Re: replay & integrity

2003-07-10 Thread C. Wegrzyn
Zooko, I don't think you actually need to worry about the At-Most-Once semantics you example below. This sort of stuff has been around for decades and there are a number of open source programs available. Don't confuse what TLS does - transport messages securely end-to-end - to what the end poi

Re: Fwd: [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect Online Messages

2003-07-09 Thread C. Wegrzyn
Actually i would imagine that banks could have such a trusted position. They haven't done anything in the space but I am sure they will at some time. The problem isn't them holding the key but once it is in the hands of a third party it could easily be gotten to by the government (through a co

Re: Fwd: [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect OnlineMessages

2003-07-09 Thread C. Wegrzyn
From my very practical position ( I was the CTO of Authentica and responsible for their email and web technology) there are truths to the email from Ian. Though I will also state that their is a very real segment of the marketplace which does require a user to have secure messaging while the co

Re: Voltage - Identity Based Encryption.

2003-07-08 Thread C. Wegrzyn
Martin, I understand your reluctance. I don't like this mechanism either and I was the CTO of Authentica! martin f krafft wrote: also sprach C. Wegrzyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003.07.08.2324 +0200]: This is the same approach used in the Authentica system but it is deployed in an

Re: Voltage - Identity Based Encryption.

2003-07-08 Thread C. Wegrzyn
This is the same approach used in the Authentica system but it is deployed in an enterprise environment. Chuck Wegrzyn martin f krafft wrote: also sprach Hack Hawk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003.07.08.0154 +0200]: So what they're saying is that your PRIVATE key is stored on a server somewhere on