. Why? Well because when you change the password they dont change the symmetric key used to encrypt the data. The password is used to

Re: Hamiltonian path as protection against DOS.

2006-08-14 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, Aug 14, 2006 at 12:23:03PM +1000, mikeiscool wrote: But you're imaging an attack with a distributed bot net DDoS'ing you, correct? Couldn't they then also use their botnet to process the messages faster then normally? They already have the computering power. Just a minor addon to the

encrypted filesystem integrity threat-model (Re: Linux RNG paper)

2006-05-05 Thread Adam Back
I think an encrypted file system with builtin integrity is somewhat interesting however the threat model is a bit broken if you are going to boot off a potentially tampered with disk. I mean the attacker doesnt have to tamper with the proposed encrypted+MACed data, he just tampers with the boot

Re: Unforgeable Blinded Credentials

2006-04-19 Thread Adam Back
On Wed, Apr 19, 2006 at 11:53:18AM -0700, bear wrote: On Sat, 8 Apr 2006, Ben Laurie wrote: Adam Back wrote: My suggestion was to use a large denomination ecash coin to have anonymous disincentives :) ie you get fined, but you are not identified. The problem with that disincentive

Re: Unforgeable Blinded Credentials

2006-04-08 Thread Adam Back
On Sat, Apr 08, 2006 at 07:53:37PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: Adam Back wrote: [about Brands credentials] I think they shows are linkable, but if you show more than allowed times, all of the attributes are leaked, including the credential secret key and potentially some identifying

Re: Unforgeable Blinded Credentials

2006-04-04 Thread Adam Back
On Tue, Apr 04, 2006 at 06:15:48AM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: This illustrates a problem with multi-show credentials, that the holder could share his credential freely, and in some cases even publish it, and this would allow non-authorized parties to use it. To avoid this, more complicated

Re: Unforgeable Blinded Credentials

2006-04-02 Thread Adam Back
On Sat, Apr 01, 2006 at 12:35:12PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: However, anyone I show this proof to can then masquerade as a silver member, using my signed nonce. So, it occurred to me that an easy way to prevent this is to create a private/public key pair and instead of the nonce use the hash of

Re: Your secrets are safe with quasar encryption

2006-03-30 Thread Adam Back
How many suitable quasars are there? You'd be damn lucky if its a cryptograhic strength number. Now you might think there are limits to how many signals you can listen to and that would be some protection, however you still have brute force guess a signal, and probability of guessing the right

conservative choice: encrypt then MAC (Re: general defensive crypto coding principles)

2006-02-09 Thread Adam Back
Don't forget Bleichenbacher's error channel attack on SSL implementations, which focussed on the mac then encrypt design of SSL... web servers gave different error for malformed padding vs plaintext MAC failure. The lesson I drew from that is the conservative choice is encrypt then MAC. I dont

Re: long-term GPG signing key

2006-01-11 Thread Adam Back
There are a number of differences in key management priorities between (communication) signature and encryption keys. For encryption keys: - you want short lived keys - you should wipe the keys after at first opportunity - for archiving you should re-encrypt with storage keys - you can't detect

Re: OpenSSL BIGNUM vs. GMP

2006-01-03 Thread Adam Back
On Tue, Jan 03, 2006 at 10:10:50PM +, Ben Laurie wrote: Jack Lloyd wrote: Some relevant and recent data: in some tests I ran this weekend [gmp faster than openssl] AFAIK blinding alone can protect against all (publicly known) timing attacks; am I wrong about this? Yes, you are -

Re: Defending users of unprotected login pages with TrustBar 0.4.9.93

2005-09-21 Thread Adam Back
I would think it would be safer to block the site, or provide a warning dialog. (This is what I was expecting when I started reading the head post; I was bit surprised at the interventionism to actually go ahead and fix the site, maybe that would be a better default behavior). btw Regarding

e2e security by default (Re: e2e all the way)

2005-08-27 Thread Adam Back
OK summing up: I think e2e secure, and secure by default. On Fri, Aug 26, 2005 at 04:17:32PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: On the contrary -- I did say that I support and use e2e security. I simply said that user-to-server security solves a lot of many -- most? -- people's security

e2e all the way (Re: Another entry in the internet security hall of shame....)

