fyi: Storm Worm botnet numbers, via Microsoft

2007-10-02 Thread Jeff . Hodges
food for consideration. yes, #s are from MSFT as he notes, but are the only 
ones we have presently wrt actual Storm extent, yes? If not, pls post 
pointers...

=JeffH
--
Storm Worm botnet numbers, via Microsoft
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=533

Posted by Ryan Naraine @ 7:40 am Categories: Patch Watch, Hackers, Microsoft, 
Browsers, Rootkits, Vulnerability research, Spam and Phishing, Spyware and 
Adware, Botnets, Exploit code, Viruses and Worms, Data theft, Pen testing, 
Passwords Tags: Microsoft Corp., Worm, Machine, MSRT, Productivity, Microsoft 
Windows, Cyberthreats, Spyware, Adware  Malware, Viruses And Worms, Security, 
Operating Systems, Software, Ryan Naraine
icn_balloon_154x48
+14
16 votes Worthwhile?

If the statistics from Microsoft\u2019s MSRT (malicious software removal tool) 
are anything to go by, the Storm Worm botnet is not quite the world\u2019s 
most powerful supercomputer.

The tool \u2014 which is updated and shipped once a month on Patch Tuesday 
\u2014 removed malware associated with Storm Worm from 274,372 machines in the 
first week after September 11. In all the tool scanned more about 2.6 million 
Windows machines.

These numbers, released by Microsoft anti-virus guru Jimmy Kuo, puts the size 
of the botnet on the low end of speculation that Storm Worm has commandeered 
between 1 million and 10 million Windows machines around the world.

[ SEE: Storm Worm botnet could be world\u2019s most powerful supercomputer ]

The MSRT numbers, though helpful, shouldn\u2019t be relied on as gospel. For 
starters, the tool targets a very specific known malware (it only finds 
exactly what it\u2019s looking for) and attackers constantly tweak malware 
files to get around detection. In addition, it is only delivered to Windows 
machines that have automatic updates turned on, which means there are liely 
tons and tons of hijacked machines that never gets a copy of the MSRT.

Still, Kuo claims that the September version of MSRT made a dent in the botnet.

Another antimalware researcher who has been tracking these recent attacks 
has presented us with data that shows we knocked out approximately one-fifth 
of Storm\u2019s Denial of Service (DoS) capability on September 11th. 
Unfortunately, that data does not show a continued decrease since the first 
day. We know that immediately following the release of MSRT, the criminals 
behind the deployment of the Storm botnet immediately released a newer version 
to update their software. To compare, one day from the release of MSRT, we 
cleaned approximately 91,000 machines that had been infected with any of the 
number of Nuwar components. Thus, the 180,000+ additional machines that have 
been cleaned by MSRT since the first day are likely to be home user machines 
that were not notably incorporated into the daily operation of the Storm 
botnet. Machines that will be cleaned by MSRT in the subsequent days will be 
of similar nature.

The September release of the MSRT probably cleaned up approximately one 
hundred thousand machines from the active Storm botnet. Such numbers might 
project that the strength of that botnet possibly stood at almost half a 
million machines with an additional few hundred thousand infected machines 
that the Storm botnet perhaps were not actively incorporating.

Kuo also confirmed fears that the botnet will slowly regain its strength once 
those cleaned machines become reinfected because those machines are likely 
unpatched and not equipped with any security software.

---
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Re: Enigma for sale on eBay

2007-07-21 Thread Jeff . Hodges


[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
 http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItemitem=270146164488


ebay now says (as of when this messge is sent):


   This Listing Is Unavailable 
 This listing (270146164488) has been removed or is no longer available.
 Please make sure you entered the right item number. If the listing was
 removed by eBay, consider it canceled. Note: Listings that have ended more
 than 90 days ago will no longer appear on eBay.



=JeffH


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fyi: UK National Information Assurance Strategy Launched

2007-07-03 Thread Jeff . Hodges

From: Peter Tomlinson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: National IA Strategy
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2007 16:00:16 +0100


From http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/ :


  News

National Information Assurance Strategy launched 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/national_ia_strategy/index.asp
On 27th June, a National Information Assurance Strategy was launched at 
the IA07 event in Brighton. The annual event is hosted by CESG and 
brings together key players in industry and government to work in 
partnership to address the UK’s needs in safeguarding information and ICT.


