Re: Gutmann Soundwave Therapy
On Mon, Feb 11, 2008 at 07:01:07PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: Daniel Carosone [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [...] Particularly for the first point, early validation for packet integrity in general can be a useful defensive tool against unknown potential implementation vulnerabilities. This is an example of what psychologists call own-side bias (everyone thinks like us), in this case the assumption that after a peer has authenticated itself it'd never dream of sending a malformed packet and so we don't need to do any checking after the handshake has completed. Why would you trust data coming from a remote system just because they've jumped through a few hoops before sending it? I can steal the remote system's credentials or hijack the session and then send you anything I want, it's no safer to blindly accept the data if there's a MAC attached or not. Point taken, but I respectfully disagree with the relevance in the present context, though of course I agree entirely in the wider philosophical sense. Remember that we're also talking about practical deployment decisions: - if someone steals credentials, they can do all sorts of mischief and damage; the incremental risk in the present discussion is that doing 'lossy'/partial validation may allow additional injection and MITM attacks beyond those. - especially for the other cases I gave (SNMP and NTP), the alternative mitigating controls are such strong things as IP address based ACLs (on UDP packets). I'll take the stronger tool if it's on offer. The fact this kind of authentication is applied before the packet gets to more complex and potentially vulnerable parsing and processing code gives me a valuable opportunity to be defensive, especially as an end customer deploying some random vendor's kit. In those cases, I don't have visibility of the implementation, but I do have some assurance about the order of operations and can put that structural knowledge to good use. Much the same is true in this discussion about protocol design; we're making no specifications about processing of the data once the transport hands it off, but we're starting to make assumptions about the risks therein, and the reliance those layers may be placing on the transport, for better or worse. Your criticism would be fair if I was advocating blindly accepting the data or not doing any checking after the initial handshake. It would be fair criticism of a codec vendor who took such a stance, relying overly on transport authentication (or forcing me to). I am most certainly not advocating that, merely recognising that sometimes such checking may be deficient or vulnerable, or just simply uncertain. Good defensive protocol design lets me validate the blob before inspecting the fields; poor defensive programming conflates frame validation with more detailed syntactic and semantic validation later. If there are authentication-hijacking vulnerabilities in the endpoints (like your SIP gateway), sure, I'm screwed in a number of ways. That's sad, but a given regardless of whatever variant and detail of keying and MACing mechanism this discussion comes up with. Hostile data inside a secure tunnel or wrapper is still hostile data. If cryptography can come up with some way to ensure robustness against hostile data all the way down an implementation stack, regardless of layering, we'll all be surprised. Some of us might even be very rich. Otherwise, it's a risk mitigation tool, subject to constraints we need to understand. If the constraints are ones of key management and endpoint security, I can use the mechanism in my toolkit. If the constrains mean that every fourth SNMP request or routing update will be unauthenticated, it's much less use to me as a structural security layer; the bar isn't raised in any practical sense. As the OP said, as long as you can deterministically detect attacks (which a 1-of-n packet MAC will do) you're not giving up much security by not MAC'ing all packets. I attempted to illustrate, with some counterexamples, threat models where even one unauthenticated packet could lose you more than not much security. Threats where detection of the attack wasn't enough, or was too late, or was itself the point. Robust implementation behind that MAC is essential, and helps realise and provide assurance around not much, as well as addressing broader threats that are more likely in the overall economic argument we acknowledged at the outset, but is outside what I saw as the OP's scope, and not part of the incremental risk I was highlighting. -- Dan. pgpHBm0jjURiV.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Gutmann Soundwave Therapy