2005-08-26 Thread Adam Back
On Fri, Aug 26, 2005 at 11:41:42AM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Adam Back writes: Thats broken, just like the WAP GAP ... for security you want end2end security, not a secure channel to an UTP (untrusted third party)! What is security? What are you

Re: How many wrongs do you need to make a right?

2005-08-17 Thread Adam Back
Not to defend PKI, but what about delta-CRLs? Maybe not available at time of the Navy deployment? But certainly meaning that people can download just changes since last update. Steven writes: [alternatives] such as simply publishing the hash of revoked certificates, Well presumably you mean

locking door when window is open? (Re: solving the wrong problem)

2005-08-08 Thread Adam Back
Single picket fence -- doesn't work without a lot of explaining. The one I usually have usually heard is the obvious and intuitive locking the door when the window is open. (ie fixating on quality of dead-bolt, etc on the front door when the window beside it is _open_!) Adam On Sat, Aug 06,

Re: mother's maiden names...

2005-07-16 Thread Adam Back
I think in the UK check signatures are not verified below £30,000 (about US $53,000). I presume it is just economics ... cost of infrastructure to verify vs value of verifying given the fraud rate. Adam On Fri, Jul 15, 2005 at 01:42:08PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: My bank doesn't even bother to

Re: use KDF2 / IEEE1363a (Re: expanding a password into many keys)

2005-06-14 Thread Adam Back
I suppose I should also have note that the master key going into KDF2 would be derived with PBKDF2 from a password if this is a password derived set of keys, to get the extra features of a salt and iterator to slow down brute force. Adam On Tue, Jun 14, 2005 at 04:21:39AM -0400, Adam Back wrote

Re: Microsoft info-cards to use blind signatures?

2005-05-30 Thread Adam Back
Yes but the other context from the related group of blog postings, is Kim Cameron's (microsoft) laws of identity [1] that this comment is made in the context of. It is relatively hard to see how one could implement an identity system meeting the stated laws without involving blind signatures of

Re: and constrained subordinate CA costs?

2005-03-28 Thread Adam Back
On Fri, Mar 25, 2005 at 04:02:36PM -0600, Matt Crawford wrote: There's an X.509v3 NameConstraints extension (which the higher CA would include in the lower CA's cert) but I have the impression that ends system software does not widely support it. And of course if you don't flag it

and constrained subordinate CA costs? (Re: SSL Cert prices ($10 to $1500, you choose!))

2005-03-25 Thread Adam Back
The URL John forwarded gives survey of prices for regular certs and subdomain wildcard certs/super certs (ie *.mydomain.com all considered valid with respect to a single cert). Does anyone have info on the cost of sub-ordinate CA cert with a name space constraint (limited to issue certs on

pgp global directory bugged instructions

2004-12-22 Thread Adam Back
So PGP are now running a pgp key server which attempts to consilidate the inforamtion from the existing key servers, but screen it by ability to receive email at the address. So they send you an email with a link in it and you go there and it displays your key userid, keyid, fingerprint and email

Re: The Pointlessness of the MD5 attacks

2004-12-15 Thread Adam Back
, 2004 at 11:21:13PM +, Ben Laurie wrote: Adam Back wrote: I thought the usual attack posited when one can find a collision on a source checksum is to make the desired change to source, then tinker with something less obvious and more malleable like lsbits of a UI image file until you find

Re: The Pointlessness of the MD5 attacks

2004-12-15 Thread Adam Back
and change surrepticiously with C'. Adam On Wed, Dec 15, 2004 at 08:44:03AM +, Ben Laurie wrote: Adam Back wrote: Well the people doing the checking (a subset of the power users) may say I checked the source and it has this checksum, and another user may download that checksum

