Re: [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers

2013-09-13 Thread Chris Kuethe
(curse you anti-gmail-top-posting zealots...)

On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 3:47 PM, Dave Horsfall d...@horsfall.org wrote:

 Another whacky idea...

 Given that there is One True Source of randomness to wit radioactive
 emission, has anyone considered playing with old smoke detectors?


Yep. For fun I wrote a custom firmware for the Sparkfun Geiger counter to
do random bit or byte generation that I could mix into my system's entropy
pool. I'll eventually update the code to also work with the ExcelPhysics
APOC.

acknowledging some prior art: http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/

The ionising types are being phased out in favour of optical (at least in
 Australia) so there must be heaps of them lying around.


There are heaps of them at big-box retailers in the US, with no sign of
going away. I got a couple for $5 each.


 I know - legislative requirements, HAZMAT etc, but it ought to make for a
 good thought experiment.


Low activity sources seem to be fairly unencumbered. There are plenty of
places that will sell calibrated test sources or lumps of random ore for
educational use. Then you get to tell people funny stories about the time
you bought radioactive material on the internet, and someone else gets to
do the compliance paperwork (if necessary).

Homebrew geiger counter rigs aren't exactly practical or scalable - I don't
want to make my datacenter guys cut open a case of smoke detectors and
solder a dozen GM tubes so we can have good random numbers. A better
solution might be to use one of the various thumb-drive sized AVR-USB
boards: load in a simple firmware to emulate a serial port, and emit
samples from the onboard ADCs and RC oscillators... no soldering required.

I was going to say that it's simple to inspect the code - even the
generated assembly or the raw hex - for undesired behavior, then I
remembered the USB side is non-trivial. If you're not using the onboard USB
hardware it's much easier to verify that you're only doing an ADC sample, a
timer read, a couple of comparisons, a UART write, and nothing else
(assuming you offload the whitening to your host's entropy pool).

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Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Chris Kuethe
On Wed, Aug 6, 2008 at 8:23 AM, Peter Saint-Andre [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide answers
 to security questions such as these:

 ***
 ...
 ***

 It strikes me that the answers to many of these questions might be public
 information or subject to social engineering attacks...

Lie.

I don't actually give the real answers to those questions for just
that reason. Make up some plausible and memorable words (maybe using a
tool like yould), and pick your mother a new random name from the
phone book.


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Re: the joy of enhanced certs

2008-06-05 Thread Chris Kuethe
On Wed, Jun 4, 2008 at 12:51 PM, Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 An object lesson in this just fell in my lap -- I just got my first
 email from a spammer that links to a web site that uses such a cert,
 certified by a CA I've never heard of (Starfield Technologies, Inc.)

starfield = godaddy.

see https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/ssl/ssl.asp?app_hdr=ci=12421 and
click on the fluffy little webtrust icons to get the reports.
https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=355

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Re: Seagate announces hardware FDE for laptop and desktop machines

2007-09-07 Thread Chris Kuethe
On 9/6/07, Jacob Appelbaum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Seagate recently announced a 1TB drive for desktop systems and a 250GB
 laptop drive. What's of interest is that it appears to use a system
 called DriveTrust for Full Disk Encryption. It's apparently AES-128.

Yes, but will it work on my UltraSparc? How about my PPC powermac? Or
maybe my OpenBSD laptop?

What's that - I have to use some opaque mechanism to key my drive? Pass.

And how do I know that the drive didn't just store a copy of my
encryption key in NVRAM somewhere which can be retrieved by reading
some magic sequence of negative sectors? And what about a zillion
other paranoid but reasonable concerns?

CK

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Re: (Short) Intro and question

2007-01-08 Thread Chris Kuethe

On 1/6/07, Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

One of the questions that I have been raising is trust and how to
ensure that that it is not misplaced or eroded over time. Which
leads me to my question for the list: I can see easily how to do
split key for 2 out of x for key recovery, but I can't seem to
find a reference to the 3 out of x problem.

In case I have not been clear enough, it is commonly known that
it is harder to get collusion when three people need to act
together than when there are just two. For most encryption 2 out
x is just fine, but some things need a higher level of security
than 2 out of x can provide.


http://freshmeat.net/projects/sharesecret/
http://freshmeat.net/projects/shsecret/
http://freshmeat.net/projects//

I can't speak much about them other than when I last tested them, they
were able to split and reassemble a few test cases.

CK

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Re: Dirty Secrets of noise based RNGs

2006-07-05 Thread Chris Kuethe

On 7/4/06, Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

2) Hifn used to make this documentation publically available but access
   to it now requires permission from Hifn sales -- it has been password
   protected on their public web site.  In other words, after years of
   design wins based on little but open-source friendliness (after all,
   Hifn's chips are no faster, often slower, than others', and notoriously
   buggy) they are now, at least on this issue, biting the hand that feeds
   them.


ftp://ftp.hifn.com/ - it's a little shaky right now, but lots of
people have mirrored its contents. ;) keep an eye on it.

