Public key encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt?

-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt is equally secure. Is this really true? My feeling was that the principle from Krawczyk's paper should apply to the public key setting as well. Did anyone anyone ever publish a follow up to [2] ? I wasn't able to find any. Regards, Mads Rasmussen [1] Hugo

Phd thesis on voting

I haven't seen this mentioned here: Ben Adida did a Phd thesis on voting at MIT (ended this August) http://ben.adida.net/research/phd-thesis.pdf At his blog there is more material available such as conference slides, paper etc. http://benlog.com/ (end of page) -- Mads Rasmussen LEA

more MD5 collisions

://www.cs.colorado.edu/~jrblack/md5toolkit.tar.gz -- Mads Rasmussen LEA - Laboratório de Ensaios e Auditoria (Cryptographic Certification Laboratory) Office: +55 11 4208 3873 Mobile: +55 11 9655 8885 Skype: mads_work http://www.lea.gov.br

Re: quantum chip built

that they cannot store those many qubits COHERENTLY. To store reliably individual qubits is not that difficult, but to prevent entangled systems from interacting with the environment is very, very difficult. Maybe someone else can give more information? -- Mads Rasmussen LEA

Re: faster SHA-1 attacks?

it couldn't get out of the US, now when it isn't considered a weapon anymore it cannot enter the country ;-) -- Mads Rasmussen Security Consultant Open Communications Security +55 11 3345 2525 - The Cryptography Mailing List

webcast of crypto rumpsession this year?

Anyone knows whether there will be webcasts from this years Crypto conference? -- Mads Rasmussen Security Consultant Open Communications Security +55 11 3345 2525 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Two results on SHA-256 in progress

and Christian Rechberger and Vincent Rijmen pp. 145 Still work in progress, these two papers are just appetizers ;-) -- Mads Rasmussen Security Consultant Open Communications Security +55 11 3345 2525 - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

account except for .004 grams of gold. -- Mads Rasmussen Security Consultant Open Communications Security +55 11 3345 2525 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: SHA-1 cracked

Ian G wrote: Stefan Brands just posted on my blog (and I saw reference to this in other blogs, posted anon) saying that it seems that Schneier forgot to mention that the paper has a footnote which says that the attack on full SHA-1 only works if some padding (which SHA-1 requires) is not done. I

Re: Banks Test ID Device for Online Security

Bill Stewart wrote: That's still a serious risk for a bank, since the scammer can use it to log in to the web site and then do a bunch of transactions quickly; it's less vulnerable if the bank insists on a new SecurID hit for every dangerous transaction, but that's too annoying for most customers.

Re: MD5 collisions?

? Any news on Antoine Joux and his attack on SHA-0? how did he create the collision previously announced on sci.crypt? Regards, Mads Rasmussen Open Communications Security - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: SHA-1 rumors

Eric Rescorla wrote: P.S. AFAIK, although Dobbertin was able to find preimages for reduced MD4, there still isn't a complete break in MD4. Correct? Dobbertin published a complete break of MD4 (namely, a breaking algorithm and some collisions found with it) in the Journal of Cryptology. Mads