Others have made similar points and suggestions, not picking on this instance in particular: On Mon, Feb 04, 2008 at 02:48:08PM -0700, Martin James Cochran wrote: Additionally, in order to conserve bandwidth you might want to make a trade-off where some packets may be forged with small probability (in the VOIP case, that means an attacker gets to select a fraction of a second of sound, which is probably harmless) This is ok, if you consider the only threat to be against the final endpoint: a human listening to a short-term, disposable conversation. I can think of some counter-examples where these assumptions don't hold: - A data-driven exploit against an implementation vulnerability in your codec of choice. Always a possibility, but a risk you might rate differently (or a patch you might deploy on a different schedule) for conversations with known and trusted peers than you would for arbitrary peers, let alone maliciously-inserted traffic. How many image decoding vulnerabilities have we seen lately, again? - People have invented and do use such horribly-wrong things as fax-over-voip; while they seem to have some belief in their own business case, I may not have as much faith in their implementation robustness. - Where it's audio, but the audience is different such that the impact of short bursts of malicious sound is different: larger teleconferences, live interviews or reporting by journalists, and other occasions, particularly where the credibility of the speaker is important. Fractions of seconds of sound is all I might need to insert to .. er .. emulate tourette's syndrome. Fractions of seconds of soundwave therapy could still be highly unpleasant or embarassing. Particularly for the first point, early validation for packet integrity in general can be a useful defensive tool against unknown potential implementation vulnerabilities. I've used similar arguments before around the use of keyed authentication of other protocols, such as SNMPv3 and NTP. It also reminds me of examples where cryptographic protections have only covered certain fields in a header or message. Attackers may find novel ways to use the unprotected space, plus it just makes the whole job of risk analysis at deployment orders of magnitude more complex. Without dismissing the rest of the economic arguments, when it comes to these kinds of vulnerabilities, be very wary of giving an attacker this inch, they may take a mile. -- Dan. pgpP4RjLsu7PD.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Seagate announces hardware FDE for laptop and desktop machines
On Tue, Oct 02, 2007 at 03:50:27PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: Without access to the device (I've contacted Hitachi EMEA to find out if it is possible to purchase the special disks) it is difficult to infer how it works, but the final page of the howto seems strange: ... NOTE: All data on the hard drive will be accessible. A secure erase should be performed before disposing or redeploying the drive to avoid inadvertent disclosure of data. One would assume that if you disable the password, the data would NOT be accessible. Making it accessible should require a read+decrypt+write of the entire disk, which would be quite time consuming. It may be that this is happening in the background, although it isn't clear. It sounds to me as if they are storing the AES key used for bulk encryption somewhere on the disk, and that it can be unlocked via the password. Assumption: clearing the password stores the key encrypted with password or an all-zeros key, or some other similar construct, effectively in plain text. So it may be that the bulk data encryption AES key is randomized by the device (using what entropy?) or possibly generated in the factory, rather than derived from the password. Speculation: the drive always encrypts the platters with a (fixed) AES key, obviating the need to track which sectors are encrypted or not. Setting the drive password simply changes the key-handling. Implication: fixed keys may be known and data recoverable from factory records, e.g. for law enforcement, even if this is not provided as an end-user service. -- Dan. pgpbW81YLkONk.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design
On Thu, Sep 14, 2006 at 02:48:54PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote: | The problem is that _because there is an interface to poll the token for | a code across the USB bus_, malicious software can *repeatedly* steal new | token codes *any time it wants to*. This means that it can steal codes | when the user is not even attempting to authenticate I think this summarizes things nicely. Me too. While less emphatic, my reaction to Vin's post was similar to Thor's.. that it seemed to at least miss, if not bury, this point. But let's not also forget that these criticisms apply approximately equally to smart card deployments with readers that lack a dedicated pinpad and signing display. For better or worse, people use those to unlock the token with a pin entered on the host keyboard, and allow any authentication by any application during a 'session', too. Pressing the button supplies exactly the confirmation of intent that was lost. And further, a token that includes more buttons (specifically, a pinpad for secure entry of the 'know' factor) is vulnerable to fewer attacks, and one that permits a challenge-response factor for specific transaction approval is vulnerable to fewer again (both at a cost). Several vendors have useful offerings of these types. The worst cost for these more advanced methods may be in user acceptance: having to type one or more things into the token, and then the response into the computer. A USB connected token could improve on this by transporting the challenge and response, displaying the challenge while leaving the pinpad for authentication and approval. But the best attribute of tokens is they neither use nor need *any* interface other than a user interface. Therefore: * it works anywhere with any client device, like my phone. I choose my token model and balance user overhead according to my needs. * it is simple to analyse. How would you ensure the above ideal hypothetical USB token really couldn't be subverted over the bus? By the time you've given up that benefit, and done all that analysis, and dealt with platform issues, perhaps you might as well get the proper pinpad smartcard it's starting to sound like, and get proper signatures as well, rather than using a shared-key with the server. -- Dan. pgpotlLAwVOtZ.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Creativity and security