CK

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Re: European country forbids its citizens from smiling for passport photos

2005-09-17 Thread Chris Kuethe
On 9/17/05, William Allen Simpson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Do you really need to click on this link to know which one it is?
 
 http://cbs5.com/watercooler/watercooler_story_258152613.html
 
 I guess we should give neutral facial expressions for the photo, then
 smile (or frown) while in the airport
 
 Sounds like the technology (still) isn't ready for prime time.

And this is news why?

http://www.pptc.gc.ca/passports/get_photo_specs_e.asp
http://travel.state.gov/passport/guide/composition/composition_874.html

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Re: Another entry in the internet security hall of shame....

2005-08-26 Thread Chris Kuethe
On 8/26/05, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 ...
 If you don't trust your (or your correspondents') IM servers, it may be
 a different situation.  I haven't read Google's privacy policies for
 IM; if it's anything like gmail, they're using automated tools that
 look at your messages and add to your behavioral profile.  As Peter
 said, though, you can always run your own server or find one that you
 do trust.

Got a nice little surprise yesterday when I [ge]mailed someone, and
moments later gaim beeps at me. Checking gaim, I see that suddenly
these users had been added to my gaim/gtalk buddies list without my
intervention. Grr

Anyway, I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if somewhere down the
road a folder called archived gtalk shows up in gmail where you can
search through all your old conversations.

CK

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Re: WYTM - but what if it was true?

2005-06-27 Thread Chris Kuethe
On 6/26/05, Dan Kaminsky [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 It is not necessary though that there exists an acceptable solution that
 keeps PC's with persistent stores secure.  A bootable CD from a bank is
 an unexpectedly compelling option, as are the sort of services we're
 going to see coming out of all those new net-connected gaming systems
 coming out soon.

You just know that people won't want to totally reboot their machines
every time they want to bank, because that'll break their
excel+quicken+msmoney integrated finances. So they try make a bootable
HD partition, or run it under vmware, or copy the trusted client
off. These of course cannot be allowed by the banks if they want to
preserve the illusion of their secure banking app...

And now we have a market for cracked trusted banking clients, both
for phishers and lazy people... it's game copy protection wars all
over again. :)

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Re: How secure is the ATA encrypted disk?

2005-05-26 Thread Chris Kuethe
On 4/8/05, James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 --
 Every ATA disk contains encryption firmware, though not
 all bioses allow you to use it.

Not all drives contain this encryption firmware, which isn't
actually encryption firmware. It's more of a login feature. You have
to send the drive the password before you can do any real I/O.

$ sudo atactl wd0
Model: HMS360404D5CF00, Rev: DN4SCA2A, Serial #: N2L7G5HA
Device type: ATA, fixed
Cylinders: 7936, heads: 16, sec/track: 63, total sectors: 7999488
Device capabilities:
IORDY operation
IORDY disabling
Device supports the following standards:
ATA-1 ATA-2 ATA-3 ATA-4 
Device supports the following command sets:
NOP command
READ BUFFER command
WRITE BUFFER command
Read look-ahead
Write cache
Power Management feature set
Flush Cache command
Advanced Power Management feature set
CFA feature set
Device has enabled the following command sets/features:
NOP command
READ BUFFER command
WRITE BUFFER command
Read look-ahead
Write cache
Power Management feature set
Flush Cache command
Advanced Power Management feature set
CFA feature set


# sudo atactl wd0
Model: SAMSUNG MP0804H, Rev: UE100-14, Serial #: S042J10Y241522
Device type: ATA, fixed
Cylinders: 16383, heads: 16, sec/track: 63, total sectors: 156368016
Device capabilities:
ATA standby timer values
IORDY operation
IORDY disabling
Device supports the following standards:
ATA-1 ATA-2 ATA-3 ATA-4 ATA-5 ATA-6 ATA-7 
Master password revision code 0xfffe
Device supports the following command sets:
READ BUFFER command
WRITE BUFFER command
Host Protected Area feature set
Read look-ahead
Write cache
Power Management feature set
Security Mode feature set
SMART feature set
Flush Cache Ext command
Flush Cache command
Device Configuration Overlay feature set
48bit address feature set
Automatic Acoustic Management feature set
Set Max security extension commands
Advanced Power Management feature set
DOWNLOAD MICROCODE command
SMART self-test
SMART error logging
Device has enabled the following command sets/features:
READ BUFFER command
WRITE BUFFER command
Host Protected Area feature set
Read look-ahead
Write cache
Power Management feature set
SMART feature set
Flush Cache Ext command
Flush Cache command
Device Configuration Overlay feature set
48bit address feature set
DOWNLOAD MICROCODE command

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Re: link-layer encryptors for Ethernet?

