Re: [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia

2013-10-07 Thread Faré
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 9:10 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote: I am even starting to think that maybe we should start using the NSA checksum approach. Incidentally, that checksum could be explained simply by padding prepping an EC encrypted session key. PKCS#1 has similar stuff

[Cryptography] Some protection against replay attacks

2013-09-09 Thread Faré
there is a DoS attack possible if NTP is subverted. —♯ƒ • François-René ÐVB Rideau •ReflectionCybernethics• http://fare.tunes.org Reason isn't about not having prejudices, it's about having (appropriate) postjudices. — Faré ___ The cryptography mailing list

Re: [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-04 Thread Faré
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Sep 3, 2013, at 3:16 PM, Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: Can't you trivially transform a hash into a PRNG, a PRNG into a cypher, and vice versa? No. Let H(X) = SHA-512(X) || SHA-512(X) where '||' is concatenation

Re: [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-04 Thread Faré
On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: Just because it's trivial to produce bogus crypto doesn't mean it's non-trivial to produce good crypto, given a few universal recipes. Look, if you want to play around a produce things that look secure to you and a few of

[Cryptography] A strategy to circumvent patents?

2013-09-03 Thread Faré
Don't write the code. Write a reasonably general software solver that finds a program that fulfill given specifications, given a minimum number of hints. Then write a specification for the problem (e.g. finding a nice elliptic curve with interesting properties) and let the solver find them. You

Re: [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-03 Thread Faré
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Richard Salz rich.s...@gmail.com wrote: ITAR doesn't require a license or permit for strong hash functions, but for US persons require(d?) notification of NSA of authorship, contact email and download URL(s), at least in 2006 it did. That strikes me as an

Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys

2013-09-02 Thread Faré
So, how do I translate al...@example.org into a key? Once again, what do you think of namecoin? A bitcoin-like consensual database based on proof of work. If you also require proof-of-key via signature from the recipient, majority attacks make DoS easy, but identity stealing is still dependent

Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys

2013-09-02 Thread Faré
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 7:19 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote: On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 03:00:42 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: At intervals, the trustworthy organization (and others like it) can send out email messages to Alice, encrypted in said key, saying Hi there! Please

Re: [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)

2013-08-28 Thread Faré
There is still a need for a distributed database to handle the lookup load, though, and one that is not the DNS. What do you think of namecoin? —♯ƒ • François-René ÐVB Rideau •ReflectionCybernethics• http://fare.tunes.org Truth comes as conqueror only to those who have lost the art of

Re: [Cryptography] Separating concerns

2013-08-28 Thread Faré
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Phill hal...@gmail.com wrote: My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with anything more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look feel and smell exactly the same as current mail. The only difference being that