The document is available at: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/national_ia_strategy/index.asp . I 
haven't read it yet, and so cannot comment, but in a related area I'm 
puzzled: having heard that Cabinet Office will be supporting Cabinet, I 
wonder what will happen to all the technical stuff such as Govt Gateway 
and even CSIA.

Peter

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Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine (aka TPM, AMT)

2007-06-27 Thread Jeff . Hodges
i'd also scrawled:
 my understanding from a person active in the NEA working group [1] (IETF) 
 is that TPMs these days come along for free because they're included on-die
 in at least one of said chips.


[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
 Check again.  A few months ago I was chatting with someone who works for a
 large US computer hardware distributor and he located one single motherboard
 (an Intel one, based on an old, possibly discontinued chipset) in their
 entire inventory that contained a TPM (they also had all the ex-IBM/Lenovo
 laptops, and a handful of HP laptops, that were reported as having TPMs).  He
 also said that there were a handful of others (e.g. a few Dell laptops, which
 they don't carry) with TPMs.

my bad. I'd neglected to add on enterprise-class systems after come along 
for free (a qualification he did indeed express). WRT to Dell notebooks, 
that'd be the Latitude models.

In fact, with a little searching, i found the Dell pages below [2] that 
indicate TPM is installed on Dell's D-series enterprise class notebooks.


[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
 One of the driving forces for TPM adoption going forward will be enterprise
 remote or distributed management.

Of course. And that's the driving force behind the IETF NEA (Network Endpoint 
Assessment) working group AFAIK [1].


=JeffH
--

[1] http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/nea-charter.html


[2]
http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/solutions/en/latitude_highlight
?c=usl=ens=gen

...
Trusted Platform Module (TPM 1.1)
The TPM, or Trusted Platform Module ships standard on D410, D610  D810. TPM 
is a security hardware device on the system board that will hold computer 
generated keys for encryption. It is a hardware-based solution that can help 
avoid attacks by hackers looking to capture passwords and encryption keys to 
sensitive data.
...

http://www.dell.com/content/learnmore/learnmore.aspx?c=uscs=RC968571l=ens=h
ea~id=smartcard~line=notebooks~mode=popup~series=latit~tab=recommendations


What is TPM?

The TPM, or Trusted Platform Module, is a security hardware device on 
the 
system board that will hold computer generated keys for encryption. It is a 
hardware based solution that can help avoid attacks by hackers looking to 
capture passwords and encryption keys to sensitive data.

When deploying advanced security features like TPM in your environment, the 
archive and recovery of keys protected by the TPM is critical to avoiding the 
risk of data loss or inaccessibility in the event of a system failure.

The security features provided by the TPM are internally supported by the 
following cryptographic capabilities of each TPM: hashing, random number 
generation, asymmetric key generation, and asymmetric encryption/decryption. 
Each individual TPM on each individual computer system has a unique signature 
initialized during the silicon manufacturing process that further enhances its 
trust/security effectiveness. Each individual TPM must have an Owner before it 
is useful as a security device.

TPM Applications

TPM is useful for any customer that is interested in providing an 
addition 
layer of security to the computer system. The TPM, when bundled with an 
optional security software package, can provide overall system security, file 
protection capabilities and protect against email /privacy concerns. TPM helps 
provide security that can be stronger than that contained in the system BIOS, 
operating system, or any non-TPM application.

Which Dell systems support TPM? 

The TPM 1.2 security hardware device comes standard on the following 
LatitudeTM  notebook systems: Latitude D420, D620, D820, OptiPlexTM  desktop 
systems: Optiplex 745, 740 and Dell PrecisionTM  Mobile Workstations M65, M90. 
Dell recommends the use of Microsoft® Windows®  XP Professional XP 
Professional operating system with TPM which includes advanced security, 
mobility and networking features. TPM is currently not supported by Dell on 
Red Hat® Linux®  operating systems. Customers who deploy TPM should also 
purchase Wave Systems Embassy Trust Suite from Dell Software  Peripherals to 
enable full TPM features including key archival and migration.