2005-02-09 Thread Chris Kuethe
http://www.gdds.com/company/portfolio.html#ias
http://www.gdc4s.com/Products/sectera.htm

Maybe one of these nifty looking  general dynamics widgets is what you're after?

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Re: link-layer encryptors for Ethernet?

2005-02-07 Thread Chris Kuethe
http://www.google.com/search?q=ethernet+link+encryptor
says that there are. There's even a widget that supposedly runs up to
gigabit. http://www.atmedia.de/english/news.html

I'm enough of a freenix zealot though that I'd build one out of a
couple of opteron boxen with gig ether cards and run ether over ipsec
or something like that.

CK


On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 15:11:41 -0500, Steven M. Bellovin
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Are there any commercial link-layer encryptors for Ethernet available?
 I know that Xerox used to make them, way back when, but are there any
 current ones, able to deal with current speeds (and connectors)?
 
 --Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
 
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Re: Conspiracy Theory O' The Day

2005-01-05 Thread Chris Kuethe
On Tue, 04 Jan 2005 15:41:12 -0500, John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Udhay Shankar N wrote:
  I just got a batch of spam: perfectly justified blocks of random-looking
  characters. Makes me wonder if somebody is trying to train Bayesian
  filters to reject PGP messages.

Or someone is trying to slip messages past bayesian filters trained to
allow pgp messages. Most of these spams are awarded insanely high spam
scores by spamassassin.

 Another hypothesis:  Cover traffic, to defeat traffic analysis.
 
 The procedure:  send N copies.  N-M of them are spam, sent to uninterested
 parties.  The other M parties are the intended recipients.  Provided NM,
 and other mild restrictions, they achieve plausible deniability.

I've been getting spam with blocks of text strongly resembling pgp
signatures appended for years now. Got about 250 of them last year.
And, amusingly enough, they seem to keep up on their patches (the
versions of pgp seem to keep up with the official releases). Still,
the signatures would never verify, as there were invalid base64
characters in the signature block.

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Re: 3DES performance

2004-12-08 Thread Chris Kuethe
On Wed, 8 Dec 2004 13:33:27 +0100, Lee Parkes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Hi,
 I'm working on a project for a company that involves the use of 3DES. They 
 have
 asked me to find out what the overheads are for encrypting a binary file. 
 There
 will be quite a lot of traffic coming in (in the region of hundreds of
 thousands of files per hour). Has anyone got any figures for 3DES performance?
 I've tried bdes on OpenBSD which has given me some useful results.

use openssl speed. 

ttyp1# openssl speed des blowfish
To get the most accurate results, try to run this
program when this computer is idle.
Doing des cbc for 3s on 16 size blocks: 3237791 des cbc's in 2.74s
Doing des cbc for 3s on 64 size blocks: 885896 des cbc's in 2.74s
Doing des cbc for 3s on 256 size blocks: 173965 des cbc's in 2.15s
Doing des cbc for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 53943 des cbc's in 2.59s
Doing des cbc for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 6254 des cbc's in 2.37s
Doing des ede3 for 3s on 16 size blocks: 1253405 des ede3's in 2.64s
Doing des ede3 for 3s on 64 size blocks: 331913 des ede3's in 2.77s
Doing des ede3 for 3s on 256 size blocks: 82690 des ede3's in 2.75s
Doing des ede3 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 19544 des ede3's in 2.54s
Doing des ede3 for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 2455 des ede3's in 2.55s
Doing blowfish cbc for 3s on 16 size blocks: 3843597 blowfish cbc's in 2.02s
Doing blowfish cbc for 3s on 64 size blocks: 645760 blowfish cbc's in 1.14s
Doing blowfish cbc for 3s on 256 size blocks: 352101 blowfish cbc's in 2.70s
Doing blowfish cbc for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 88319 blowfish cbc's in 2.63s
Doing blowfish cbc for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 11269 blowfish cbc's in 2.69s
OpenSSL 0.9.7d 17 Mar 2004
built on: date not available
options:bn(64,32) md2(int) rc4(idx,int) des(ptr,risc1,16,long)
aes(partial) blowfish(idx)
compiler: information not available
available timing options: USE_TOD HZ=100 [sysconf value]
timing function used: getrusage
The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.
type 16 bytes 64 bytes256 bytes   1024 bytes   8192 bytes
des cbc  18891.73k20675.95k20729.04k21296.44k21642.88k
des ede3  7594.60k 7680.88k 7697.69k 7882.07k 7896.48k
blowfish cbc 30510.41k36233.33k33442.44k34452.82k34350.01k


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