On Thu, Mar 23, 2006 at 08:15:50PM -, Dave Korn wrote: As we all know, when you pay with a credit or debit card at a store, it's important to take the receipt with you [..] So what they've been doing at my local branch of Marks Spencer for the past few weeks is, at the end of the transaction after the (now always chip'n'pin-based) card reader finishes authorizing your transaction, the cashier at the till asks you whether you actually /want/ the receipt or not; [..] ... Of course, three seconds after your back is turned, the cashier can still go ahead and press the button anyway, and then /they/ can have your receipt. [..] I think the better solution would still be for the receipt to be printed out every single time and the staff trained in the importance of not letting customers leave without taking their receipts with them. Two observations: - your preferred solution to a problem of fraudulent cashier staff doing the wrong thing ... relies on the cashier staff doing the right thing. Training fraudulent and creative cashiers on the importance of this action probably encourages them to come up with other ways to do the same thing. - even when they've handed you a receipt, on many systems there's a good chance they can get a reprint those same three seconds later. Paper jams or gets torn, ribbons run out, and sometimes you legitimately need a duplicate. -- Dan. pgpwSsJTGLOWq.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix
On Tue, Feb 14, 2006 at 04:26:35PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Werner Koch writes: I agree. However the case at hand is a bit different. I can't imagine how any application or upper layer will be able to recover from that error (ENOENT when opening /dev/random). Okay, the special file might just be missing and a mknod would fix that ;-). Is it the duty of an application to fix an incomplete installation - how long shall this be taken - this is not the Unix philosophy. It can take context-specific error recovery. Maybe that's greying out the encrypt button on a large GUI. Maybe it's paging the system administrator. It can run 'mknod' inside the appropriate chroot partition, much as /sbin/init on some systems creates /dev/console. It can symlink /dev/geigercounter to /dev/random. It can load the kernel module that implements /dev/random. It can do a lot of things that may be more appropriate than exiting. Or an even simpler example: maybe it will still be a fatal error, but there's some important state outside the library being called that it should clean up before exiting so abruptly. Somehow, applications that are consumers of crypto libraries seem like likely candidates for this sort of thing. -- Dan. pgpJyhp2aeO8S.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: solving the wrong problem
On Tue, Aug 09, 2005 at 01:04:10AM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: That sounds a bit like unicorn insurance [..] However, this is slightly different from what Perry was suggesting. There seem to be at least four subclasses of problem here: 1. ??? : A solution based on a misunderstanding of what the real problem is. 2. Unicorn insurance: A solution to a nonexistent problem. 3. ???: A solution to a problem created artificially in order to justify its solution (or at least to justify publication of an academic paper containing a solution). 4. PKI: A solution in search of a problem. Nice list, and terms for the remaining ??? cases would be nice, but I'm not sure that any of these captures one essential aspect of the problem Perry mentioned, at least as I see it. One of the nice aspects of the snake oil description is the implications it has about the dodgy seller, rather than the product. To my view, much of the Quantum Cryptography (et al) discussion has this aspect: potentially very cool and useful technology in other circumstances, but being sold into a market not because they particularly need it, but just because that's where the money is. Certainly, that's the aspect I find most objectionable, and thus deserving of a derogatory term, rather than just general frustration at naive user stupidity. None of the terms proposed so far capture this aspect. The specific example given doesn't quite fit anywhere on your list. It's somewhere between #3 and #4; perhaps it's a #4 with a dodgy salesman trying to push it as a #3 until a better problem is found for it to solve? I was going to suggest porpoise oil (from not fit-for-purpose), but how about unicorn oil - something that may well have some uncertain magical properties, but still sold under false pretenses, and not really going to cure your ills? -- Dan. pgp6yaUOzDOti.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: encrypted tapes (was Re: Papers about Algorithm hiding ?)
