On Fri, Jul 17, 2009 at 01:37:43PM -0500,
travis+ml-cryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
I'm curious if there's a way to express this calculation as a
mathematical formula, rather than an algorithm, but right now I'm just
blanking on how I could do it.
This has been dubbed the guesswork of a
On Wed, Mar 19, 2008 at 02:25:36PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
[This has been thrashed out on other lists.]
Just how would that help? As I understand it, Firewire and PCMCIA
provide a way for a device to access memory directly. The OS doesn't
have to do anything - in fact, it *can't* do
It seems that disk containing records of the Irish Blood Transfusion
service seems to have been stolen in New York:
http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0219/blood.html
Thankfully, the data was encrypted. The head of the IBTS said on
the news that there was a remote possibility of access, roughly
On Wed, Apr 25, 2007 at 03:32:43PM -0500, Travis H. wrote:
I think a simple evolution would be to make /boot and/or /root on
removable media (e.g. CD-ROM or USB drive) so that one could take it
with you.
Marc Schiesser gave a tutorial at EuroBSDcon 2005 on encrypting the
whole hard drive on
On Fri, May 19, 2006 at 06:51:55AM -0500, Travis H. wrote:
As I understand it, when looking at output, one can take a
hypothetical source model (e.g. P(0) = 0.3, P(1) = 0.7, all bits
independent) and come up with a probability that the source may have
generated that output. One cannot,
On Sat, Mar 25, 2006 at 07:26:51PM -0500, John Denker wrote:
Executive summary: Small samples do not always exhibit average behavior.
That's not the whole problem - you have to be looking at the right
average too.
For the long run encodability of a set of IID symbols produced with
probability
On Thu, Mar 23, 2006 at 01:55:30AM -0600, Travis H. wrote:
It's annoying that the random number generator code calls the
unpredictable stuff entropy. It's unpredictability that we're
concerned with, and Shannon entropy is just an upper bound on the
predictability. Unpredictability cannot be
On Tue, Dec 27, 2005 at 11:34:15PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
If you don't have sufficient plain/ciphertext, then of course you can
choose incorrect pairs.
Yep - that's my point. The thing to note is that for an arbitrary
permutation, knowing the image of n plaintexts tells you (almost)
nothing
On Tue, Dec 27, 2005 at 03:26:59AM -0600, Travis H. wrote:
On 12/26/05, Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Surely if you do this, then there's a meet-in-the middle attack: for a
plaintext/ciphertext pair, P, C, I choose random keys to encrypt P and
decrypt C. If E_A(P)=D_B(C), then your
