Re: 5x speedup for AES using SSE5?

2008-08-26 Thread Ilya Levin
Brian Gladman wrote:
 But a fully byte oriented implementation runs at about 140 cycles/byte
 and here the S-Box substitution step is a significant bottleneck.
 ...
 It is also possible that the PPERM instruction could be used to speed up
 the Galois field calculations to produce the S-Box mathematically rather
 than by table lookup. I have tried this in the past but it has not
 proved competitive.  But PPERM looks interesting here as well.

This is where the following may be handy:
http://www.literatecode.com/2007/11/11/aes256/

It is a byte-oriented AES-256 implementation without S-box tables.
Although I doubt it can be speeded up that much.

Regards,
Ilya
-- 
http://www.literatecode.com

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Re: Ransomware

2008-06-11 Thread Ilya Levin
Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Agreed, but..., well there is the small matter of figuring out /who/ is
 doing it and that just might require some small bit of technology.

Certainly, it is not mutual exclusive. However factor an RSA key
hardly can help with that.

 At least two defects in this thinking. A) How do we know *a* person did the
 coding? B) Who defines what is illegal code?

A) All the authorities ever need is always *a* person, and then they can do
the rest. In this particular case the *real* solution of the problem would be
trace the money dropper and bust the chain. The only required cryptanalysis
here is a thermo-rectal one.

B) It not about legal or illegal code, it is not about a code at all.
Blackmailing
for ransom is a crime and demanding a ransom for digital assets does not
make this any different. A crime must be addressed as a crime in a first place.

Ilya
-- 
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Re: Ransomware

2008-06-10 Thread Ilya Levin
Leichter, Jerry [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Computerworld reports:

 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasicarticleId=9094818

 on a call from Kaspersky Labs for help breaking encryption used by some
 ransomeware:  Code that infects a system, uses a public key embedded in

This is ridiculous. It set a totally wrong message. Converting
a plain vanilla crime into a geeky challenge for whatsoever marketing
purposes is a dead end.

A blackmailer demanding a ransom is not a technological issue but
a matter of FBI/ Interpol/ FSB/ you name it. A person behind Gpcode
must be tracked down to face criminal charges. Apart from setting
an example to future morons, it will give all the necessary keys
at once.

Ilya
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Re: Declassified NSA publications

2008-04-29 Thread Ilya Levin
On Fri, Apr 25, 2008 at 12:22 AM, Steven M. Bellovin
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 http://www.nsa.gov/public/crypt_spectrum.cfm


I know this is silly but I could not resist to comment on some NSA redacts:
http://www.literatecode.com/2008/04/29/nsaredact/

Ilya

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Re: solving the wrong problem

2005-08-09 Thread Ilya Levin
Dave Howe wrote:
  Nonsense fence maybe less metaphoric but more clear.
 I disagree - one picket fence gives a clear impression of a protective 
 device
 that is hardened at but one point - leaving the rest insecure. nonsense 
 fence
 doesn't give any real image.

Perhaps, but sometimes rubbish just better be named rubbish without
any metaphorical allusions. For everyone's good.

-- 
Ilya Levin
http://www.literatecode.com

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Re: solving the wrong problem

2005-08-07 Thread Ilya Levin
John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 So, unless/until somebody comes up with a better metaphor,
 I'd vote for one-picket fence.

Nonsense fence maybe less metaphoric but more clear.

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Ilya O Levin
http://www.literatecode.com

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