Re: The Pointlessness of the MD5 attacks

2004-12-14 Thread Adam Back
I thought the usual attack posited when one can find a collision on a source checksum is to make the desired change to source, then tinker with something less obvious and more malleable like lsbits of a UI image file until you find your collision on two input source packages. Adam On Tue, Dec

Brands credential book online (pdf)

2004-10-05 Thread Adam Back
Stefan Brands book on his credential / ecash technology is now downloadable in pdf format from credentica's web site: http://www.credentica.com/the_mit_pressbook.php (previously it was only available in hardcopy, and only parts of the content was described in academic papers). Also the

anonymous IP terminology (Re: [anonsec] Re: potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED]))

2004-09-11 Thread Adam Back
Joe Touch [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The point has nothing to do with anonymity; The last one, agreed. But the primary assumption is that we can avoid a lot of infrastructure and impediment to deployment by treating an ongoing conversation as a reason to trust an endpoint, rather than a

Re: anonymous IP terminology (Re: [anonsec] Re: potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED]))

2004-09-11 Thread Adam Back
On Sat, Sep 11, 2004 at 11:38:00AM -0700, Joe Touch wrote: Although anonymous access is not the primary goal, it is a feature of the solution. The access is _not_ anonymous. The originator's IP, ISP call traces, phone access records will be all over it and associated audit logs. And you

finding key pairs with colliding fingerprints (Re: How thorough are the hash breaks, anyway?)

2004-08-28 Thread Adam Back
You would have to either: - search for candidate collisions amongst public keys you know the private key for (bit more expensive) - factorize the public key after you found a collision the 2nd one isn't as hard as it sounds because the public key would be essentially random and have

Re: RPOW - Reusable Proofs of Work

2004-08-21 Thread Adam Back
It's like an online ecash system. Each recipient sends the RPOW back to the mint that issued it to ask if it has been double spent before accepting it as valid. If it's valid (not double spent) the RPOW server sends back a new RPOW for the receiving server to reuse. Very like Chaum's online

Re: should you trust CAs? (Re: dual-use digital signature vulnerability)

2004-08-01 Thread Adam Back
On Wed, Jul 28, 2004 at 10:00:01PM -0700, Aram Perez wrote: As far as I know, there is nothing in any standard or good security practice that says you can't multiple certificate for the same email address. If I'm willing to pay each time, Verisign will gladly issue me a certificate with my

should you trust CAs? (Re: dual-use digital signature vulnerability)

2004-07-28 Thread Adam Back
The difference is if the CA does not generate private keys, there should be only one certificate per email address, so if two are discovered in the wild the user has a transferable proof that the CA is up-to-no-good. Ie the difference is it is detectable and provable. If the CA in normal

Re: Brands' private credentials

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Wed, Apr 28, 2004 at 07:54:50PM +, Jason Holt wrote: Last I heard, Brands started a company called Credentica, which seems to only have a placeholder page (although it does have an info@ address). I also heard that his credential system was never implemented, It was implemented at

chaum's patent expiry? (Re: Brands' private credentials)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
approach of Wagner's protocol. But I obviously am not a patent lawyer, and have avoided reading and participating in the writing of patents. Adam On Sun, May 09, 2004 at 05:08:09AM -0400, Adam Back wrote: [...] I looked at Camenisch protocol briefly a couple of years ago and it is not based Brands

Re: Brands' private credentials

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
[copied to cpunks as cryptography seems to have a multi-week lag these days]. OK, now having read: http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/HiddenCredentials.html http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/pubs/wpes03.pdf and seeing that it is a completely different proposal essentially being an application of IBE, and extension

Re: Brands' private credentials

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 02:42:04AM +, Jason Holt wrote: However can't one achieve the same thing with encryption: eg an SSL connection and conventional authentication? How would you use SSL to prove fulfillment without revealing how? You could get the CA to issue you a patient or

blinding BF IBE CA assisted credential system (Re: chaum's patent expiry?)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 03:03:56AM +, Jason Holt wrote: [...] Actually, now that you mention Chaum, I'll have to look into blind signatures with the BF IBE (issuing is just a scalar*point multiply on a curve). I think you mean so that the CA/IBE server even though he learns pseudonyms

more hiddencredentials comments (Re: Brands' private credentials)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 08:02:12PM +, Jason Holt wrote: Adam Back wrote: [...] However the server could mark the encrypted values by encoding different challenge response values in each of them, right? Yep, that'd be a problem in that case. In the most recent (unpublished) paper, I

Re: blinding BF IBE CA assisted credential system (Re: chaum's patent expiry?)