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fyi: SHA-2 patent status

2007-06-25 Thread Jeff . Hodges
of possible interest...

 Original Message 
Subject: [saag] SHA-2 patent status
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2007 09:55:46 -0700
From: Paul Hoffman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Of possible interest (but hopefully no concern) to this list: a new 
IPR statement from the NSA to the IETF. 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_detail_show.cgi?ipr_id=858

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
___
saag mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/saag

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Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine

2007-06-22 Thread Jeff . Hodges

[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
 With TPMs it's a bit different, they're absent from the hardware by default

in case you're referring to the TCPA (trusted computing platform alliance) 
TPM..

my understanding from a person active in the NEA working group (IETF) is that 
TPMs these days come along for free because they're included on-die in at 
least one of said chips. I don't recall whether he said it was the network 
interface (NIC) and/or one of the others. So anyway, he said 
...enterprise-class systems (eg Dell Latitudes) mostly all already contain, 
TPMs and various network gear manufacturers have boxes that speak to them 
already, and NEA is just trying to standardize the protocols...

I've noticed my latitude systems do in fact have a bios option for 
enabling/disabling their TPMs. (mine are disabled)

the way in that IT depts ensure that vic...er...employees don't turn 'em off 
(as I understand it) is they set the BIOS admin password on their assets 
(computers) before their give them out.

=JeffH


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fyi: Ross Anderson on UK ATM fraud

2007-06-21 Thread Jeff . Hodges
see also: Reliability of security systems
   http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/#Reliability


=JeffH

From: Ross Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Newsnight tonight
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 19:19:24 +0100


We helped make a piece on ATM fraud a few weeks ago for Newsnight, pointing
out that law enforcement on bank fraud is now deeply corrupt. The Home Office 
did a deal with the banks so that fraud victims must report the crime to the
bank, not the police; the City force's card squad is a tied cottage (as Nick
put it) as the banks pays its bills; ditto the Met's e-crime squad; ditto 
the Financial services ombudsman. This is jolly nice for the banks when the
fraud is done by a bent insider they don't want exposed, and jolly nasty for
the poor customer. It's also jolly nice for terrorists such as the Tamil   
Tigers who use ATM fraud to raise money to finance murder and mayhem. It's
really wonderful for government spin doctors as fraud figures have fallen to
near zero.

I'm now told that the programme will run tonight. Unfortunately a lot of its
teeth have been drawn (below)

Ross

**

Date:Wed, 20 Jun 2007 19:09:10 BST
To:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From:*** @bbc.co.uk
Subject: newsnight

Just to let you know. The piece will run tonight. Sadly  we could only
include a small part of your magnificent contribution, so the angle
about the tamil tigers was dropped,  against my wishes. 
The banks spokesman is coming on afterwards. The Home Office  and ACPO
both refused to appear. 
  
Regards

***


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wrt Network Endpoint Assessment (was: Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine)

2007-06-21 Thread Jeff . Hodges

of potential related interest is..

Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nea-requirements-02.txt

note term remediate/remediation.

relevant snippage below. see also..

http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/nea-charter.html


=JeffH

snip/

1. Introduction 

Today, most network providers can leverage existing standards-
based technologies to restrict access to their network based 
upon criteria such as the requesting system's user or host-based 
identity, source IP address or physical access point.  However 
these approaches still leave the network resident systems 
vulnerable to malware-based attack, when an authorized but 
infected system is admitted and the malware is able to spread 
throughout the internal network. 
 
As a result, network operators need a proactive mechanism to 
assess the state of systems joining or present on the network to 
determine their status relative to network compliance policies.  
For example, if a system is determined to be out of compliance 
because it is lacking proper defensive mechanisms such as 
firewalls, anti-virus software or the absence of critical 
security patches, there needs to be a way to safely repair 
(remediate) the system so that it can be subsequently trusted to 
join and operate on the network.  The NEA technology strives to 
provide a mechanism to report the configuration of an endpoint 
for evaluation against network compliance policy.  Such a 
mechanism could offer a useful tool for the network operators'
arsenal but should be recognized as not being a complete 
endpoint compliance solution in and of itself.  
 
