in this chain (with apologies), I too would
prefer a standard that that has Postel's principles as a touchstone.
John Lowry
Sent from my iPhone
On Sep 30, 2013, at 0:28, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
On 2013-09-29 23:13, Jerry Leichter wrote:
BTW, the *idea* behind DER isn't
On Apr 20, 2010, at 11:31 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Via /., I saw the following article on ever higher speed QKD:
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2010-04/19/super-secure-data-encryption-gets-faster.aspx
Very interesting physics, but quite useless in the real world.
I wonder why
I'm old enough to remember hearing (I've worked at BBN for a long
time now)
that connecting computers on a large scale just isn't going to work,
that
I would never need more than 4MB of main memory, etc. Any reader can
fill out the rest without my risking being pedantic.
I do remember
My favorite ...
http://www.geogreeting.com/view.html?zl1erV5i+mReSdx7+nTAh$$M+ohilV14
+xq_G
On May 2, 2007, at 2:09 PM, Udhay Shankar N wrote:
At 10:27 AM 5/2/2007, Aram Perez wrote:
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/191/480556169_6d731d2416_o.jpg
From another list:
This was one of my
Non-repudiation is really very simple in concept.
The ability to prove to a third party that you (or someone else) was party
to a transaction.
There are a lot of problems regarding who the third party must be, what
constitutes proof, etc., etc.
In the English common-law system, this is applied
Perry is absolutely right.
There is no point in pursuing this.
It might even be analogous to what we now know about computers.
We were warned that there would never be a need for more than
A half-dozen - after all, they were extremely expensive just to get
A few more digits in the logarithm table
QC is currently a one-time pad distribution mechanism - or at lower rates a
key establishment mechanism most suitable for symmetric algorithms.
You are correct that authentication is not inherent. Then again, this is
also true for classical symmetric and PKI schemes. To be usable, all
crypto