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
But if I understand that is only half of the picture. The recipient's IBE CA will still be able to decrypt, tho the sender's IBE CA may not as he does not have ability to compute pseudonym private keys for the other IBE CA. If you make it PFS, then that changes to the recipient's IBE CA can get

Re: 3. Proof-of-work analysis

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
Here's a forward of parts of an email I sent to Richard with comments on his and Ben's paper (sent me a pre-print off-list a couple of weeks ago): One obvious comment is that the calculations do not take account of the CAMRAM approach of charging for introductions only. You mention this in the

Re: Reusable hashcash for spam prevention

2004-05-25 Thread Adam Back
FYI Richard amended the figures in the paper which makes things 10x more favorable for hashcash in terms of being an ecomonic defense against spammers. Richard wrote on asrg: | we're grateful (albeit a little embarrassed) for the consideration | given to one of our figures by Ted Wobber (MS

Re: Microsoft publicly announces Penny Black PoW postage project

2003-12-28 Thread Adam Back
://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3324883.stm Adam Back is part of this team, I think. Similar approach to Camram/hahscash. Memory-based approaches have been discussed. Why hasn't Camram explored them? steve

Re: Microsoft publicly announces Penny Black PoW postage project

2003-12-28 Thread Adam Back
applications. Adam On Fri, Dec 26, 2003 at 09:37:18PM -0500, Adam Back wrote: I did work at Microsoft for about a year after leaving ZKS, but I quit a month or so ago (working for another startup again). But for accuracy while I was at Microsoft I was not part of the microsoft research/academic team

Re: Protection against offline dictionary attack on static files

2003-11-13 Thread Adam Back
Yes this is a good idea, and some people thought of it before also. Look for paper secure applications of low entropy keys or something like that by Schnieir, Wagner et al. (on counterpane labs page I think). Also the PBKDF2 function defined in PKCS#5 used to convert the password into a key

efficiency?? vs security with symmetric crypto? (Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP)

2003-09-26 Thread Adam Back
What conceivable trade-offs could you have to make to get acceptable performance out of symmetric crypto encrypted+authenticated tunnel? All ciphers you should be using are like 50MB/sec on a 1Ghz machine!! If you look at eg cebolla (more anonymity than VPN, but it's a nested forward-secret VPN

why are CAs charging so much for certs anyway? (Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star)

2003-09-24 Thread Adam Back
Saw this on theregister.co.uk: geotrust is undercutting veri$ign at $159/cert vs $350/cert by verisign and $199 by Thawte (which as you note is just a verisign brand at this point). http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/67/33009.html You'd have thought there would be plenty of scope for

Re: why are CAs charging so much for certs anyway? (Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star)

2003-09-24 Thread Adam Back
On Wed, Sep 24, 2003 at 05:40:38PM -0700, Ed Gerck wrote: Yes, there is a good reason for CAs to charge so much for certs. I hope this posting is able to set this clear once and for all. [zero risk, zero cost, zero liability, zero regulatory burden] 9. Product Price: At Will. There is no

Re: traffix analysis

2003-08-28 Thread Adam Back
explores this in the context of ZKS Freedom Network, and Pipenet presenting attacks on the Freedom Network, Onion Network, Crowds and Pipenet which affect privacy and availability. Adam Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems, IH 2001, Adam Back, Ulf Moeller, and Anton

Re: Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web Based Apps

2003-06-15 Thread Adam Back
I think he means higher level frameworks, web programming libraries, toolkits, and web page builder stuff; not hooks into SSL sessions. Not to say that a hook into an SSL session is not a good place to get an application sessions identifier from -- it would be, presuming that you can't trick a