NEA typically involves the use of special client software 
running on the requesting system that observes and reports on 
the configuration of the system to the network infrastructure.  
The infrastructure has corresponding validation software that is 
capable of comparing the system configuration information with 
network compliance policy and providing the result to 
appropriate authorization entities that make decisions about 
network and application access.  Some systems may be incapable 
of running the NEA client software (e.g. printer) or be 
unwilling to share information about its configuration.  In 
these cases the network infrastructure might decide to disallow 
or limit access to the network. 
 
In many cases, the admission decision is provisioned to the 
enforcement mechanisms on the network and/or system requesting 
access.  The decision might allow for no access, limited or 
quarantined access (possibly to allow for remediation), or full 
access to the network.  While the NEA Working Group recognizes 
there is a link between an assessment and the enforcement of the 
assessment decision, the mechanisms and protocols for 
enforcement are not in scope for this specification. 
 
Architectures, similar to NEA, have existed in the industry for 
some time and are present in shipping products, but do not offer 
interoperability.  Some examples of such architectures include: 
Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Network Connect [TNC], 
Microsoft's Network Access Protection [NAP], Cisco's Network 
Admission Control [CNAC]).  These technologies assess the 
software or hardware configuration of endpoint devices for the 
purposes of monitoring or enforcing compliance to an 
organization's policy.  These architectures are not 
interoperable because they are implemented using primarily non-
standards based technologies. 
 
The NEA working group is working on defining standard protocols 
so as to enable interoperability between devices from different 
vendors allowing network owners to deploy truly heterogeneous 
solutions. This document describes the requirements for NEA 
candidate technologies and protocols.  
 
snip/

 4. Problem Statement 
 
NEA technology may be used for several purposes.  One use is to 
facilitate endpoint compliance checking against an 
organization's security policy when an endpoint connects to the 
network.  Organizations often require endpoints to run an IT-
specified OS configuration and have certain security 
applications enabled, e.g. anti-virus software, host intrusion 
detection/prevention systems, personal firewalls, and patch 
management software.  An endpoint that is not compliant with IT 
policy may be vulnerable to a number of known threats that might 
exist on the network. 
 
Without NEA technology, ensuring compliance of endpoints to 
corporate policy is a time-consuming and difficult task.  Not 
all endpoints are managed by a corporation's IT organization, 
e.g. lab assets and guest machines.  Even for assets that are 

fyi: A5 Cracking Project

2007-05-07 Thread Jeff . Hodges

From: steve [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: A5 Cracking Project
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 6 May 2007 16:54:58 +


Hi,

we are inviting people to design and build a A5/1 cracking machine.

We are security enthusiasts. We started in January 2007 and built a
GSM Receiver for 700 USD (http://www.thc.org/gsm). The first alpha
version of the GSM receiver is available from our webpage.

We are now looking for the next challenge: Cracking A5/1 for real.

We put up a public wiki at http://wiki.thc.org/cracking_a5 for anyone
to edit and to add information.

If you are interested please also subscribe to our mailinglist by sending
an email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Spread the word  happy hacking,

steve



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Re: Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

2007-04-27 Thread Jeff . Hodges
There's also this paper..

Donald T. Davis, Defective Sign  Encrypt in S/MIME, PKCS#7, MOSS, PEM, PGP, 
and XML., Proc. Usenix Tech. Conf. 2001 (Boston, Mass., June 25-30, 2001), 
pp. 65-78
http://world.std.com/~dtd/#sign_encrypt


..which addresses some of the questions, in a certain context, that Travis 
raised.


=JeffH


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Re: Skype reverse-engineering details]

2006-12-21 Thread Jeff . Hodges
Yes, that's a very interesting slide deck. 

An alternative URL to the talk is in this blog posting..