On Tue, Jun 07, 2005 at 07:48:22PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: It happens because some idiot web designer thought it was a nice look, and their security people are too ignorant or too powerless to stop it, that's why. It has nothing to do with cost. The largest non-bank card issuer in the world can pay for the fifteen minutes of time it would take to fix it by putting the login on a separate SSL protected page. It has nothing to do with ease of use or tools that default safe. The problem is that they don't know there is anything to fix at a level of the firm that is capable of taking the decision to fix it. It may well be that, rather than the fault of the web designer, an explicit business requirement was presented to do this, because of perceived ease of use for the customer... and then the lack of knowing any better to kill the idea before it takes hold. At least, that's how it's happened in several places I've been involved, and it took more than a little effort to make them understand why it was a bad idea. Thankfully, they were paying for my time and advice, and *also* had the sense to listen to it when given - the two don't always go together - but in this sense security did cost them something. The customer ease-of-use argument is quite easy to see - and also quite easy to provide, if they want to, by putting the normal company homepage that contains the form on SSL too. I've had conversations about the cost of doing that with knowledgable web designers (largely centering on image caching concerns), and really, it isn't quite free, even if the costs come from unreasonable and annoying places. Those costs can have returns, even non-risk ones like being better able to track users' browsing patterns and site navigation, too - but just by virtue of having to have the conversation, its no longer free, especially if people bring organisational politics to the table. Security these days is usually bad not because good security is expensive, or because it is particularly hard. These are the things that make the difference between middling-fair and somewhat-decent security (let alone good security, which requires many other things to be Done Right, more operational than technical). The irony is that bad IT security (just like any other bad IT) is expensive, often much more expensive - even without considering the potential costs involved if the risks are realised. It is bad because even people at giant multinational corporations with enough budget to spare are too dumb to implement it. Worse than that: people at the giant multinational corporations who provide the outsourced IT services to those other corporations - and who sell their services based on 'economies of scale' and 'industry expertise' and 'best practice', and who are thus charged with the responsibility of knowing better - are too dumb to implement it. And then they're too dumb to implement it at other customer sites even when that one rare customer comes along who knows better (or at least knows to ask for independent outside help), and has fought hard to convinve their outsource provider of the need and economic sense of not being dumb on their behalf. Most organisations just let them get away with it, and think they're getting a good deal, while the very basis on which that deal was sold is defeated. If it weren't for all the other people that get hurt by the schrapnel, it would be very hard to continue trying to help people who seem to like walking around with bullet holes in their shoes. -- Dan. pgpj1TA56flkt.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: SSL stops credit card sniffing is a correlation/causality myth
On Tue, May 31, 2005 at 06:43:56PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: So we need to see a Choicepoint for listening and sniffing and so forth. No, we really don't. Perhaps we do - not so much as a source of hard statistical data, but as a source of hard pain. People making (uninformed or ill-considered, despite our best efforts to inform) business and risk decisions seemingly need concrete examples to avoid. Its depressing how much of what we actually achieve is determined by primitive pain response reflexes - even when you're in the beneficial position of having past insistences validated by the pain of others. The day to day problem of security at real financial institutions is the fact that humans are very poor at managing complexity, and that human error is extremely pervasive. I've yet to sit in a conference room and think oh, if I only had more statistical data, but I've frequently been frustrated by gross incompetence. Amen. -- Dan. pgppCusu69AQW.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Is 3DES Broken?
On Mon, Jan 31, 2005 at 10:38:53PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: When using CBC mode, one should not encrypt more than 2^32 64-bit blocks under a given key. That comes to ~275G bits, which means that on a GigE link running flat out you need to rekey at least every 5 minutes, which is often impractical. Notably for those encrypting data at rest, it's also rather smaller than current hard disk sizes, which are much harder to re-key. (Even for those only encrypting data in flight, it has practical implications regarding the feasibility of capturing that data for later analysis) -- Dan. pgpeucg0rdznT.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: entropy depletion
On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 03:48:32PM -0500, William Allen Simpson wrote: 2. set the contract in the read() call such that the bits returned may be internally entangled, but must not be entangled with any other read(). This can trivially be met by locking the device for single read access, and resetting the pool after every read. Slow, but it's what the caller wanted! Better variants can be experimented on... Now I don't remember anybody suggesting that before! Perfect, except that an attacker knows when to begin watching, and is assured that anything before s/he began watching was tossed. The point is interesting and well made, but I'm not sure it was intended as a concrete implementation proposal. Still, as long as it's floating by.. Rather than locking out other readers from the device (potential denial-of-service, worse than can be done now by drawing down the entropy estimator?), consider an implementation that made random a cloning device. Each open would create its own distinct instance, with unique state history. One might