At 11:56 PM +0200 6/19/04, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
Hi,
does anyone know good jokes about
cryptography, cryptographers, or security?
Q: How many cryptographers does it take to change a light bulb?
A: XIGHCBS
---
There was a story in the NY Times many years ago about an apartment
The Mythical Man-Month is a great book, but it's almost 30 years
old. Brooks considered OS/360 to be hopelessly bloated. My favorite
quote (from Chapter 5, The Second System Effect, p. 56):
For example, OS/360 devotes 26 bytes of the permanently resident
date-turnover routine to the proper
At 9:19 PM -0400 5/27/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
At 12:35 PM -0400 5/27/04, John Kelsey wrote:
Does anyone know whether the low-power nature of wireless LANs protects
them from eavesdropping by satellite?
It seems to me that you'd need a pretty big dish
At 8:21 PM +0100 4/26/04, Graeme Burnett wrote:
Hello folks,
I am doing a presentation on the future of security,
which of course includes a component on cryptography.
That will be given at this conference on payments
systems and security: http://www.enhyper.com/paysec/
Would anyone there have any
At 4:01 PM +0200 4/14/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi,
I'm looking for interesting and unusal defitions of the
term Security (or secure).
I'm fully aware that it is difficult or impossible to give
a precise, compact, and universal definitions, and some
book authors explicitely say so. However,
I was the one who updated the Wikipedia entry . It was shortly before
the cryptography list came back up. I found the June 2003 CNSS fact
sheet while looking for other information on NIST's standards
program. The first reference that I found that suggested AES could be
used for classified was
At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that
the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens
the way for serial voting fraud.
The receipt should be exposed to the voter
.
- don davis, boston
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to authenticate
software
releases
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: Macintosh Cryptography mac_crypto.vmeng.com
At 4:51 PM +0100 4/5/04, Nicko van Someren wrote:
...
While I agree that it is somewhat lax of Apple to be using MD5 for
checking its updates it's far from clear to me that an attack of the
sort described above would ever be practical. The problem is that
the while there are methods for
I did a Google search on irrebuttable presumption and found a lot
of interesting material. One research report on the State of
Connecticut web site
http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2003/olrdata/ph/rpt/2003-R-0422.htm
says: The Connecticut Supreme Court and the U. S. Supreme Court have
held that
At 11:12 AM + 12/31/03, Ben Laurie wrote:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
In my opinion, the various hashcash-to-stop-spam style schemes are not
very useful, because spammers now routinely use automation to break
into vast numbers of home computers and use them to send their
spam. They're not paying
Jill's approach to key stretching is not quite the same as the
traditional iterated hash. It imposes no cost at encryption time,
you only have to work at decryption. This might be valuable when you
want to save your files as the Gestapo is breaking down your door.
I've been working on a
At 6:38 PM -0400 9/18/03, John S. Denker wrote:
Yes, Mallory can DoS the setup by reading (and thereby
trashing) every bit. But Mallory can DoS the setup by
chopping out a piece of the cable. The two are equally
effective and equally detectable. Chopping is cheaper and
easier.
Other
At 1:22 PM -0400 5/29/03, Ian Grigg wrote:
The following appears to be a bone fide case of a
threat model in action against the PGP program.
Leaving aside commentary on the pros and cons
within this example, there is a desparate lack of
real experience in how crypto systems are attacked.
IMHO,
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