 Skype.exe innards revealed...
 http://identitymeme.org/archives/2006/04/06/skypeexe-innards-revealed/


=JeffH


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fyi: On-card displays

2006-09-20 Thread Jeff . Hodges
From: Ian Brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: On-card displays
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2006 07:29:13 +0100


Via Bruce Schneier's blog, flexible displays that can sit on smartcards.
So we finally have an output mechanism that means you don't have to
trust smartcard terminal displays:
http://www.cr80news.com/library/2006/09/16/on-card-displays-become-reality-maki
ng-cards-more-secure/

So, when do we see the combined chip/fingerprint reader/display on a
payment card :) Doesn't of course address the requirement that we want
evidence (such as a signed paper receipt) that can later be adjudicated
by a court with higher evidential standards than a bank statement that
their systems work perfectly...
- -- 
Blogzilla -- http://dooom.blogspot.com/


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fyi: Ross' Book now online

2006-08-30 Thread Jeff . Hodges

From: Ross Anderson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Ross' Book now online
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2006 18:17:30 +0100


I finally managed to persuade Wiley to let me put Security Engineering
online for free download:

  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html

Some of the chapters in it are on-topic for this list, such as ch 6 
(naming), ch 8 (medical privacy), 13 (biometrics), 20 (copyright)
and 21 (crypto policy).

Enjoy ...

Ross


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Re: mailer certificate retrieval via LDAP?

2006-06-09 Thread Jeff . Hodges
You should consider also posting your query to ldap@umich.edu


JeffH



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fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose

2006-04-19 Thread Jeff . Hodges
From: Owen Blacker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Deniable File System
To: UK Crypto list [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 11:43:18 +0100 (BST)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/deniable_file_s.html

Some years ago I did some design work on something I called a Deniable 
File System. The basic idea was the fact that the existence of 
ciphertext can in itself be incriminating, regardless of whether or not 
anyone can decrypt it. I wanted to create a file system that was 
deniable: where encrypted files looked like random noise, and where it 
was impossible to prove either the existence or non-existence of 
encrypted files.

This turns out to be a very hard problem for a whole lot of reasons, and 
I never pursued the project. But I just discovered a file system that 
seems to meet all of my design criteria -- Rubberhose 
http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ :

Rubberhose transparently and deniably encrypts disk data, minimising
the effectiveness of warrants, coersive interrogations and other
compulsive mechanims, such as U.K RIP legislation. Rubberhose differs
from conventional disk encryption systems in that it has an advanced
modular architecture, self-test suite, is more secure, portable,
utilises information hiding (steganography / deniable cryptography),
works with any file system and has source freely available.

The devil really is in the details with something like this, and I would 
hesitate to use this in places where it really matters without some 
extensive review. But I'm pleased to see that someone is working on this 
problem.

Next request: A deniable file system that fits on a USB token, and 
leaves no trace on the machine it's plugged into.


- -- 
Owen Blacker, London GB
Say no to ID cards: www.no2id.net
- --
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
  safety deserve neither liberty nor safety --Benjamin Franklin, 1759


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fyi: talk: Reflective side-channel cryptanalysis

2005-07-11 Thread Jeff . Hodges
From: Eu-Jin Goh [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: FRI 15 JULY 1630 HRS : Reflective side-channel cryptanalysis
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2005 08:46:19 -0700


- ---
When -  FRI 15th July
1630 hrs at Gates 4-B (opposite 490)

Who  -  Eran Tromer, Weizmann Institute of Science

What -  Reflective side-channel cryptanalysis
- ---

Abstract:

Side-channel cryptanalysis exploits physical information leakage from
cryptographic devices to undermine their security. Most side-channel
attacks require special measurement equipment and are thus limited in
applicability.

This talk will present two side channels that can be exploited in many
settings without special equipment. First, CPU cache contention leaks
information on memory access patterns in several ways. Second,
acoustic emanations from electronic circuit components can be
information-bearing and are often detectable by a plain
microphone. Applications of these side channels to RSA and AES will be
shown.

In some common cases these attacks can be carried out by software
within the target computer, allowing an unprivileged process to glean
secret information from privileged ones without any explicit
interaction. This raises new challenges for multiuser, partitioned and
sandboxed environments.

Joint work with Dag Arne Osvik and Adi Shamir. 

- ---

Map to Gates Computer Science Building

http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/results.jsp?bldg=gatesdept=addr=
- -++**==--++**==--++**==--++**==--++**==--++**==--++**==

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Re: fyi: Fingerprinting CPUs

2005-02-16 Thread Jeff . Hodges
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
 This subject came up before.
 http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/shankar04side.html 

ah, yes, in various forms. 

The refs in that paper lead to this, fwiw..

http://dynamo.ecn.purdue.edu/~kennell/genuinity/publications.html




JeffH



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