initialise the clone with a zero (fully decoupled, but potentially weak as noted above) state, or with a copy of the base system device state at the time of cloning, but with a zero'd estimator. From there, you allow it to accumulate events until the estimator is ready again. Perhaps you clone with a copy of the state, and allow an ioctl to zero the private copy.. perhaps you only allow a clone open to complete once the base generator has been clocked a few times with new events since the last clone.. many other ideas. Most implementations allow data to be written into the random device, too, so a process with a cloner open could add some of its own 'entropy' to the mix for its private pool, if it wanted additional seeding (usually, such writes are not counted by the estimator). The base system device accumulates events while no cloners are open. You'd need some mechanism to distribute these events amongst accumulating clones such that they'd remain decoupled. It's an interesting thought diversion, at least - but it seems to have as many potential ways to hurt as to help, especially if you're short of good entropy events in the first place. Like smb, frankly I'm more interested in first establishing good behaviour when there's little or no good-quality input available, for whatever reason. -- Dan. pgpiBemAGKvdQ.pgp Description: PGP signature
Hashes, splints, and PRNGs
I'm really enjoying the current discussion about hash constructions and splints for current algorithms. I will make one observation in that discussion, which is that the proposal for a Hnew (2n - n) seems a little beyond the scope of a field splint that can be done using existing tools and implementations, and so I prefer some of the other proposals that don't require this new element. The discussion also gives me the excuse to ask a question I've been wanting to pose to this list for a long time, regarding the techniques used by the NetBSD /dev/random pseudo-device. Although designed and used for different purposes, the discussion here in the past few days has similarities to that construction. I hope that by raising it, I can both add something to the discussion, and also get feedback from this esteemed company on its general worthiness for original purposes. I've attached the source code for the core part of the accumulator and output function, which is reasonably well commented. (I hope; the comments are largely mine, the code is very largely not). The general construction is an entropy pool (equivalent to the state passed from block to block in the diagrams we've been using to talk about Joux' attack) into which data (input blocks of 32-bit words) are mixed. The first observation here is that the state path between blocks is very much wider than the blocksize of either input or output, as desired. The input mixing is done my modelling the state array as 32 parallel LFSR PRNG's, one per bit-plane, in combination with a rotation of the input and output around each of the LFSR's (so that none of them runs for many cycles and becomes vulnerable to the well-known limitations of LFSR's run too long). In the normal usage of this device, the input data is timing information from various device drivers (disks, keyboards, etc). It can also include user-supplied data written to /dev/random, and so collision-resistance does become at least potentially an issue. Output is done by taking a SHA-1 hash of the whole state array, and then folding it in half (XOR) before giving it to the user. (The unfolded SHA-1 result is also mixed back into the pool as above, so that successive calls produce different results as a PRNG). Again, this is reminiscent of using a n-bit hash to claim only n/2 bits of security, though obviously this usage originated out of different concerns. So, looking at this in the context of present disussions, and pretending this construct is used purely as a (hybrid) hash function, it has the following characteristics: - 32-bit input block - 80-bit output block - wide path (4096 bits in default configuration) between blocks - Hnew = TT ( H2 (H1 (M) )) - probably only effective for messages longer than some multiple of the internal state size Joux' arguments certainly apply to this construction (which was in any case designed to preserve entropy rather than for collision resistance against wholly-known different inputs). If collisions can be found for H1, then H2 adds nothing (its purpose is whitening of the internal state, in the original usage). Anyway, some questions for the floor: - How much relevance and similarity is there between PRNG style constructs used this way and hash compression functions? Normally, a PRNG is designed to produce many bits from few, and a hash the reverse. However, using the PRNG this way tries to produce many state bits to carry forward, rather than output bits. - If contemplating a construct such as this as a hash-like function, any hope of Joux-resistance relies on the large internal state. How could this be made stronger? One thought would be to clock the output function (a SHA-1 of the pool) and mix that back in every N inputs - or is this just needless work? - Is the whole thing pointless (for this purpose) and does it just amount to a SHA-1 of TT(M) if M is wholly-known? - Finally (and of most interest to me practically), can anyone see a problem with the construct for its intended usage as a PRNG. In particular, can anyone see a way to feed/flood it with known input such that the output becomes weaker (if M is partially known or partially chosen)? -- Dan. PS: if looking at the code, please ignore the entropy count parts; they work with an estimator that implements the (non-)blocking nature of /dev/(u)random, but this is known to be highly arbitrary and (hopefully) overly conservative. /* $NetBSD: rndpool.c,v 1.17 2002/11/10 03:29:00 thorpej Exp $*/ /*- * Copyright (c) 1997 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation * by Michael Graff [EMAIL PROTECTED]. This code uses ideas and * algorithms from the Linux driver written by Ted Ts'o. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met:
Re: More problems with hash functions
My immediate (and not yet further considered) reaction to the description of Joux' method was that it might be defeated by something as simple as adding a block counter to the input each time. I any case, I see it as a form of dictionary attack, and wonder whether the same kinds of techniques wouldn't help. -- Dan. pgpRyiFiNhXGq.pgp Description: PGP signature
