Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?

2013-10-03 Thread Alan Braggins
On 02/10/13 18:42, Arnold Reinhold wrote: On 1 Oct 2013 23:48 Jerry Leichter wrote: The larger the construction project, the tighter the limits on this stuff. I used to work with a former structural engineer, and he repeated some of the bad example stories they are taught. A famous case a

Re: [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor

2013-09-25 Thread Alan Braggins
On 23 September 2013 01:09, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: So we think there is 'some kind' of backdoor in a random number generator. One question is how the EC math might make that possible. Another is how might the door be opened. Are you talking about

Re: [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.

2013-09-25 Thread Alan Braggins
On 24 September 2013 17:01, Jerry Leichter wrote: On Sep 23, 2013, at 4:20 AM, ianG wrote: ... But they made Dual EC DRBG the default ... At the time this default was chosen (2005 or thereabouts), it was *not* a mistake.

Re: Lava lamp random number generator made useful?

2008-09-24 Thread Alan
On Tue, 2008-09-23 at 00:09 -0700, Jon Callas wrote: A cheap USB camera would make a good source. The cheaper the better, too. Pull a frame off, hash it, and it's got entropy, even against a white background. No lava lamp needed. I sort of agree, but I feel cautious about recommending

Re: Question on export issues

2008-01-03 Thread Alan
On Sun, 2007-12-30 at 08:30 -0500, Richard Salz wrote: In my personal experience, if you are developing a mass-market item with conventional crypto (e.g., SSL, S/MIME, etc ) then it is fairly routine to get a commodity export license which lets you sell globally. Disclaimers abound,

Question on export issues

2007-12-29 Thread Alan
What are the rules these days on crypto exports. Is a review still required? If so, what gets rejected? Just wondering... I have people at work ask me what the rules are and I have not kept up with them. If GnuPG can ship, what gets rejected? Is there some magic cryptotech I am not aware of?

Re: More on in-memory zeroisation

2007-12-14 Thread Alan Barrett
)); --apb (Alan Barrett) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: using SRAM state as a source of randomness

2007-09-18 Thread alan
On Tue, 18 Sep 2007, James A. Donald wrote: Using SRAM as a source of either randomness or unique device ID is fragile. It might well work, but one cannot know with any great confidence that it is going to work. It might work fine for every device for a year, and then next batch arrives, and

Re: How the Greek cellphone network was tapped.

2007-07-10 Thread alan
is undefined. ANSI C also says that struct assignment is a memcpy. Therefore struct assignment in ANSI C is a violation of ANSI C... - Alan Cox - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: Hamiltonian path as protection against DOS.

2006-08-20 Thread alan
On Tue, 15 Aug 2006, Bill Stewart wrote: Crypto is usually about economics and scalability. If you're doing this for DOS/DDOS prevention, you don't need the NP-completeness perfection you get from Hamiltonian paths or similar problems - SHA is fine, or any other hash that's quick to verify and

Re: Crypto to defend chip IP: snake oil or good idea?

2006-07-26 Thread alan
On Tue, 25 Jul 2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote: EE Times is carrying the following story: It is about attempts to use cryptography to protect chip designs from untrustworthy fabrication facilities, including a technology

Re: NSA knows who you've called.

2006-05-13 Thread alan
On Fri, 12 May 2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: alan writes: -+-- | | Probably because most Americans believe they are being spied on | anyways. (And have for a very long time.) | Au contraire', it is precisely what, for example, my spouse would say: I live a decent life and have

Re: NSA knows who you've called.

2006-05-13 Thread alan
On Fri, 12 May 2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Perry E. Metzger writes: -+ | | And a personal note to you all: | | Let me again remind people that if you do not inform your elected | representatives of your displeasure with this sort of thing, | eventually you will not

Re: ID theft -- so what?

2005-07-25 Thread Alan Barrett
was still unable or unwilling to show me the promised copies of relevant documents. The merchant eventually contacted me about the repudiated charge. --apb (Alan Barrett) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake companies, real money)

2004-10-25 Thread Alan Barrett
with a keypad? Aside from the weight of the 'computer' in your pocket... The risks of using *somebody else's keypad* to type passwords or instructions to your smartcard, or using *somebody else's display* to view output that is intended to be private, should be obvious. --apb (Alan Barrett

Re: [camram-spam] Re: Microsoft publicly announces Penny Black PoW postage project

2004-01-02 Thread Alan Brown
On Tue, 30 Dec 2003, Bill Stewart wrote: The reason it's partly a cryptographic problem is forgeries. Once everybody starts whitelisting, spammers are going to start forging headers to pretend to come from big mailing lists and popular machines and authors, so now you'll not only need to

Re: [camram-spam] Re: Microsoft publicly announces Penny Black PoW postage project

2003-12-30 Thread Alan Brown
On Tue, 30 Dec 2003, Eric S. Johansson wrote: But using your spam size, , the slowdown factor becomes roughly 73 times. So they would need 73 machines running full tilt all the time to regain their old throughput. Believe me, the professionals have enough 0wned machines that this is